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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM

The application of some or other form of interrogation to the problems of education goes back at least as
far as Socratic dialectic as seen in the Platonic dialogues.

The use of questions as a part of the educative

process seems to have taken place more or less continuously from at least that far back down to the present
time.

Perhaps the most common use of questioning in

education has been evaluative.

But, as in the case of

Socratic dialectic, some kind of questioning has frequently been seen as an integral part of the learning
process rather than as merely an evaluative tool.

It is

probable that one of the basic assumptions that has
served to justify this use of questioning is the belief
that questioning tends to promote both faster and more
permanent learning by stimulating greater and more vigorous participation of the learner in the process.

This

belief constitutes the basic premise of the present work.
The problem addressed in this work is the formulation of an educational approach to a document in the
philosophy of science that will be largely auto-didactic
in its application.

The fact that some of immediacy of
1

2

an in-person, face to face dialogue are sacrificed by the
use of a written format is counterbalanced by at least
one advantage that the spoken format fails to provide.
This advantage is the availability that the written format can supply.

Thus,

this effort represents an attempt

to combine some of interactive stimulation of dialogue
with the availability of the written format.
The task attempted here, then, is to start with a
document, i. e., a professional paper, in the philosophy
of science and derive from it a set of questions which
will serve as an autodidactic tool that will facilitate
the learning of that document.

The primary problem lies

in the analysis of the document that is required

to

convert all of its significant concepts into questions in
such a manner that the complete set will reflect the
conceptual patterns of the document.
The level of profundity that this effort will attempt to attain is the middle level.

That is, there will

be no attempt to construct the questions in such a way
that they will teach the fundamental concepts that a
student must have become acquainted with before having
begun the study of the document.

Neither will an attempt

be made to teach the student the higher skills that will
enable him to synthesize new concepts by rearranging the
juxtapositions of the elements of the concepts that can
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be learned from the study of this document, to evaluate
these concepts through the use of external criteria, nor
to relate these concepts to external conceptual contexts.
The task attempted here is rather to develop a set of
questions that will enable the student to understand the
concepts as they are expounded within the document itself.
The problem of ordering and categorizing the quest ions logically is addressed to some extent here, but
not that of ordering with reference to didactic considerations.

It is, of course, possible that the logical

order will turn out to be the optimal didactic order.
While the close association that has developed in people's

minds over the years

logic,

linking the concepts of

thinking and learning tends to lead to the

conclusion that this sometimes assumed coincidence is a
fact, the truth is that this cannot be safely taken for
granted.

Moreover,

the undertaking of the empirical

investigations that might serve to establish or refute
this principle is beyond the scope of this work.
One relatively peripheral assumption that has to
some extent guided the form that the results of the
present inquiry have taken is the principle that emphasizes the importance of establishing and strengthening
associations, making connections, between the elements of
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the concepts being studied.

A palpable result of the

application of this principle to the formulation of the
question-answer set that constitutes the concrete product
of this work lies in the fact that the suggested answers
that have been suggested for these questions invariably
include the whole sense of the questions within themselves.

It is the above named principle that justifies

this apparent redundancy.
In sum, what is attempted here can be conceptually
divided into two main categories of tasks:

(1) to ana-

lyze the conceptual structure of a document in the philosophy of science, and (2) to categorize the results of
this analysis in a such a way that the results can be
used to guide the formulation of a group of questions
that somehow manages to express or reflect that structure.

The next chapter will consist of a discussion of

some of the details of the nuts and bolts methodology
that structures the tasks whose aims have just been
stated.

CHAPTER II
THE METHOD
What will be attempted here are three tasks:

(1) to

give a brief account of the document to be analyzed, (2)
to describe briefly the process that led from an analysis
of the document to the final result, and (3)

to explain

the method of relating the final result to the process
that produced it.

The first of these tasks will now be

performed.
The document to be used as the sample test to be
"taught" by the method proposed here is Chapter 5,

"Con-

cepts of Model", of Mario Bunge's work, Method, Model and
Matter.
It is a work in the philosophy of science dealing
with the use of models in science.

The role of models in

science has, over the years, motivated an ongoing controversy in the philosophy of science.
asks, "To what extent

The question that

should models be considered as

part of scientific theories or to what extent should they
even be accorded an integral role in an account of the
web of interrelated processes that constitute the body of
scientific endeavor?", forms one aspect of this controversy.

The problem of defining the limits of the concept
5

6

of "model" forms another.

The document under considera-

tion here addresses itself primarily to the second of
these two problems, dealing with it as indicated in the
following sketch.
The work concerns itself primarily with four basic
concepts:

referent, model object, theoretical model, and

general theory.

(These concepts will be hereafter be

referred to as content-concepts.)

Referents are real

objects, processes or situations that are to be represented as the first step in the process of accounting for
them.

Model objects are qualitive representations of

referents.

They consist of lists of their significant

elements or properties, possibly in conjunction with some
information about their spatial disposition, but they
lack any important quantitative data about the ways that
these elements or properties interrelate.

Theoretical

models are the result of supplying model objects with the
quantitative data that they lack.
consist of series

Theoretical models

of logically interrelated statements

that quantitatively relate the elements and properties of
the model object to each other.
specific theories.

They are also called

General theories are mathematical

statements that may have a wide range of specific applications that can be implemented only indirectly by being
combined with model objects to form theoretical models.
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That they can be tested only in this way points up the
importance of theoretical models and, hence, of model
objects.
The primary polemical thrust of this text relates to
the proposition that model objects (and, by extension,
theoretical models) can be classified as black box, grey
box, translucid or transparent boxes according to whether
they supply none, some, or much information about the
inner workings of their referents.

Black boxes give only

the input and output of the system, while successively
lighter colored boxes connect the input and output by
providing successively greater amounts of information
about the mechanism of the system.

The text,

then,

opposes the rather behavioristic viewpoint that maintains
that the black box is enough.

This viewpoint contradicts

the main philosophical position of the text by implying
that, since no mechanism has to be explained, none exists.

The text, then, reflects the view that a mechanism

must be assumed, and, in cases where scientific knowledge
is sought, an attempt must be made to explain it.

This

ends the implementation of the first of the three specified tasks:

to examine briefly the document to be used

in this work as a sample object to be learned. Now the
second task,

the description of the derivation of the

results from the document will be attempted.
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The approach to the studying of such a document
herein proposed assumes that a

set of questions and

answers can reflect the results both of a logical analysis of a

text and of the method that is employed to

transform that analysis into the set of questions and
answers.

The philosophical implications of this assump-

tion will not be questioned in the present work, since
its use here will be primarily practical.

Neither will

the present task include the actual doing of the analysis.

Rather what will be attempted is merely to provide

a description of the general processes that figured in
the task of the analysis that resulted in the production
of the set of questions and answers.

The first of these

processes is the separation of the task of analysis into
two principal divisions: (1)

the discovery of ways of

categorizing the textual material itself and (2)

the

invention or discovery of ways of categorizing the kinds
of tasks that the resultant questions will represent.
The first of these divisions,
categorizing the textual material,
two subproblems:

(1)

the problem of

is also divided into

the problem of classifying the

specific ideas that are to be found in the text and (2)
the problem of finding more general categories to
implement the classification of the kinds of ways that
the author has chosen to deal with those ideas that are
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specific to the text.
The ideas or constructs that are specific and to a
considerable degree peculiar to the text are those (as
explained above) of referent,

model object,

model and general theory (content-concepts).

theoretical
An examina-

tion of the text shows that every statement or idea
therein can ultimately be traced back to one or more of
these content-concepts.
Accordingly, the analysis proceeded by means of an
minute examination of the text.

The purpose of this

examination is to sift out and list all of the statements,

claims and comments

divide them into subsets

in the text and then to

according to which of the four

concepts predominates in each.

These statements, claims

and comments, then, within the framework of the task
being attempted here, constitute the logical elements of
the text,

elements which had at this point had been

categorized and labelled according to one criterion:
their primary conceptual focus.

The results of this

first categorization are the content-concepts.
After isolating and labeling the logical elements of
the text according to one criterion, it became necessary
to repeat the task using another criterion in order to
implement the second part of the first task:

the cate-

gorization of the means that the author chooses to deal
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with the content-concepts that he has set forth.

This

does not mean that the already obtained categories were
subdivided, but that the complete list of logical elements was repartitioned without regard for their first
division.

This procedure was necessary because the text-

ual examination revealed that the author did not deal
with each given content concept in its own way, inventing
or applying means that are especially appropriate to
each.

Had this been the case, each mean-category could

reasonably have been designated one of a number of subcategories of each content-concept.

What he did do,

rather, was to select from a field of means-categories
the ones to be applied to each content-concept in way
that turned out to be unpredictable solely on the basis
of the identity of the latter. Thus, a set of meanscategories was applied to the raw list of content-concepts leaving each element twice categorized--a member
of two separate categories.

Yet neither of these cate-

gories bore any simply expressed relation to the other.
The foregoing consequently comprised the two stages of
the first of the processes that were performed for the
purpose of deriving a set of questions and answers that
would reflect the logical structure of the text.
The next procedure that was performed for this purpose dealt not directly with the text per se, but with

11

the text only indirectly by means of processes that would
contribute to the formulation of the questions that would
be derived from it.

The first of these processes was the

selection of a series of modes in which to formulate the
proposed questions, to answer questions about whether the
questions would require the user directly to supply an
answer, to choose between a number of given answers or to
come up with an answer by means of deduction. This procedure did not, like the previous ones, result in a new set
of categories to apply to the logical elements (contentconcepts and means-categories) of the text, but in a set
of categories to apply to the proposed questions.
this point neither the elements of the text

At

nor the

author's ways of dealing with them were being categorized.

What was being categorized was the ways that these

things were to be treated in the present work, not in the
document to be analyzed.
The next step in this process was that of developing
a set of categories that would render it possible to
classify the kinds of tasks that the resultant questions
would require performed within the process of obtaining
appropriate answers for them. The issues to be decided
involved decisions regarding another aspect of the nature
of the questions to be generated.

It had to be deter-

mined whether any given question would require a descrip-
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tion, a classification, a comparison, etc ••
When the list of task types had been formulated,
what then remained to be accomplished was the integration
of all of the previous work:

the derivation of a set of

questions and answers based upon the logical elements
(the content-concepts and the means-categories) of the
text and the ways that these were dealt with therein, and
expressed in terms of the modes and task types that would
indicate the kinds of requirements that these questions
would embody.

What has been been described so far, then,

finishes the implementation of the second of the three
tasks:

to describe the process that led from the textual

analysis to the finished product.
the third task:

What remains to do is

to explain how to identify the results

of textual and task analysis for any given element (question and answer set) of the final result.

This will be

attempted now.
Since the purpose of this task is to enable the
reader to identify the main textual and categorical elements that contributed to the formulation of any specified question and answer set comprising the final results
of the present work, the point of departure will be the
identity 1 ine that accompanies each such set.

In order

to implement this task, such a line will be shown here
and then analyzed.

First, the general meaning of each of
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the kinds of indicators that appear in the line will be
described.

And then each of the possible replacements

for each indicator will be described in turn.
from
"Q

chapter

and A 233:

III,

page

eighty-seven

A line

follows:

page 91; line 10; type IV, i, E, d.".

The

first part of this line, 'Q and A 233:', assumes that the
351 questions and answers that comprise the results of
this work are presented in series and numbered serially
from 1 through 351, and indicates that the question and
answer set being identified holds the 233rd position in
that series.

Chapter III (pp. 31-72) contains the ques-

tion and answer sets numbered 1 through 149.

Chapter IV

(pp. 73-99) contains the question and answer sets numbered

150

contains

through 278.

And Chapter V (pp.

the question and answer

sets

100-127)

numbered

279

through 351.
The next member of the identity line to appear,
'page 91 ,', indicates that the textual material used in
the formulation of this question and answer set can be
found on page 91 of Bunge' s work.

The chapter from that

work that constitutes the basis of the present work can
be found in the appendix.
indicator,

'page 91 ;',

It should be noted that the

refers to page 91 of Bunge's work,

not of either the main body nor the appendix of the
present work.
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After the page number indicator,

'page 91;', next

appears the line indicator, 'line 10;', whose function
it, obviously enough, is to indicate the line on page 91
in Bunge's work in which can be found the textual material from which this particular question and answer set
was derived.

This is all pretty straightforward except

for one minor point.

The line named by the line indica-

tor is not necessarily the only line upon which this
material appears.

It can be better described as approxi-

mately the first line upon which the immediately related
material appears since this material may occupy several
lines or even paragraphs, and since the place where such
material begins is not always clear.
tion here is

The difficult ques-

'At what point is the material closely

enough related to the conceptual focus of the question
and answer set to merit inclusion in the reference?
However,

it need not be inferred from the above that the

situation is always or even usually that bad.

Most of

the time the extent of the relevant reference is clear,
and even when its clarity is not optimal, it does not dip
below an acceptable level.

CHAPTER III
TASK TYPES
Next after the line indicator, and comprising the
balance of the line, is seen the type indicator "type IV,
i, E, d.," whose four parameters will be explained below.
The first of these, designated by Roman numeral IV in the
sample, is designated by Roman numerals I through VIII in
the complete question and answer set.

The function of

these Roman numerals is to indicate the nature of the
task that each question requires of the student who is to
answer it.

The questions are grouped together under each

task designation in such a way that task I comprises
questions and answers 1-8; task II comprises questions
and answers 9-149; task III comprises questions and answers 150-155;
156-254;

task IV comprises questions and answers

task V comprises questions and answers 255-258;

task VI comprises questions and answers 259-278;

task

VII comprises questions and answers 279-347 and task VIII
comprises questions and answers 348-351.
In the process of describing these tasks, the expression, "semi-schematic form" will be used.

The ex-

pression is meant to denote the result of an attempt to
simplify and formalize questions and answers to some
15

16

degree in order to provide a glimpse of their logical
structure.

No pretense is made that these results will

have been formalized

sufficiently to make it possible to

translate them into rigorous symbolic form.

They are

meant only as aids in understanding the various tasks and
in revealing the similarities and differences among them.
Task I is centered on the concept of definition.
Questions of this set take the semi-schematic form "What
is an X?" or the equivalent.

An X in this case is some

central concept such as referent or model object.

The

skeletal form then fills out to "What is a referent?" or
"What is a model object?"

The answer can be expected to

assume a semi-schematic form equivalent to "An X is a Y
that possesses the set of attributes Z.

The term "Y"

represents a wider class of objects or concepts than does
"X," and "Z" represents a set of attributes that distinguishes an X from other elements of Y.

By making appro-

priate substitutions, something on the order of "A theoretical model is a hypothetico-deductive system concerning
a model object." is obtained.

"Concerning a model ob-

ject" does not follow the prototypical adjectival formula
for attribution.

Nevertheless,

to say that a hypotheti-

co-deduct i ve system concerns a model object does, in a
wider but still legitimate sense, express attribution.
Thus, task I requests a definition which, in these ques-
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tions, implies placement in a wider class plus sufficient
attribution to enable the defined concept to be differentiated from the other elements of the wider class.
This ends the explanation of task I; an explanation of
task II follows.
The primary thrust of task II is specification.
Questions of this group require the supplying of some
specific bit of information, the naming perhaps of an
object, relation, principle, concept, etc.

The semi-

schematic form of the typical question of this group is
"What object or concept that is an element of set Y
fulfills

the set of conditions,

Z?"

To put it in a

slightly different form, questions of type II may be seen
as requests to "Supply or name the object or concept,
that is a (member of wider class) Y, and that (set of
attributes or conditions) Z

can be predicated of it."

A

set of attributes or conditions plus a genus is supplied,
while a species or element of a species is asked for.
For example, "What is the object, mechanism or process
that a model object represents?"

In this case, "object,

mechanism or process" as a general class is Y.

The

particular object, mechanism or process asked for is X.
And the attribute or predicate of being represented by a
model object is Z.

An appropriate answer to a question

of this kind, in effect, simply supplies the species or
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member of the species that had been asked for by the
question.

Such answer would typically take the semi-

schematic form, "An object or concept that is a member of
class Y of which Z is predicated is X (or,

an X)."

A

fleshed out example comes out, "The object, mechanism, or
process that a model object represents is its referent."
where "its referent" is

X.

This finishes the explana-

tion of task II; that of task III follows.
Task III focuses

on description or attribution.

Questions of this type generally require one or the other
of these two kinds of responses:

(1)

the attribution of

a set of properties or characteristics that adequately
describe an object or concept within a given context, or
( 2) the "unpacking," elaboration,

or making explicit of

a set of attributes that reside implicitly within some
briefer,

more cryptic description of a given concept.

Semi-schematic forms that can represent these kinds of
questions are (1) What set of attributes, Z, adequately
describe an X of which set of attributes Y is predicated?
or,

(2) What (wider or more detailed) set of attributes Z

are implied by a (narrower or more compact) set of attributes, Z, which is predicated of object or concept, X? It
can be seen that, in spite of

certain superficial dif-

ferences, there exists a kind of rough equivalence between these two forms of the kinds of questions that

19

implement task III.

The actual phrasing of these ques-

tions does not of ten reveal their semi-schematic form in
any obvious way.

For example, either of them is capable

of generating the question,
schematic model object?"

"What is a

more or less

Here, "model object" represents

the object or concept, X, while "more or less schematic"
represents the set of attributes, Y,
of X.

z,

which is predicated

then, represents the set of attributes which

the question is supposed to evoke in order to "unpack" Y.
The answer to this kind of question turns out to be
appropriately complementary to the question.

It merely

supplies the set of attributes of the given object or
concept that,

implicit in the given predicate,

less serve to flesh it out.

nonethe-

The semi-schematic form

comes out "Set of attributes, Y, which is predicated of X
implies (more detailed) set of attributes,

z."

This,

in

response to the example question, filled out to "A more
or less schematic model object is a model object that in
some way represents its referent but does it rather
crudely--leaving out many significant aspects of the
referent."
Classification or categorization is the focal point
of task IV.

The object here is to place some object,

process, or concept in some wider category, e.g., some
particular in its species or some species in its genus.

20
The differentiation of the object, process, or concept
from from other similar entities belonging to the same
wider category is incidental at best.
called for,

If it is at all

it is unessential to the performance of task.

If this were not so, this task would be identical to task
I,

i.e.,

Although it is superficially simi-

def ini ti on.

lar to task I--"What is a ••• ?" being the apparent form-it differs from that task in that the request for differentia occurs, if at all,

only incidentally.

In semi-

schernatic form, the questions that implement this task
comes out thus:

"What is the smallest relevant class Y

to which an X belongs?" where an X is the object or
concept for which classification is asked for.

Substi-

tuting actual concepts for X and Y, produces, "What is
the smallest relevant class to which a
longs?"

In actual practice, this comes out, "What is a

mass cell?"
task IV,

mass cell be-

The answer to a question that implements

turns out considerably more straightforward than

the question.

'rhe semi-schematic form shows up as, "An X

is a Y," or "An X belongs to class Y."

The meanings of X

and Y, of course, remain the same as for the questions.
The substitution of these meanings gives "A mass cell is
an example of a model object."
substituted for X,

Here "A mass cell" is

while "An example of a model object"

is substituted for Y.

The transparency of the equiva-
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lence of the alternate form "A mass cell belongs to the
class of examples of a model object," is not detracted
from by its awkwardness.

This ends the explanation of

task IV, and now begins that of task V.
Task V involves the general concept of comparison;
this includes that of contrast.

Questions of this type

may ask for any of three kinds of response.

They may ask

for a set of attributes that two concepts or objects
possess in common, for a set of attributes that distinguish two concepts or objects, or for a set of attributes
that justify some value judgement that distinguishes
between two concepts or objects.
of request

share are

(1)

that

What these three kinds
they each involve the

furnishing of set of attributes and (2) that in each
case, the required set of attributes serves to distinguish between two concepts or objects.
Type V questions, it has been seen, can be divided
into three groups.

Each of these can be represented by

its own semi-schematic form.

The first of these, dealing

with similarities is "What set of attributes Z do concepts or objects X and Y possess in common?"
involving differences is,

The second,

"What sets of attributes V and

W serve to distinguish between concepts or objects X and
Y?"

And the third one, also having to do with differ-

ences is "What set of attributes Z justifies value judge-
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ment V by distinguishing between concepts or objects X
?"
an d Y ·

When the proper substitutions are made,

the

first example produces, "What set of attributes do semantic models and metascientif ic models possess in common?,"
or more idiomatically, "In what ways are semantic models
and metascientif ic models similar?"

The second example

gives, "What set or sets of attributes distinguish between theoretical models and semantical models?," in a
more idiomatic form,

"What is the difference between

theoretical models and semantical models?"

And the third

example come out, "What set or sets of attributes justify
the preference for the theoretical model over the model
object?," idiomatically, "In what way is a theoretical
model far richer than the bare model object?"
The answer to each of

these kinds

of

questions

involves the supplying of the correct set of attributes,
in the first case, similarities, in the second, differences,

and

in the third,

differences that

preferential value judgement.

justify a

In the first case,

substitutions give the semi-schematic form,

the

"The set of

attributes Z which concepts X and Y have in common is set
A consisting of elements (attributes) a, b, c, d and e. 11
Semi-idiomatically, this comes out, "The set of attributes that semantic models and metascientif ic models have
in common consists of the possession of (a) a set of
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abstract statements,

(b) a set of designation rules,

(c)

a set of semantic assumptions, (d) a set of properties
linking those designation rules and semantic assumptions
in such a way as to provide the abstract statements with
factual content, and (e) a set of properties that make it
possible for that factual content to be assigned truth
values."

In completely idiomatic form (for this sort of

thing) this comes out, "Semantic models and metascientific models are similar to the extent that they both
contain designation rules and semantic assumptions that
provide the abstract statements with factual content that
can be assigned truth values."
The second example, in a similar manner, gives semischernatically,

"The sets of attributes V and

W that

distinguish concept Y from concept X are the sets of
attributes A and B." Semi-idiomatically this yields "The
sets of attributes that distinguishes between theoretical
models and semantical models consists of the following:
for theoretical models, the attribute of consisting of
statements concerning some aspect of reality and for
semantical models,

the attribute of serving to interpret

abstract theories."
obtained,

In a more idiomatic form, this is

"The difference between theoretical models and

semantical models is that while theoretical models are
sets of statements concerning some aspect of reality,
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semantical models are interpretations of abstract
'
II
theories.

The third kind of answer returns the semi-schematic
example,

"The set of attributes Z that distinguishes

between concepts X and Y thereby justifying preferential
value judgement V is set A." Semi-idiomatically, as a
result of appropriate substitutions, it becomes, "The set
of attributes that distinguishes between the theoretical
model and the model object, thereby justifying a preferential value judgement in favor of the theoretical model,
is the theoretical model's capacity to link together the
list of traits that constitutes the model object."

In

final form, this shows up as, "A theoretical model is far
richer than the bare model object in that it links together mathematically the mere list of traits that constitutes the bare model object."

These examples show

that while the questions and answers that serve to implement task V display some differences of form, their basic
unity is manifested by their common involvement with the
closely related concepts of comparison and contrast.

It

is time now to turn from the consideration of task V to
that of task VI.
The questions that serve to implement task VI ask
for an interpretation or the meaning of an expression
which may be a word, a phrase, or a sentence.

In semi-
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symbolic form, such a question can be expressed, "What
aoes

(expression)

X mean?" or equivalently,

"What is

meant by (expression) X?," or "What does it mean to say
(expression)

X?."

In spite of

the fact

that several

variants are possible, in general, the foregoing are also
the virtual idiomatic forms of these questions.
actual

examples

are,

"What

does

'The

same

A few
holds,

a fortiori for the diagram' mean?," or "What does it mean
to say that a referent is not abstract?"
The answers to these questions typically perform the
function of supplying the interpretation or meaning that
the questions ask for.

Their semi-symbolic forms,

pre-

dictably, are usually, "(Expression) X means (interpretation or meaning) Y," "By (expression) X,

(interpretation

or meaning) Y is meant," or "To say (expression) X means
(interpretation or meaning) Y."

The foregoing are also

usually the idiomatic forms, although the latter sometimes comes out, "To say (expression) X is to say (expression or statements giving the interpretation or meaning for X) Y."

The actual examples that correspond to

the above questions are, "The same holds, a fortiori, for
the diagram" means that the diagram, in some respects, a
prototypical case of metaphor, can be expected to display
its properties par excellence.

In this case, the proper-

ty in question is that of being misleading when used as
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the characterization of a model object,"

and "To say

that a referent is not abstract, is to say that it is a
factual referent.

This means that it (purportedly) re-

presents some concrete (real) thing or event.
empirical content."

Thus terminates the

It has

explanation of

task VI and now begins that of task VII.
Task VII deals with the concept of explanation.

As

in the case of task II, task VII is something of a catchall.

There are so many kinds of explanation that an

attempt to account for them all would not prove useful in
the present context.

Suffice it to say that, while an

explanation can subsume any of the foregoing tasks, it
must in some way go a

bit farther than they do.

An

explanation is somewhat more comprehensive than a definition, an identification, a specification,
etc.

a description,

An explanation frequently gives reasons, frequently

accounts for some state of affairs.

An explanation is

often called for by means of a why-question or a howquestion.

Questions meant to evoke explanations can be

expressed semi-symbolically thus,

"What (set of reasons)

Y accounts for (state-of-affairs) X?," or "What (set of
statements)
(process)

Y indicates the manner or mode in which

Y occurs?" In a slightly more idiomatic form,

"Why is X so?" or "How does X occur?"

Here are the true

to life examples, "Why might the logical strength of a
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theory be expected to turn out to be inversely related to
its ability to solve particular theoretical problems and
to empirical testability of that theory." and "How can it
be known that a linear model of a gas is a theoretical
model?"
The answers to questions of this kind, it follows,
simply provide the reasons or statements requested.

The

semi-symbolic for the answers that correspond to the
above questions are, "The set of reasons that accounts
for (the state-of-affairs) X is Y," or "The set of statements that indicate the manner or mode in which (process)
X occurs is Y."

The corresponding examples from list of

questions and answers are, "The logical strength of a
theory might be expected to turn out to be inversely
related to its ability to solve particular theoretical
problems and to the empirical testability of that theory
because logical strength is gained only at the expense of
empirical content,

whereas particular theoretical prob-

lern s are essentially about empirical content." and "It
can be known that a linear model of a gas is a theoretical model because it has been stated that a linear
model of a gas can mimic the condensation process.
order to mimic the condensation process,

In

the model must

specify the mathematical dimensions of the changes or
movement that takes place.

And if a model can specify
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the mathematical dimensions of the changes or movement
that takes place, it must be a theoretical model."
this point,

At

the discussion of task VII ends and that of

task VIII starts.
The questions that implement task VIII ask for some
kind of evaluation, that is, they ask for some kind of
judgement or assignment of value.

Although this assign-

ment of value is the primary component of an appropriate
response to this question, it frequently happens that
some kind of explanation of that judgement seems in
order.

It is the fact that this asked for explanation is

secondary to the evaluation that makes it impossible to
classify these questions as belonging to task VII and
make necessary to categorize them,
to class VIII.

Generally,

rather,

as belonging

the idiomatic expression of a

questions of this type tends to disguise rather than to
reveal the question's inner structure.

Hence,

the idio-

matic expression does not prove readily deducible from
its semi-symbolic form.
the case.

Nor, of course, is the converse

The following example from the questions and

answers provides a case in point.

Where V is some value,

C is a set of (possibly problematic) conditions, and X is
given concept (expressed as a set of statements), the
semi-symbolic form is this,

"What value of V can be

appropriately applied to X under C?"

Comparison with the
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idiomatic version shows that the derivation is not imme-

diately obvious.

"In section 1 O, it is stated that (1)

semantical models are interpretations of formal

systems

that make all statements of the system true, (2) theoretical models (since their content is empirical) are never
more than partially true so they cannot be semantical
models,

( 3) the three empirical model objects described

on page 112 are not always true,

nonetheless (4) they

constitute (or produce) semantical models.

How is this

possible?"

In this example, (1 ), (2), and (4) constitute

concept X,

(3) constitutes condition

asked for in a straightforward manner.

c,

but V is not

The formulation

of the nuclear question, "How is this possible?" represents something of a trick since it falsely assumes that
X is possible under C, ostensibly asking only the manner
of that possibility.

The student is then required to

reject the question as formulated, substitute another,
"Is it in fact possible?," and answer the substituted
one.

Although this formulation appears logically messy,

its use may be justifiable on didactic grounds.

Asking

the student to go beyond the rather cut and dried mechanical answering of a question to uncover a trick may tend
to stimulate him to think more deeply about some of the
issues that are examined in the paper and thus to encourage the development of a greater degree of intellectual
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penetration into their implications and subtleties.
The answers to these questions frequently conform
reasonably well to the expectations raised by those questions, that is, they conform with respect to their inner
structures as represented by their semi-symbolic forms.
The answer to the above example gives this:

"The value

of v that can be appropriately applied to X under C is
A."

Although the idiomatic answer from the question set

does not reveal this conformity in a markedly obviously
way, it nevertheless can be demonstrated that it does in
fact exist.

First,

the idiomatic version:

"This is not

possible, it constitutes an unexplained contradiction.
If semantical models are interpretations of formal systems that make all statements of the system true (1 ), and
theoretical, hence empirical, models are never more than
partially true (2),

then it is manifestly impossible for

them to constitute semantical models.

The value of V,

namely A, in this case, is represented by sentence, "This
is not possible, it constitutes an unexplained contradiction."

After the implicit rejection of the ostensible

question,

"How is this possible?," the answer to the

"real" question, "Is it possible?" is given.
constitutes,

in effect,

This answer

a negative evaluation of the

claim X that "they [semantical models] constitute (or
produce) semantical models."

This negation is then spec-
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ified as operative under the conditions C, "If semantical

models are interpretations of formal systems that make
all statements of the system true (1 ), and theoretical,
hence empirical, models are never more than partially
true (2),"

The conclusion of the argument,

manifestly impossible for

them

constitute semantical models,"

"then it is

[theoretical models]

to

is no more than a slight-

ly more elaborate reiteration of the opening negative
evaluation,

"This is not possible,

unexplained contradiction."

it constitutes an

Thus, it can be seen that

the idiomatic version does, although not obviously,

con-

form to the semi-symbolic representation of an appropriate response to the question.

This, then, by conclud-

ing the exposition of task type VIII,

concludes the

explanation of the series of task types, and leads to the
consideration of the modes.
next chapter.

This will be taken up in the

CHAPTER IV
MODES
The three modes that are made use of in the classification of the question set are represented by the lower
case Roman numerals, i, ii, and iii.
the indicative mode,

The first of these,

simply indicates that the specific

question being classified asks for the straightforward
supplying of an answer.
shows up as a brief,

Its gross semi-symbolic form

"What is X?"

X, then, will turn

out to be a definition, a classification, an evaluation
or so on according the specified task type.
semi-symbolic form is gross,

Since this

it lacks sufficient detail

to distinguish one task type to which it may be applied
from another.

Thus, if this form is applied to task IV,

X would represent a classification of the pertinent concept.

If it is applied to task V, a comparison of two

given concepts.

Or if to task VII, an explanation of the

appropriate concept.

For example, in the case of this

task II idiomatic realization of the above semi-symbolic
form, "What is the relation between a sketch of an animal
population and the animal population itself," X turns out
to be a relation to be specified between two given con32
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cepts.

In the case of this task VI realization of the

same semi-symbolic form, "How can the relation between
hypothetical mechanisms and model objects be stated in
terms of subsets and supersets?," X is now a kind of
interpretation,

elaboration,

or statement of the "mean-

ing" of the given concept, in this case, a particular
relation.
The answers to questions in the indicative mode
merely involve, as might be expected, the production of
the required value of X:

a definition, a description, or

an explanation according to the task type being irnplemented.

The gross semi-symbolic form accordingly takes

shape as, "X is A," where X is the means of expressing
the required concept or statement in the question, while
A performs the analogous function in the answer.

The

idiomatic actualization of the answer to the first of the
above example-questions comes out, "The relation between
a sketch of an animal population and the animal population itself is the relation that holds between a model
object and its referent:

the modeling relation."

Here,

"the relation between a sketch of an animal population
and the animal population itself" is X while "the relation that holds between a model object and its referent:
the modeling relation." is A.

The idiomatic answer to

the second of the example-questions is "The relation
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between hypothetical mechanisms and model objects can be
stated in terms of subsets and supersets by saying that
the set of hypothetical mechanisms forms a subset of the
set of model objects, which is equivalent to saying that
the set of model objects forms a superset of the set of
hypothetical mechanisms.

Here X is "The relation between

hypothetical mechanisms and

model

obj ects ••• in terms of

subsets and supersets," while A is "the set of hypothetical mechanisms forms a subset of the set of model objects,

which is equivalent to saying that the set of

model objects forms a superset of the set of hypothetical
mechanisms."

This cone 1 udes the explanation of mode i,

upon which will follow that of mode ii.
Mode ii might be described as a sort of binary mode.
It calls for an affirmation or denial,

an assertion that

some statement or claim is either true or false.

The

answerer is asked to choose between two possibilities,
one of which is assumed at the outset to be correct while
the other is taken to be incorrect.

As in the case of

mode i, this mode may be used to implement any of the
tasks.

The difference between these two modes does not

involve a difference between the kinds of tasks to be
implemented,

but rather a difference between the manner

of evoking the desired implementation.

Mode ii, it turns

out, offers considerable more in the way of restrictions
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or guidance with respect to the kind of answer expected
than does mode i.
Again,

the semi-symbolic examples to be considered

here will reveal only the gross structure of mode ii
while obliterating the details of the various tasks.
Basically equivalent but superficially variant forms are,
"Is situation X the case or is it not?" and "Which is the
case, situation X or situation Y?"

Both offer examples

of the disjunctive form which implies a background in
which the universe with respect to the problem being
considered is divided into two mutually exclusive but
conjunctively exhaustive possible states of affairs.

The

possibility of the existence of a third state of affairs
in which the question has been misapplied has been implicitly rejected ipso-facto by the use of this form.
Normally,
faith,

with a question of this type asked in good

it can reasonably be expected that this

division

of the universe of discourse fairly represents the situation being discussed.

Nevertheless, the possibility that

didactic strategy might suggest the employment of devious
methods (as in the case of task VIII) cannot be entirely
ruled out.
ples,

To recognize the equivalence the above exam-

it need only be considered that the negation or

falsity of situation (represented by a statement) X in
the former is equivalent to the affirmation or truth of
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situation Y in the latter because of the mutual exhaustiveness implicitly assumed in both cases.
The former example converted to idiomatic form
gives, "Does the set of entities: 'the set of bodies,'
'the temperature,' 'the quantity of heat per unit mass,'
and 'the specific heat at constant volume' constitute a
semantical model?"

Here the constitution of a semantical

model by the set of entities:

the set of bodies,

the

temperature, the quantity of heat per unit mass, and the
specific heat at constant volume is the current value of

x,

while the failure of said constitution is the value of

not-X (the denial or falsity of X).

The conversion of

the second example to idiomatic form results in, "Is the
Rashevsky citation meant to inform the reader about how
to go about performing a scientific investigation, or
what?"

Here, the present value of X is the truth of the

statement that the Rashevsky citation is in fact meant to
inform the reader about how to go about performing a
scientific investigation,

while the "or what?" represent

the value of its denial.

Furthermore, the addition of

the phrase "or what?" invites the inclusion of an alternate definition of the situation in case that the response denies the truth of X.

Certainly this example

constitutes something of a variant of the cited semiforrnal case where both alternatives are explicit as
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opposed to the above idiomatic version in which one is
implicit.

Nonetheless,

the general principle,

although

perhaps not transparent, is adequately illustrated by
these examples.
The relation of the semi-symbolic forms of the answers of mode ii questions to those of the questions
themselves interjects few surprises.

In the first case,

what is asked for is a choice between the affirmation or
the denial of the truth of a statement outlining a proposed situation.
that.

What the answer gives is essentially

The semi-symbolic representation gives either, "X

is the case (is true)" or "X is not the case (is false)."
In the latter case, non-logical (didactic) considerations
may prompt the expectation that the answer will contain
some sort of supplementary explanation or alternative
suggestion,

but such an inclusion would constitute a

secondary adjunct to the primary selection of choices.
In the case of the semi-symbolic form of an answer to the
second example, the inclusion of a statement delineating
an alternate state of affairs along with a
explanation is explicitly called for.

possible

The semi-symbolic

form that reveals the skeletal structure of this type of
question is,

either "X is the case and Y is not the

case," "Y is the case and X is not the case."

Whether or

not Y is stated explicitly as a possibility or merely
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explicitly called for without being named can be of
paramount importance for certain purposes, but not for
those of the present work.
The idiomatic versions of these examples conform
predictably to the expectations raised by the sernisymbolic representations of their underlying structures.
The first gives, "No.
bodies,'

The set of entities 'the set of

'the temperature,'

'the quantity of heat per

unit mass,' and 'the specific heat at constant volume'
does not constitute a semantical model."

Here, the an-

swer is little more than a flat denial that the proposed
situation does in fact obtain.

The second example gives

this possible realization of its semi-symbolic form: "The
Rashevsky citation is not meant to inform the reader how
to go about the performance of a scientific investigation, but to describe some of the essentials of scientific investigation as necessarily performed by practicing
scientists."

Here X, i. e., the truth of the statement

that the Rashevsky citation is not meant to inform the
reader how to go about the performance of a scientific
investigation, is rejected while an alternative, Y, i.
e., the statement that the Rashevsky citation is meant to
describe some of the essentials of scientific investigation as necessarily performed by practicing scientists"
is proposed and certified as true.

The nature of the
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task that a question is meant to evoke, it can be seen,
is a matter of indifference to the mode.

Whether the

given task involves a definition, a comparison or

an

explanation has little bearing per se on the selection of
the mode that is to evoke it.

Mode ii questions simply

offer the choice between the acceptance or rejection of a
given definition, comparison or explanation, or else they
ask for choice between alternate definitions, comparisons, or explanations.

The discussion now turns from the

consideration of mode ii questions to the contemplation
of those of mode iii.
Mode iii questions involve deduction or inference.
They ask the answerer to go beyond the explicitly stated
facts to attempt the discovery of the implicit.

While

the structural details of these questions vary considerably,

the overall structure merely serves as a framework

for supplying premises and the asking for a conclusion.
The semi-symbolic form that shows this structure amounts
to, "What relevant statement Y can be deduced from set of
premises X?"

The main difference between mode iii ques-

tions and those of modes i and ii is that the answer
asked for does not appear in the demonstration document
in explicit form at all;
inference.

it can be obtained only by

One idiomatic realization of this form pro-

duces, "If one of the aims of research were to be in-
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stantaneously and universally realized, what would be the
effect on all black boxes?"

It can be noticed that this

example turns out doubly obscure.

Not only does it call

for the production of an inference, but only a hint is
given as to the exact content of one of the premises.
The identity the "aim of research" being talked about in
this question is not given;

it is only by a perusal of

the demonstration document at the specified location that
the context will supply the means of ascertaining this
information.

The relation between this, the dominant

"aim of research" dealt with in the document both as a
whole and at the specified location, and the expected
answer, a projected result of said "aim," is so close it
would have been difficult if not impossible to ask the
question without virtually revealing the answer.

The set

of premises X, then, includes both the unstated premise
that identifies the relevant "aim of research," and the
explicit premise, "one of the aims of research 'is' (were
to be) instantaneously and universally realized."

The

expected conclusion Y is a statement that identifies,
"the effect on all black boxes," consistently with the
content of the set of premises X.
The answer to this kind of question follows
expected formula,

the

consisting essentially of nothing more

than the revelation of the conclusion asked for by the
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question.

The semi-symbolic form in point, "A relevant

conclusion Y that can be drawn statement X is A."

A,

here, is the specific present case value of the generic
conclusion Y.

The idiomatic version comes out, "If one

of the aims of research were to be instantaneously and
universally realized,

all black boxes would be converted

into built-up models.

Since one of the aims of research

is to throw further light into every box, the accomplishment of this aim would change all black boxes into builtup models or, at least, into grey boxes."

"One of the

aims of research is to throw further light into every
box," makes specific the unstated premise to complete set
X, while, "the accomplishment of this aim would change
all black boxes into built-up models or, at least, into
gray boxes," constitutes the asked for conclusion.

This

ends the discussion of mode iii questions in particular
and of question-modes in general.

Next to be considered

are twenty "content-types" that designate the conceptual
categories that the author of the demonstration document
has employed in dealing with his subject matter as an
integral component of the process of exposition.
will be considered in the following chapter.

These

CHAPTER V
CONTENT TYPES

The "content-types" are not, as in the cases of the
task-types or the modes, to be found solely in the questions; their primary source is the demonstration document
itself.

It is from there that they find their way into

the questions.

In general, it is to be understood that

underlying every question can be found a particular kind
of content-type called here "concept-type."

In the dis-

cussion of the demonstration document these four conceptt y p es have been named,

"referent," "model object,"

"theoret ica 1 mode 1," and "genera 1 theory."

Al though at

least one of these concept-types can always be found in
the background of any of the questions, this may or may
not

be

true of

the foreground.

And what

the term

"content-type" designates is what is in the foreground.
It does happen, however, that sometimes one or more
of the concept-types is found in the foreground, and when
this happens, an "A" appears in the classification line
of the question wherein this occurs.

This indicates that

one or more of the concept-types is to be found at the
conceptual focal point of the question in an explicit,
rather than in a merely implicit form.
42

Whether or not
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one or another of the specific content-types is to be
encountered there is only remotely material to the form,
semi-symbolic or otherwise, of the questions and answers.
Thus no attempt will be made to associate given contenttypes with specific semi-symbolic forms or,

for that

matter, with specific modes or task-types.

At least

theoretically, and for the most part in practice, any
content-type might be matched with any mode or task-type.
Furthermore, any number of content-types might theoretically show up at the focal point of any given question,
though the practical limit is perhaps about four or five.
An example of

content-type A in

which

the specific

concept-type is referent is, "What is a referent?"

And

the answer comes out, "A referent (of a particular model
object) is the object, process or bit of reality that is
represented by that model object."

Mutatis mutandis, for

the model object is obtained, "What is a model object?"
along with its corresponding answer, "A model object is a
schematic representation of an object or process, that
is, a schematic conceptual representation of a thing or
of a situation assumed to be actual or possible."

Analo-

gous methods would, of course, give analogous results for
the two remaining concept-types.

Both of these examples

obtained from task I, mode i questions, but content-type
A question and answers may be encountered in association
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with many combinations of tasks and modes.
confirmation of this fact,

Here, for

is an example of concept-type

A combined in a question with task VIII, mode ii:

"Are

theoretical models necessarily true?" with -its answer,
"No.

Theoretical models are not necessarily true; they

may be either true or false."
"What is a general theory" constitutes an example of
a content-type A question in combination with mode iii.
It s

a n s we r

i s

"A

g_ e !:!.§.E. a.!.

t he or y

i s

a

t heor y

(a

hypothetico-deductive system) that has a particularly
wide range of application by virtue of the fact that it
contains only high level abstractions, which is to say
that it has no specific empirical content."

This is a

mode iii question not by virtue of any attribute or
attributes of the question itself, but because the lack
of an explicit definition of the term "theoretical model"
in the demonstration document.

The preceding example is

particularly apt in that it serves the purpose of rounding out this exposition of content-type A in combination
with both the remaining mode, mode iii, and the remaining
concept-type, the general theory, before turning to the
consideration of content-type B.
Content-type B questions tend to revolve around the
concept of description.

They generally involve a proper-

ty, attribute, characteristic, or something of that sort.
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whether they in some way identify, specify, describe,
classify, compare, interpret, explain, or evaluate the
involved attribute or attributes depends upon their tasktype.

It should be noted that, in accordance with al-

ready given description of the relation between tasktypes and content-types,

one task-type

may be found

paired with several content-types, but not vice-versa.
An example of a content-type B question:

"What feature

of crude (simple) models frequently renders them more
instructive that more complicated models?"
responding answer:

And the cor-

"The feature of crude (simple) models

that frequently renders them more instructive than more
complicated models is the exactness or precision of the
solutions that they provide."

Here, it is obvious that

the term, "feature," is one "of that sort" that fits in
with attribute, etc.

Now, the discussion turns from the

consideration of content-type B to that of
type

content-

c.
Content-type C questions deal with alternate kinds,

sorts,

types or varieties of concepts.

It happens so

frequently that the particular entity to be varied turns
out to be one of the four basic concept-types that it may
be assumed that content-type C questions,

as well as

questions of any other content-type, at least implicitly
subsume the consideration of at least one of the four
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basic concept-types.

This means that virtually every

question may be considered to be a
content-type A question.

sort of "soft"

Since this "soft" attribute of

the questions is ubiquitous, there is no distinction to
be made with respect to it.

Consequently, the content-

type labels that appear in the identification lines of
the questions do not contain any indication that this
attribute exists. It is only when one of the concepttypes appears explicitly as a central focal point of the
question that the question is labeled content-type A;

in

which case it is not a "soft" Content-type A that is
under consideration, but a "hard" one.

The distinction

between "soft" and "hard" A's can be illustrated by means
of the following examples:

The question,

"What is a

model called if it has an input and an output along with
internal variables, but no explanatory mechanism?" and
the corresponding answer,

"A model that has an input and

an output along with internal variables but no explanatory mechanism is called a grey box," provide an example
of a content-type C question-answer that is an implicit
or

soft

content-type A question-answer.

As

a

soft

content-type A question-answer, its only content-type
label

is

"C."

Whereas

the question,

"What

are

non-

realistic abstract situations?" along with its answer,
"Non-realistic abstract situations are,

in effect,

model
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objects in which only certain significant aspects of the
referent are modeled.

All other aspects of the referent

are ignored," provide an example of a content-type C
question-answer set that is also an explicit or hard
content-type A question-answer set.

The first example

serves as an example of a content-type C question-answer
set because a grey box is a variety of a concept.

It is

an example of an implicit or soft content-type A because
the grey box exemplifies a kind of model object or theoretical model, both of which fit into the content-type
category.

The second example provides an example of a

content-type C question-answer set that is also an explicit or hard content-type A because the fact that "nonrealistic abstract situations" represent a variety of
model object looms larger and more central here than does
the analogous fact in the first example.

The foregoing,

it is hoped, provides an adequate view of the meaning of
"content-type C" and the focus of attention can now turn
to the consideration of content-type D.
Content-type D questions have to do with relations
or connections of some kind or other.

Again, the identi-

ty of the task-type will determine whether the particular
relation or connection under consideration is to be classified,

compared, or explained, etc.

The discovery that

the relations dealt with by means of content-type D ques-
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tions tend most frequently to link one concept-type with
another is beyond a doubt minor.
tion,

For example, the ques-

"What is the relation between a continuum endowed

with certain properties, such as compressibility and
viscosity, and a fluid?"

and its concomitant answer,

"The re la ti on between a continuum endowed with certain
properties, such as compressibility and viscosity and
fluid is the relation that holds between a model object
and its referent:

the modeling relation," relate the

concept-types, model object and referent. The relation
between these two concept-types, model object and referent, occur in the present document more frequently than
any others.

As another example,

take the question,

"How

are the sun (along with its optical and gravitational
manifestations) and a rotating ellipsoid or a mass point
related to each other?" Look at it together with its
attending answer, "The sun (along with its optical and
gravitational manifestations) and a rotating ellipsoid or
a mass point are related to each other in the following
way.

The sun (along with its optical and gravitational

manifestations) is an example of a referent for which a
rotating ellipsoid or a mass point is an example of a
model.

Conversely, a rotating ellipsoid or a mass point

is an example of a model for which the sun (along with
its optical and gravitational manifestations) is an exam-
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ple of a referent," These provide a case in point.
in the preceding cases,

While

both elements of the relation in

question proved to be concept-types, it sometimes happens
that one or the other of the elements turns out to be
something other than a concept-type.
ple:

Witness the exam-

"How can the relation between hypothetical mechan-

isms and model objects be stated in terms of subsets and
supersets?" with its corresponding answer,

"The relation

between hypothetical mechanisms and model objects can be
stated in terms of subsets and supersets by saying that
the set of hypothetical mechanisms forms a subset of the
set of model objects, which is equivalent to saying that
the set of model objects forms a superset of the set of
hypothetical
of

the

mechanisms."

Al though one of the elements

relation being discussed

(model object)

is a

concept-type, the other, while closely related, is not.
The other element of this relation,

although not

in

itself a concept-type, nevertheless has been defined as a
set of them.

It constitutes in fact a set, although not

the set of model objects.

Here the discussion of

content-type D is concluded and that of content-type E is
begun.
Concept-type E questions
instances.

relate

to

examples

and

Expository confrontation with the basic con-

cepts of a discipline entail the almost ubiquitous use of
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examples.

Examples generally represent particular con-

crete applications of more or less abstract concepts.

It

might be said that the function of an example is to
provide the realization of those idealizations that are
termed "concepts."

The question,

"What is the purpose of

the examples of the mechanisms of electromagnetic propagation, of complex chemical reactions, and of biological
evolution?" along with its expected answer, "The purpose
of the examples of the mechanisms of electromagnetic
propagation,

of complex chemical reactions,

and of bio-

logical evolution is to combat the identification of the
concepts of model and mechanism, that is, to show that
the concept of model is broader than this identification
would suggest that there are models that are not mechanistic,"

provide an example of questions wherein the fact

that they are about examples is explicit.

Whereas the

question, "What is the referent of which the sociological
interpretation of

the symbols,

's',

'F(s)',

'G(s,s')',

and 'G(s,s')' constitute a model object is the probability of migration taking place between one given country
and another," supplies an example in which the analogous
fact can be seen to be only implicit.

Nowhere in the

test of the latter question and answer does the term
"example" appear.

Nevertheless

the expression "con-

stitute a model object" can--indeed,

in the present con-
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text,

rrnst--be interpreted as meaning "constitute an

--

exam.E.1£ of a model object."
findings,

In consonance with earlier

it is found that the foregoing all involve

examples of one or more concept-types.

While this situa-

tion is not invariable, even the exceptions adhere to its
spirit.

The question, "What are the symbolic diagrams

that correspond to the alternative representations of the
motion of the set of coupled oscillators?" with the
adjunct answer, "The symbolic diagrams that correspond to
the alternative representations of the motion of the set
of coupled oscillators are examples of heuristic devices
that render the alternative representations more intelligible while remaining merely adjuncts to, and not parts
of, those model objects," constitute an example of a case
in which, although the example is not of a concept-type,
it nonetheless does bear an intimate relation to a particular concept-type,

to wit:

the model object.

Even

though the raison d'etre of the question involves the
making of the point that the relation between the symbolic diagrams and the model objects is not as close as
it might appear to be,

the raison d'etre of the symbolic

diagrams is just that relation.
from

The discussion now turns

the consideration of concept-type E to that of

concept-type F.
Concept-type F questions deal with classifications
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and categorizations.

The first problem that arises in

this connection is that, at first glance,

concept-type F

seems to duplicate task-type IV, since they both deal
with classification or categorization.

This apparent

duplication, however, proves more illusory than real.
The difference between concept-type F and task-type IV
resides in the fact that while task-type IV questions ask
for a classification or categorization of some concept or
other,

i.

e.,

a

content-type or a

concept-type,

the

concept-type F questions ask about some classification or
categorization that has already been embedded either
explicitly or implicitly in the text being analyzed.

It

should not be imagined, however, that the designations
"task-type IV" and "concept-type F" must inevitably be
applied in a mutually exhaustive manner.

Since it is

possible to ask for a classification or categorization
about, or perhaps of, another classification or categorization,

it follows that the two designations can be

applied simultaneously.

This is, of course, consonant

with the principle that any task-type can,
theoretically,
content-type.

be combined in one question with any
Also, it should be remembered that any

content-type can,

in principle,

be combined with any

other content-type in the same question.
hand,

at least

the fact that task-type IV

~ay

On the other
combine with
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concept-type F does not entail that

they must.

As a

matter of fact in the set of questions and answers that
constitutes perhaps the most palpable part of the results
of the present work, they do not.
An appropriate move at this time is to consider the
question, "Why does not the set of entities 'the set of
bodies', 'the quantity of heat per unit mass', and 'the
specific heat at constant volume' constitute a semantical
model?"

Next, it should help to look at the answer that

this question might expected to evoke, "The set of entities 'the set of bodies', 'the quantity of heat per unit
mass', and 'the specific heat at constant volume' does
not constitute a semantical model for these reasons:

(1)

this set of entities constitutes a factual interpretation
of the mathematical system, F1 through F4, (2) it is a
factual interpretation,of the purely formal system, A1
through AS, (3) it does not make these systems come out
true in every case, (4) a factual interpretation, in fact
any interpretation of a formal system that does not make
that system come out true in all cases fails by definition to constitute a semantical model."

This question-

answer set is typical of many of those of content-type F
in that it is about a classification without asking for a
classification.

What it does ask for is an explanation

of why a given classification,

i. e.,

the classification

54

of a given set of entities as a semantical model, does
not hold.

It is appropriate at this point to turn from

the discussion of content-type F questions to that of
questions categorized as belonging to content-type G.
The kind of concept that content-type G questions
involve can be suggested fairly well by such closely
related, but not entirely synonymous terms as "function,"
"purpose," "goal," "end," "use," and "application."

The

lack of a precise definition of the scope of this category is not really a fatal disadvantage here.

In the

8resent application, an indication of the general location and boundaries of the conceptual area covered by
these questions is adequate.

The question,

"Why are

theoretical models necessary to science?" and the appropriate answer,

"Theoretical models are necessary to

science because they alone are testable," serve to exemplify the content-type G question-answer set.

The un-

stated premise of the argument contained in the answer is
that testing is necessary to science,"

Here, the test-

ability of the theoretical model explains its usefulness
in the context of scientific investigation.
question,

Another

"What are the three chief functions of theore-

tical models?" must here be considered.

This question,

along with its answer, "The three chief functions of
theoretical models are these:

(1) the posing of specific
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theoretical problems, (2) the solution (explanation) of
specific theoretical problems, and (3) the testing of
proposed solutions (explanations)," brings up the problem
of scope.

In this respect the former and the latter

question-answer sets somewhat overlap.

While the former

question was answered by naming a property that implied a
function, the latter was answered by specifying three
directly asked for functions.

The important fact here is

that functions or more or less closely related concepts
are always prominent in content-type G question-answer
sets.

This concludes the treatment of content-type G

questions and signals the start of the exposition of
content-type H questions.
Content-type H questions concern themselves with a
concept-cluster that can be hinted at by such terms as
"method," "procedure," or "process."

What is involved

here are the principles that relate to the way that
something occurs or is done.

Look at the question, "In a

field of research like contemporary mathematical sociology which has tended to produce isolated bits of knowledge rather than unifying concepts, how are theoretical
models typically constructed?."

Here, a way of accom-

plishing something, a method, is called for.

The appro-

priate answer is, "In a field of research like contemporary mathematical sociology which has tended to produce
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isolated bits of knowledge rather than unifying concepts,
theoretical models are typically constructed by building
them around model objects.
expanding

the

model

into

This is usually done by
a

mathematically oriented

hypothetico-deductive system."

This answer fulfills the

requirement of the question by specifying the asked for
procedure by means of its description.

It can be noted

here that the above example is a task-type II question,
i. e., a question that requests specification,
than a task-type III question,

rather

i. e., a question that

asks for a description, because the description is only
the means of accomplishing the specif ication--a secondary
end rather than a primary one.
Consider the question, "Why is an explicit statement
of the semantic assumptions mandatory in the axiomatic
reconstruction of a scientific theory?"

Its answer is

"An explicit statement of the semantic assumption is
mandatory in the axiomatic reconstruction of a scientific
theory because the same mathematical formulas will sometimes fit more than one referent.

For example, the flow

of water in a pipe can be represented by the same (or
analogous) formulas as the flow of electricity in a wire.
Thus, an explicit statement of the semantic assumption is
needed to make sure that there is no confusion regarding
which formula is being linked to which referent," This
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constitutes an example of a content-type H question that
does not ask for a method or a procedure.

This question

rather asks for an explanation regarding a procedure.
Since asking for an explanation defines a

task-type

(task-type VII) and not a content-type, it is because of
the fact that the required explanation is about a procedure that this question is categorized as content-type H.
Here ends the discussion of content-type H, and starts
that of content-type I.
The concept-cluster that constitutes the subject
matter of content-type I questions is suggested by such
terms

as

"result,"

"outcome,"

"upshot," or "effect."

Something that happens because something else has occurred is what lies at the focal point of these questions.

Examine the question,

"What is the result of

specifying the boundary and initial conditions, the mass
and stress distributions, and the external forces for the
oscillation of a shell?"

Here, a cause, the "something

else" is specified and a result is specifically asked
for.

The "something else," the cause,

is the specifica-

tion of the boundary, the initial conditions, etc. for
the oscillation of a shell.

Now look at the answer that

this question might be expected to evoke, "The result of
specifying the boundary and initial conditions, the mass
and stress distributions, and the external forces for the
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oscillation of a
answer,

shell

is a

model

object."

In this

the requested result is (the production of) a

model object.

The preceding example illustrated the

concept-type I question wherein a result is specifically
asked for.

But there are content-type I questions where-

in the reference to a result is less obvious.

Take, for

example, the question, "What can be accomplished with a
continuum endowed with certain properties,
pressibility and viscosity?"

Here

such as com-

the "something else"

that is to generate the expected result is "a continuum
endowed with certain properties, such as compressibility
and viscosity,"

More accurately, it might be said that

the "something else" is only indirectly referred to by
the expression,

"a continuum ••• etc."

What the "something

else" really is refers to is some process that is connected in some unspecified way with "a, continuum ••• etc."
The expected result in this example is obliquely referred
to as "what can be accomplished."

Now look at an answer

that fits that question, "A continuum endowed with certain properties, such as compressibility and viscosity
can be conjoined with (grafted onto) classical mechanics,
general relativistic mechanics or some other general
theory to produce a theoretical model of a fluid."

It

can now be seen that this answer explicitly names the
called for result, i. e., the production of a theoretical
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model of a fluid.

Moreover, the "something else" is now

directly specified.as the conjoining of "a continuum
endowed with certain properties, such as compressibility
and viscosity" with "classical mechanics,

general rela-

tivistic mechanics or some other general theory."

Here,

the discussion of content-type I breaks off and the consideration of content-type J begins.
Content-type J

questions

deal

with

the

concept-

cluster that is suggested by the terms, "term," "expression," "name," and "designation."

These questions tend,

to a considerable extent, to revolve around linguistic
entities.

They may describe these linguistic entities,

interpret them or explain them etc. according to the
natures of

the various

task-types that govern them.

These linguistic entities, of course, are always linked,
either immediately or ultimately, with one of the four
basic concept-types:

referent, model object, theoretical

model, or general theory.

Consider, for example, the

question, "What expression designates a model object that
concerns itself only with accounting for the end results
of the referent without attempting to explain how these
results are obtained?"

This question requires the speci-

fication of a expression that fulfills certain conditions, namely that it designate "a model object that
concerns itself only with accounting for the end results
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of the referent without attempting to explain how these
results are obtained."

Take now an appropriate answer to

this question, "The term that designates a model object
that concerns itself only with accounting for the end
results of the referent without attempting to explain how
these results are obtained can be termed a black box."
This answer satisfies the question by specifying the
called for expression:

"black box."

the following content-type J

Similarly, regard

question,

"What could a

theoretical model that has been "confirmed" be termed to
show that, to some extent (albeit inadequately),

it ful-

fills the requirements that make it possible to constitute a semantical model?"

Here again, a term is asked

for that fulfills certain conditions, i. e., that it be
applicable to theoretical models that have been confirmed, and it that it "show that, to some extent (albeit
inadequately),

it fulfills the requirements that make it

possible to constitute a semantical model"

Look at an

appropriate answer to this question, "In order to show
that, to some extent, a "confirmed" theoretical model
fulfills the requirements that make it possible to constitute a semantical model, it could be termed a "guasimodel. '"

This answer fulfills the requirements of the

question by supplying the requested term:

"guasimodel."

At this point, the discussion turns from the considera-
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tion of content-type J to the examination of contenttype K.
Content-type K questions deal with a concept-cluster
that is suggested by such terms as "sign," "symbol," and
"representation."

These questions invariably involve

something that .stands for something else.

The question,

"What does R represent?" supplies the "something that
stands for something else," i. e., R, and asks what it is
that R stands for.

The answer, "R represents a refer-

ent," tells what it is that R stands for, i. e., a referent.

The relation of the "something that stands for

something else" to the question or answer as a whole,
however, is not always so direct.

Regard the content-

type K question, "What can be done to remedy the excessive coarseness and lack of economy characteristic of the
description of the model wherein the paired inputs and
outputs are tabulated?"

This question does not simply

ask for either the entity that stands for something else
or the entity for which it stands.

It asks, rather, for

a prescription, for a method of constructing a better
something that stands for something else.
appropriate answer,

Here is an

"To remedy the excessive coarseness

and lack of economy characteristic of the description of
the model wherein the paired inputs and outputs are
tabulated, the ordered pairs can be implied by means of a

62
rule rather than stated explicitly by means of a table."
The answer, accordingly, supplies the method of constructing the entity that represents something else that the
question requests.

Thus ends the discussion of content-

type K questions and starts the discussion of contenttype L questions.
Content-type L questions involve the concept-cluster
suggested by such terms as "statement," "proposition,"
"system," or "theory."

Here,

the clarification should be

made that the "system" mentioned above is primarily a
linguistic system, or that, at least, that the questions
are oriented primarily toward the linguistic aspects of
any non-linguistic system under consideration.

Another

of approaching this might be to say that, to what ever
extent the kind of "system" being discussed here is not
linguistic, it is a conceptual system of some kind or
other expressed linguistically.

And while the object-

document may in some cases deal primarily with the concept of which the linguistic entity is only a representation, the type L question primarily confronts that representation; its involvement with the underlying concept is
only secondary.
As an example of the type L question's concern with
the linguistic entity, consider the following example:
"Why does the set of statements, 'the capital letters are
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sets or functions,

"R" is the real

line,

11

0

11

is the

arithmetic product, etc,' fail to qualify as a semantical
model?"'

Here the classification of the linguistic en-

tity, the set of statements, is all that is being questioned; the nature of the underlying mathematical concepts gains relevance only by virtue of their use as an
example.

A suggested answer to this question is, "The

set of statements,

'the capital

letters are sets or

functions, "R" is the real line, "O" is the arithmetic
product, etc,'

fails to qualify as a semantical model

because, while it is an interpretation of the system of
the signs, A1 through AS, it does not make the system
true in all cases."

This answer explains why the men-

tioned linguistic entity fails to qualify as a semantical
model. The understood missing premise in this case is the
definition of a semantical model as "an interpretation of
a theory that makes the theory come out true in all
cases."

This premise is an example of the kind of basic

knowledge that the student is assumed to possess at the
outset.

The question and answer set could, of course, be

programmed to vary the prerequisite level of sophistication,

but consideration of the implications of this pos-

sibility lie beyond the scope of the present work.
The focal point of a type L question,

i.e., some

subset of the set of linguistic entities, need not be

64

represented formally.

Take, for example, "What is the

reason for saying that simplicity is the privilege of
either total ignorance or extreme generality (no detail)?"

In this case, the linguistic entity central to

the question is expressed by a mere paraphrase of an
informal, perhaps somewhat epigrammatic, comment made in
the course of the expository process.

The answer sug-

gested for this question is, "The reason for saying that
simplicity is the privilege of either total ignorance or
extreme generality is to justify the complication of
theoretical models."

This answer supplies the asked for

purpose for the inclusion of the linguistic entity in the
text.
Look at one more example,

"Why is every formula

containing the symbol of the modeling relation either an
interpretative axiom or a semantic assumption?"

The

linguistic entity at the heart of this question is the
set of formulas "containing the symbol of the modeling
relation."

This def ini ti on of the set of formulas under

consideration may appear to emphasize the contents of the
these formulas.
upon.

But this appearance is not to be relied

This prerequisite barely indicates the general

type of formula being dealt with in the text; it leaves
plenty of room for variety.

Any formula of this type

links a model object, and hence a theoretical model to
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its referent But that referent can be a behavior or a
structure, an object or a concept; it can be statistical
or functional Moreover, given the referent, the type of
model object can vary greatly In fact there can exist an
infinite number of models for each referent any one of
which must be classified as either "an interpretation or
a semantic assumption."

This example, then,

like the

previous ones sustains the thesis that type L questions
deal with linguistic entities per se and only peripherally with their contents.

A suggested answer to this

question is, "Every formula containing the symbol of the
modeling relation is either an interpretative axiom or a
semantic assumption because such a formula relates a
theoretical model to its referent, as, for example, the
theoretical model s of a cell to the referent, or real
cell r."

This answer merely explains why a formula of

this kind always turns out to be either an interpretive
axiom or a semantic assumption--rather anticlimactic,
really.

With this,

the exposition advances from the

consideration of content-type L questions to the explication of those of content-type M.
Content-type M questions involve the juxtaposition
of concepts for the purpose of making contrasts by means
of noting the differences between them.

This example,

"What is the difference between deterministic models and
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probabilistic models," is quite straightforward.

It

simply asks for the specification of the principle difference between two concepts.

The answer to this ques-

tion, "The difference between deterministic models and
probabilistic models is that deterministic models predict
(or attempt to predict) what will occur under certain
given conditions, whereas probabilistic models try to
predict what

~2.Y

happen under given comditions while

indicating in mathematical terms what the chances are
that this or that event will or will not occur," is not
quite so simple.
cated.

Nonetheless, neither is it very compli-

It specifies the required difference between the

named concepts in terms of a contrast between the kinds
of performance expected of each.
The next example, "What is the importance of contrasting users with designers or scientists with engineers?" is almost as direct.

Judging from the question,

the ways that this example differs from the previous one
are embodied first, in the occurrence of a double contrast and second, in the more significant change in the
sort of thing that is asked for.

Since a single answer

is apparently expected to suffice for both contrasts,

it

is fairly obvious that they are in some way analogous and
that they do not really represent two different contrasts.

One the other hand, whereas the first example
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asks for the specification of the difference that constitutes the contrast, the second requires an explanation of
the author's purpose in presenting it.

In this case, the

contrast itself assumes a secondary importance,
primary is its function.

what is

Nonetheless, knowledge of what

the contrast consists of is assumed.

The answer, "Users

are contrasted with designers and scientists with engineers to show how the model's application should determine whether a dark box or a built-up model is chosen.
Where mere use is contemplated, the dark box model is
adequate,

but where knowledge is desired, a built-up

model is needed," contains a similar assumption.

It is

taken for granted that users and scientists are interested in mere use, while designers and scientists are
interested in knowledge.

The nucleus of this response is

the explanation that links the choice of model type with
the particular interests of those who choose.
Sometimes, it happens that a content-type M question
is not immediately obvious as such.

The question, "What

error does the 'semantical freak' involve?" illustrates
this.

The only way of knowing that this is a content-

type M question is by reference to the answer,

"The

'semantical freak' involves a confusion between theoretical model and referent.

The theoretical model is discus-

sed as though it were the referent."

Here it can be
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seen that what is involved is a confusion that can be
resolved by marking well the contrast between two concepts.

Thus, it is the answer that unmasks the question

as belonging to content-type M.
of content-type M questions;

This ends the discussion

next starts the considera-

tion of those of content-type N.
Content-type N questions tend to focus on principles, rules or paradigms that may or may not serve as
criteria for arriving at some decision or conclusion.
These principles, etc. may be encountered in the form of
hypotheses or assumptions of some kind or other, or even
in the form of philosophical stances or attitudes.
play various roles in the questions.

They

A look at some

examples will help to illustrate this.
The question, "What criteria were applied in order
to determine the falsity of Ising's model object?" serves
as the first of these.

It requests that a set of princi-

ples that serve as criteria be specified.

These criteria

have been used in relation to the performance of a given
function.

Here is the suggested answer to this question,

"The criteria that were applied in order to determine the
falsity of

Ising's model object were the relatively

greater prestige of the general theory (statistical mechanics) and the principle that requires a theoretical
model to represent every significant (relevant) aspect of
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its referent if it is not to be considered false."

This

answer simply specifies the (two) requested criteria.
The question, "What would be the likely result of
the universal application of the black boxist philosophy?" is another story.

Here, the principle is not

asked for, but specified at the outset.

Only the name of

the principle, referred to as a philosophy, is given, not
its content.

Knowledge of the content is assumed, there-

fore it is tested--obliquely, of course.
given,

by this question,

tion of the principle.

The primary

is a hypothesis of the applica-

In summary, then, the form of the

question is that of a conditional whose antecedent is the
hypothesis of the application of the principle and whose
consequent,

the conjectured results of that application,

is asked for.

It should be mentioned at this point that

the asked for conjecture does have to be made by the
student, it has been made by the author;

the student is,

in substance, asked to do no more than to recognize it
for what it is.

The answer to this question, "The likely

result of the universal application of the black boxist
philosophy would be the

immediate drying up of

the

sources of scientific knowledge and, consequently, an
eventual halt to scientific progress." yields no great
surprises.

It supplies a two step conjectured result

which takes on the rough outlines of the valid form,
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[(p4 q) & (q4 r)]

°"' (p4 r).

where p is interpreted as "The black boxist philosophy is
universally applied," q as "The sources of scientific
knowledge immediately dry up," and r as "Scientific progress eventually halts."

It was necessary to talk about

the "rough outline" of the form because
p4q
(the universal application of the black boxist philosophy
will immediately dry up the sources of scientific knowledge) and
q4 r
(the drying up of the sources of scientific knowledge
will cause an eventual halt to scientific progress) are
givens and not hypotheses--they are assumed to be true at
the outset.

What is asserted then is not that if these

conditionals are true then the application of the black
boxist philosophy will cause an eventual halt to scientific progress but rather that since they are true, the
application of the black boxist philosophy would eventually cause scientific progress to halt. Thus, although
the argument does follow the "rough outlines" of a tautologically valid form, it is not itself logically valid
but merely consistent.

This is not to be considered a

defect in the argument since its essentially empirical
character dictate that it be judged primarily in the
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light of empirical criteria.

Whether or not it is found

to be "sound" will depend presumably upon "the state of
things" although in actuality it may depend to a considerable extent upon one's philosophical leanings.
While in a sense the black boxist philosophy stands
as the focal point of the question,

in another it is

situated in a secondary relationship to the supposition
that it is applied--its application.
splitting hairs,

If this seems like

it should be noted that a principle (or

an attitude or a philosophy) is not identical to its
application.

To speak (directly) about a principle is to

deal with it internally, while to discuss its application
is to deal with it externally and to talk about it only
indirectly.

To deal with a principle internally is to

talk about the composition of its components and how they
relate to each other.

To deal with it externally is to

consider its relation to other concepts,
events.

objects or

The object of this example is to show how a

principle can be displaced from the logical center of a
concept-type N question without substantially surrendering its position at the conceptual center.
"Why might the black box paradigm be expected to
encourage superficiality?" is the final example of a
content-type N question

to be considered.

given is the name of a paradigm (rule,

Here,

the

or principle)
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along with a conjecture as to the probable results of the
application of that paradigm.

What is required is a

justification of the conjecture.

This is supplied by the

answer,

"The black box paradigm might be expected to

encourage superficiality because of the fact that this
paradigm, by implication, ignores the possibility of the
existence of an internal structure and mechanism of its
referent.

Thus,

the paradigm discourages the attempt to

discover the internal structure and mechanism whose existence it ignores."

The argument approximates the valid

form,
[(p-+ q) & (q-+ r)]--+ (p-+ r).
where p is interpreted as "The black box paradigm is
applied," q as "The internal structure (of a referent) is
ignored," and r as "The attempt to discover internal
mechanisms is discouraged."

This argument depends first

of all on the truth of p -> q, the claim that the black
boxist paradigm implies ignorance of "the possibility of
the existence of an internal structure and mechanism of
its referent."

Second, it depends upon the truth of a

supressed premise that mediates q -> r (to ignore "the
possibility of the existence of an internal structure and
mechanism of the" black box's referent will cause the
attempt to discover such a structure and mechanism to be
discouraged.)

The supressed premise is simply a general-
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ization of the q -> r statement:

when certain things are

ignored, the attempt to discover them is discouraged.
this point,

At

the discussion of content-type O will break

off and that of content-type 0 will begin.
The concept-type 0 questions in this set have turned
out to be a quite homogeneous lot.

There is nothing

inherent in the genus that makes it necessary that they
should turn out this way, it just happens that they did.
These questions tend to center on references, citations,
quotations, allusions or mentions of some kind that the
author makes somewhere in his text.

While many possible

patterns for questions of this concept-type exist, only
one is used in this set. This general pattern that they
all follow is exemplified by the question, "What is made
of the fact that the water molecule was rejected by turn
of the century energetists?"

Here,

the student is given

to understand that the author has made some reference to
a fact in the history of science.

And what the student

is asked to do is to state what use the author has made
of this reference or, to put it another way, to specify
the author's purpose in making it.

Although this parti-

cular example displays some slight obliquity in the wording,

virtually all of the rest of the concept-type 0

questions in this set are, if anything, more directly
explicit.
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The suggested answer to this question is, "The rejection of the water molecule model by the turn of the
century energetists is part of a sort of reductio ad absurdum argument meant to show the foolishness of preferring a grey box model to a built-up one.

The prefer-

ence for grey or black box models can lead to the rejection of models that later prove their worth by gaining
general acceptance."
two things:

This answer attempts to accomplish

first, to supply the asked for purpose of

the reference and second, to provide some insight into
the manner by which this purpose is to be fulfilled.
Since this one example suffices to display the peculiarities of concept-type O questions,

their exposition will

terminate here and that of concept-type P questions will
follow.
Concept-type P

questions

deal

with

assumptions,

conditions, premises or prerequisites of some kind or
other.

Typically, these turn out to be necessary assump-

tions upon which to base some theory or hypothesis or
else prerequisites for the application of some method or
procedure.

Usually, the question asks either for the

specification of the condition itself or perhaps for an
explanation or reason as to why it exists or is necessary.

As an example of the former, consider this ques-

tion, "In order to apply the same general theory (clas-
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sical statistical mechanics,

for example) to several

different model objects, what must be assumed about those
model objects?"

In this case, the given is the fact that

the carrying out of a specified procedure is being considered,

while the required is the assumption that must

be made in order to carry it out.

The suggested answer

to the preceding question is, "In order to apply the same
general theory,

such as classical statistical mechanics,

to several different model objects, it must be assumed
that the elements of each of those model objects are
related to each other in similar ways,
by the general theory."

in ways described

This answer simply fulfills the

requirement of the question by specifying the asked for
assumption.
An example of the latter case is supplied by the
question, "As long as the axiomatizability condition is
not necessary to obtain a theoretical model, what is the
reason for including it in the description of the process?"

Here, the condition is not asked for; it, along

with the fact that it is included although not necessary,
is part of the given.

What is asked for is an explana-

tion of the anomaly wherein the condition is included in
spite of the fact that it is not necessary to the specified process.

The answer to this question,

"Even though

the axiomatizability condition is not necessary to obtain
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a theoretical model, it is necessary in order to give a
quick and exact definition of the concept," poses no
special problems.

It merely supplies the required ex-

planation which suggests that the condition, although not
necessary, proves convenient.

At this point, the discus-

sion proceeds from the consideration of concept-type P
questions to an explanation of concept-type Q questions.
Concept-type Q questions are concerned with judgements of
some kind or other.

These judgements or evaluations may

determine truth-values,

utility values,

or the presence

or absence of some property or other.

Their objects

might be concepts, theories, objects, methods or procedures.

As an example of the latter,

it may prove

helpful to reexamine the question, "What criteria were
applied in order to determine the falsity of Ising's
model object?"

Here, the given is the fact of a judge-

ment that determined the truth-value of a specified concept, while the criteria used in making that judgement is
asked for.

The suggested answer is, "The criteria that

were applied in order to determine the falsity of Ising's
model object were the relatively greater prestige of the
general theory (statistical mechanics) and the principle
that requires a theoretical model to represent every
significant (relevant?) aspect of its referent if it is
not to be considered false."

This answer, quite directly
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and simply, provides the two criteria that the question
asks for.
Another, perhaps less typical, case is exemplified
by the question, "What does it mean to say that the game
is not just to account for appearance at any price?"

The

given is not in itself the atypical component of this
question.

What is somewhat unusual is the slightly in-

direct manner in which the given judgement is presented.
This presentation does not make it quite as obvious as do
some of the other questions that a judgement is being
asked about, nor that the object of the judgement is a
method, a procedure, or to a considerable extent, a goal.
The second and rather more obvious departure from the
content of the ordinary concept-type Q question is the
fact that a meaning is asked for.

This suggests that

what is wanted is some kind of interpretation,

explana-

tion or elaboration--an unpacking, as the cliche goes.
The suggested answer to the question is, "To say that the
game is not just to account for appearance at any price
means that the attempt should be made not only to produce
a mechanism that will adequately explain the end results
of the referent, but come up with the actual mechanism
that produces those results.

This can be accomplished by

showing some intermediate results that can be checked
against those derived from the hypothetical mechanism."
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This answer interprets the subject of the question as a
kind of judgement-prescription.

To categorize the ques-

tion as a concept-type Q question rather than as a concept-type R question is to emphasize the judgement component at the expense of the prescription component.
question could have,

The

justifiably, been placed in both

categories; it is already shared by concept-type categories H and Q.

The decision not to place it in category

R as well represents a prior or even an ipso facto decision regarding the placement of the border line between
thoroughness and over-meticulosity.
Consider now one more example, "Why should the onedimensional representation of a tridimensional system be
considered the most audacious of all model objects?"
Again, the given in the question is the fact of a judgement;

this time the judgement concerns the presence or

absence of a specified quality in a specified concept.
But what is asked for is a reason for that judgement--a
justification.

An answer is, "The one-dimensional repre-

sentation of a tridimensional system should be considered
the most audacious of all model objects because, although
model objects inherently fall short of fully representing
their referents,

the one-dimensional model object's at-

tempt to represent tridimensional referents can be considered particularly daring by virtue of the double hand-
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icap that it imposes upon itself by dispensing with two
of the three dimensions that would ordinarily seem indispensable to the adequate representation of tridimensional
referents."

This

answer

provides

the

required

explanation-justification in a straightforeward, unequivocal manner.

The discussion of concept-type

Q

questions

ends here and the consideration of concept-type R questions begins.
Concept-type R questions have to do with prescriptions, advice or suggestions.

It may be the case either

that the question asks for a prescription or that it
requires an explanation or justification of a prescription already given.

To exemplify the first of these

cases, examine again the question, "What can be done to
remedy the excessive coarseness and lack of economy characteristic of the description of the model wherein the
paired inputs and outputs are tabulated?"
is asked for by this question.

A prescription

Take another look at the

answer, "To remedy the excessive coarseness and lack of
economy characteristic of the description of the model
wherein the paired inputs and outputs are tabulated, the
ordered pairs can be implied by means of a rule rather
than stated explicitly by means of a table."

It supplies

the required prescription in a straightforeward and obvious manner.

80

For an exemplification of the second case,

look

again at the question, "Why is an explicit statement of
the semantic assumptions mandatory in the axiomatic reconstruction of a scientific theory?"
prescription is not asked for,

In this case, the

but given.

What is asked

for is an explanatory justification of the given prescription.

The suggested answer is, "An explicit state-

ment of the semantic assumption is mandatory in the
axiomatic reconstruction of a scientific theory because
the same mathematical formulas will sometimes fit more
than one referent.

For example, the flow of water in a

pipe can be represented by the same (or analogous) formulas as the flow of electricity in a wire.

Thus,

an

explicit statement of the semantic assumption is needed
to make sure that there is no confusion regarding which
formula is being linked to which referent."

This answer

provides the explanatory justification for the prescription given by the question.

And here the discussion

proceeds from the consideration of concept-type R questions to the explanation of concept-type S questions.
The special province of concept-type S questions
lies in the area of things gone wrong.

Problems, errors,

confusions or failures are the sorts of things to be
found in this terri tory--the land of the blemished, the
faulted, the defective.

In some cases, the problem or
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error is given while an explanation or a response is
asked for.

In others the specification of the confusion

or failure is expected.

Or occasionally it may turn out

that the fact of the error or confusion, masked in the
question, shows up, perhaps unexpectedly, as the answer
unfolds.
The first example is a reexamination of the question,

"Why is it important not to confuse the model

object with its referent?"

The possibility as well as

the nature of a confusion is specified as the given,
while its significance or importance is what the question
asks for.

The suggested answer:

"It is important not to

confuse the model object with its referent because the
same referent may be modeled by different model objects
in different ways.

Confusing the model object with its

referent would, by obliterating or at least minimizing
these differences, defeat the purpose of model objects-to discover ever 'truer' ways of representing reality."
This answer attempts to demonstrate the significance of
the confusion by means of a three step argument that
assumes that several unstated intermediate steps can be
supplied by the student who has become familiar with the
text.
The opposite case:

"What is the primary mistake

that the black box philosopher makes?"

Here the nature
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of the error must be specified by the answer.

Only the

fact of the mistake and its perpetrator is given.

The

suggested answer is, "The black box philosopher's primary
mistake is his failure to recognize that the acquisition
of knowledge as opposed to mere use requires the construction of built-up models as opposed to mere dark box
models."

Here, the mistake is specified and its general

described as required by the question.
Consider the question,

"Why should the modeling

relation occur explicitly in any formulation of a scientific theory that takes care of the factual meaning of its
symbols?"

This question makes no obvious reference to an

error or confusion at all.

It simply asks why a theory

should be formulated in a certain way.

That is to say

that it asks for a reason, an explanation.

But look at

the suggested answer, "The reason that the modeling relation should occur explicitly in any formulation of a
scientific theory that takes care of the factual meaning
of its symbols is to avoid any possible confusion between
the model (theoretical) and the modeled (referent)."
required reason is supplied.
development,

The

But in the course of its

it becomes clear that the original question

implied a possible confusion to be avoided.
The fourth and last example is, "In section 1 O, it
is stated that (1) semantical models are interpretations
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of formal systems that make all statements of the system
true,

(2) theoretical models (since their content is

empirical) are never more that partially true so they
cannot be semantical models,

(3) the three empirical

model objects described on page 112 are not always true,
nonetheless (4) they constitute (or produce) semantical
models."

How is this possible?"

that something may be awry.

This question suggests

But whether it presents a

resolvable paradox or an unexplainable anomaly does become apparent solely from reading it.
ency merely apparent or is it real?
ed answer,

"This is not possible,

unexplained contradiction.

Is the inconsist-

Here is the suggestit constitutes an

If semantical models are

interpretations of formal systems that make all statements of the system true (1), and theoretical,

hence

empirical, models are never more than partially true (2),
then it is manifestly impossible for them to constitute
semantical models."

The suggestion of the last sentence

of the question that the set of statements is somehow
consistent is revealed as misleading.

The answer, in

effect, rejects the question as unanswerable and answers
in the negative an implied substitute question:
possible?"

"Is this

Moreover, by implication, it goes some dist-

ance toward accusing the author of having made a mistake.
The accusation could not be made in a more positive way
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because of the possibility that were the author present
to defend himself he could come up with a satisfactory
explanation of his apparent error.

At this point, the

explanation of concept-type S questions terminates and
that of concept-type T questions begins.
The questions that are categorized as belonging to
concept-type T involve choices or options of
kinds.

various

At times the choice given in the question re-

quires the answer either to explain the reasoning behind
it or to specify the criteria that determined it.

Other

times a situation may be presented in the question which
requires the answer to specify an appropriate response
involving options or choices.
As an example of the former,

consider the question,

"Why would it not be preferable to construct a model
object that could represent its referent in every aspect
instead of in merely certain significant aspects?"

In

this case, the question, in effect, presents an (albeit
negative) choice already made and asks for a justification of that choice.

The suggested answer to this ques-

tion is, "It would not be preferable to construct a model
object that could represent its referent in every aspect
instead of in merely certain significant aspects because
the possession of sufficient knowledge to construct such
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a model object would render its construction redundant."
This answer straightforewardly supplies the required
justification.
The latter case is represented by this example,
"What is the basic choice that the model constructor must
make?"

Here, a situation is presented and the outline of

a choice-structure or a set of options is looked for.
This requirement is satisfied by the suggested answer,
"The basic choice that the model constructor must make is
between superficial knowledge and deep knowledge.
former case,

the black box is adequate.

In the

But in the

latter cause, a built-up conceptual model is required."
This concludes explanation of concept-type T questions
and, since they range from A to T, of the concept-types
in general.

Of the explanation of the whole categorical

system into which the questions and answers are organized, all that remains is a brief review of the specificcontent-constructs.
The specific-content-constructs differ from the rest
of the categories that have been used to categorize the
question and answer set in that are not organizational
categories imposed from without, but rather salient concepts extracted from the body of the object-text itself.
That is they are central concepts formulated by the
author of the object-document and so their presence be-
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hind every question is at least implied whenever it is
not

specific.

There are only four

of

these

in

the

object-document used in this work: (1) referent, designated by the lower case letter "a," (2) model object,
designated by letter "b," (3) theoretical model, designated by "c," and ( 4) general theory, by 1 et ter "d. "The
referent is the bit of reality, the object,
process that is modeled.

system or

The model object is the bare

representation of the referent which has not as yet been
organized deductively or mathematically.

The theoretical

model is the deductively and mathematically organized
model model object.

And a general theory is, as its name

implies, a law or law-like theory of particularly wide
application.
chain.

These four concepts form a kind of concept-

The interrelations between these concepts in the

chain form the subject matter of the object-document.
With this review of the specific-content-concepts, the
explanation of the the categories that organize the questions is finished.

The next three chapters will be

devoted to the presentation of the question and answers
themselves.

CHAPTER VI
TASKS I AND II:
IDENTIFYING AND SPECIFYING
This chapter along with the next two are devoted to
the exposition of the results, the end-product of the
present work--a set of questions and answers arranged
hierarchically according to the principles that have been
set forth in the previous chapters.

It has been ex-

plained that each question and answer unit begins with an
identity line that locates it within the complete question and answer set,

within the object-document, and

within the conceptual hierarchy that forms the basis both
for the formulation and for the organization of the
question and answers.
One word about the form of the suggested answers to
the questions.
answer,

It will undoubtedly be noted that each

in effect, contains the total conceptual sub-

stance of the question that it is meant to accompany.
This is not accidental.

The background assumption opera-

ting here is that a tendency exists among students to
disassociate answers from the questions that they were
intended to answer.

It is the purpose of the present

mode of formulating the suggested answers to combat this
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tendency.

Therefore, it is suggested that any practical

application of either the question system or the principles behind it not dispense with this feature.
The

questions

and

answers

that

follow

in

this

chapter are numbered from 1 to 147. They are associated
with the task-types I and II which involve the tasks of
identification and specification.

Here, then, are the

questions and answers.
Task I
Question and Answer 1:

page 92; line 1; type I, i, A, a.

What is a referent?
A referent (of a particular model object) is the
object, process or bit of reality that is represented by
that model object.
Q and A 2:

page 92; line 1; type I, i, A, b.

What is a model object?
A model object is a schematic representation of an
object or process, that is (97-18), a schematic conceptual representation of a thing or of a situation assumed
to be actual or possible.
Q and A 3:

page 97; line 17; type I, i, A, c.

What is a theoretical model?
A theoretical model is a hypothetico-deductive system concerning a model object.
Q

and A 4:

page 95; line 35; type I, i, A-C, a.
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What is a factual referent?
A factual referent is a referent that is not merely
abstract (formal), it possesses empirical content.
Q and A 5:

page 93; line 2; type I, i, A-C, b.

What are non-realistic abstract situations?
Non-realistic abstract situations are, in effect,
model objects in which only certain significant aspects
of the referent are modeled.

All other aspects of the

referent are ignored.
Q and A 6:

page 110; line 35; type I, i, A-C, c.

When is an interpretation of an abstract theory a
semantical model?
An interpretation of an abstract theory is a semantical model whenever it makes the theory come out true in
all circumstances.
Q and A 7:

page 107; line 14; type I, iii, A, d.

What is a general theory?
A

~ene~~l

theory

is a

theory (a hypothetico-

deductive system) that has a particularly wide range of
application by virtue of the fact that it contains only
high level abstractions, which is to say that it has no
specific empirical content.
Q and A 8:

page 102; line 20; type I, iii, C, c.

What is a theoretical model of the behavior of a
system?
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A theoretical model of the behavior of a system is a
set of statements, preferably mathematical formlulas,
relating the exogenous variables I and O and the endogenous variables S of the system.
Task II:
Q and A 9:

page 92; line 2; type II, i, A, a.

What is the object, mechanism, or process that a
model object represents ?
The object, mechanism, or process that a model object represents is its referent.
Q

and A 10:

page 112; line 15; type II, i, A, a.

What is the referent of which the physical interpretation

of

the

symbols;

"s," "F(s)," "G(s,s');" and

"H(s,s' )," constitutes a model object?
The referent of which the physical interpretation of
the symbols;

"s," "F(s)," "G(s,s')," and "H(s,s');" con-

stitute a model object is an electrical current at a
given point in a circuit.
Q

and A 11 :

page 11 2; 1 i ne 1 5; type I I, i, A, a.

What is the referent of which the sociological interpretation of the symbols; "s," "F(s)," "G(s,s')," and
"H(s,s');" constitutes a model object?
The referent of which the sociological interpretation

of

"G(s,s') ;"

the

symbols;

"s," "F(s)," "G(s,s')," and

constitute a model object is the probability
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of migration taking place between one given country and
another.
Q and A 12:

page 103; line 22; type II, i, A-D, a.

What is the referent of the water molecule?
The referent of the water molecule is the composition of water, since it is this that the water molecule
sets out to explain.

In another sense, it can be said

that the referent of the hypothetical or model water
molecule is the "real" molecule that it is presumed to
represent.
Q and A 13:

page 106; line 24; type II, i, A-H, d.

What must be added to a general theory in order to
obtain a theoretical model?
A model object must be added to a general theory in
order to obtain a theoretical model.
Q and A 14:

page 96; line 11; type II, i, B, a.

What do certain real valued functions that are given
on a differentiable manifold represent?
Certain real valued functions that are given on a
differentiable manifold represent properties of the referent.
Q and A 15:

page 95; line 1; type II, i, B, b.

What feature of crude (simple) models frequently
renders them more instructive than more complicated models?
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The feature of crude (simple) models that frequently
renders them more instructive than more complicated models is the exactness or precision of the solutions that
they provide.

Q and A 16:

page 110; line 15; type II, i, B, b.

What is the essential

property of model objects

that renders them useful?
The essential property of model objects that renders
them useful is their ability to be expanded into hypothetico-deductive systems to form theoretical models.
Q and A 17:

page 101; line 3; type II, i, B-C, c.

When it is said that there are many kinds of model
objects and, consequently, of theoretical models, what
property or properties account for these differences?
When it is said that there are many kinds of model
objects and, consequently, of theoretical models, the
property that accounts for the differences being talked
about is the amount of explanatory mechanism that is
postulated in each kind of model object.
Q and A 18:

page 105; line 30; type II, i, B-H, d.

What characteristic of a given field of research
diminishes the probability of finding general theories in
that field?
A field of research

that

is

likely to have few
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general theories is one that has produced mainly isolated
bits of knowledge rather than unifying concepts.
Q and A 19:

page 106; line 3; type II, i, B-H, d.

What kind of field of research can be expected to
have many general theories?
A field of research that has produced many unifying
concepts rather than mere isolated bits of knowledge can
be expected to have many general theories.
Q and A 20:

page 102; line 8; type II, i, C, b.

What kind of a model object is it that simply relates input and output by means of a rule.
A model object that simply relates input and output
by means of a rule is a black box.

Q and A 21:

page 102; line 13; type II, i, C, b.

What is a model called if it has an input and an
output along with internal variables, but no explanatory
mechanism?
A model that has an input and an output along with
internal variables but no explanatory mechanism is called
a grey box.
Q

and A 22:

page 102; line 17; type II, i,

c, b.

What is a model called if its law can be represented
by a formula relating the input, output, and the internal
variables to each other?
If a model's law can be represented by a formula
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relating the input, output, and the internal variables to
each other, it is called a grey box.
Q and A 23:

page 102; line 36; type II, i,

c, b.

What is a behavior model of a system?
A behavior model of a system is a model that attempts to relate significant phenomena to each other
without attempting to explain them by means of any conjectured structure or mechanism.

A model of this kind

that makes no attempt to go beyond the phenomena is a
black or grey box.
Q and A 24:

page 95; line 32; type II, i, C, c.

What is a model object, if theoretical?
A model object,
object at all.

if theoretical,

is not a model

According to the terminology that has

been employed hitherto, it is a theoretical model.
Q and A 25:

page 105; line 9; type II, i, C-D-S, b.

Discussion of the variety of models that can be
proposed for any given system serves to combat what
erroneous notion?
Discussion of the variety of models that can be
proposed for any given system serves to combat the mistaken notion that there is a one-to-one relation between
referents and their models.
Q and A 26:

page 103; line 1; type II, i, C-G, b.

What do black box models accomplish?
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Black box models make it possible to condense the
data and to predict the evolution of the system.
Q and A 27:

page 105; line 16; type II, i, C-G, b.

If the primary goal of model construction were mere1 y to make practical use of the referent, what kind of

model would be most appropriate?
If the primary goal of model construction were mere1 y to make practical use of the referent, the black or

grey box model would probably prove most appropriate.
Q and A 28:

page 105; line 16; type II, i, C-G, b.

In view of the fact that the goal of model construction is primarily the acquisition of theoretical knowledge, what kind of model object accords best with that
goal?
In view of the fact that the goal of model construction is primarily the acquisition of theoretical knowledge, a built-up model object accords best with that
goal.
Q and A 29:

page 105; line 34; type II, i, C-G, b.

What can a bui 1 t-up model object do that a black box
model cannot?
A built-up model object can, and a black box model
cannot, do the following:

(1) A built-up model object can

explain what takes place as opposed to merely noting that
it does take place. (2)

A built-up model object can
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predict new facts as opposed to merely making it possible
to compute outputs for given inputs.

(3)

A built-up

model object can provide knowledge that fits

in with

present knowledge as opposed to merely restating the
behavior of observed systems.
Q and A 30:

page 91; line 16; type II, i, CH, b.

What can be accomplished with a "black box'?"
A black box can be expanded into a hypotheticodeductive system to produce a theoretical model.
Q and A 31:

page 91; line 16; type II, 1. C-G-I, b.

What can be accomplished with a "black box'?"
A black box can be expanded into a hypotheticodeducti ve system to produce a theoretical model.

Q and A 32:

page 99; line 30; type II, i, C-G-0, b.

What is the point of citing the necklace, the sociogram, and the Watson-Crick model'?
The point of citing the necklace, the sociogram, and
the Watson-Crick model is to emphasize the fact that a
variety of kinds of models is possible.

Q and A 33:

page 100; line 1; type II, i, C-H, c.

How many ways are there of obtaining a theoretical
model'?
There are two ways of obtaining a theoretical model.
Q and A 34:

page 100; line 1; type II, i, C-H, c.

What are the two ways of obtaining a theoretical
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model?
The two ways of obtaining a theoretical model are
either to expand the model object or to embed it in a
general theory.
Q and A 35:

page 104;

line 29;

type II, i, C-H-Q, b.

How can the truth of the built-up models be checked?
The truth of the built-up models can be checked by
attempting to infer behavior from them.
Q and A 36:

page 101; line 4; type II, i, C-J, b.

What is the name given to a model object having no
internal explanatory mechanism?
The name given to a model object having no internal
explanatory mechanism is "black box."
Q and A 37:

page 101; line 26; type II, i, C-J, b.

What is a model object that concerns itself only
with accounting for the end results of the referent
without attempting to explain how these results are obtained called?
A model object that concerns itself only with accounting for the end results of the referent without
attempting to explain how these results are obtained is
called a black box.
Q and A 38:

page 111; line 12; type II, i, C-J, c.

What could a theoretical model that has been "confirmed" be termed to show that, to some extent (albeit
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inadequately),

it fulfills the requirements of a seman-

tical model?
In order to show that, to some extent, a "confirmed"
theoretical model fulfills the requirements of a semantical model, it could be termed a "guasimodel."
Q and A 39:

page 107;

line 25;

type II, i,

C-L, c.

What kind of theory is likely to be logically weak?
The kind of theory that is likely to be logically
weak is a specific theory (or theoretical model).
Q and A 40:

page 107; line 25; type II, i, C-L, d.

What kind of theory is likely to be logically
strong?
The kind of theory that is likely to be logically
strong is a general theory.
Q and A 41:

page 109; line 7; type II, i, C-M, c.

What is the difference between deterministic models
and probabilistic models?
The difference between deterministic models

and

probabilistic models is that deterministic models predict
(or attempt to predict) what will occur under certain
given conditions, whereas probabilistic models try to
predict what

m~

happen under given conditions while

indicating in mathematical terms what the chances are
that this or that event will or will not occur.
Q and A 42:

page 105; line 27; type II, i, C-T, b.
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What is the basic choice that the model constructor
must make?
The basic choice that the model constructor must
make is between superficial knowledge and deep knowledge.
In the former case, the black box is adequate.

But in

the latter cause, a built-up conceptual model is required.
Q

and A 43:

page 91;

line 5;

type II, i, D, b.

What is the relation between the ball-and-spoke
model of a molecule and the molecule itself?
The relation between the ball-and-spoke model of a
molecule and the molecule itself is the relation that
holds between a model object and its referent:

the

modeling relation.
Q and A 44:

page 91;

line 1 O;

type II, i, D, b.

What is the relation between a continuum endowed
with certain properties,

such as compressibility and

viscosity, and a fluid?
The relation between a continuum endowed with certain properties, such as compressibility and viscosity
and fluid is the relation that holds between a model
object and its referent: the modeling relation.
Q and A 45:

page 91; line 13; type II, i, D, b.

What is the relation between a black box and a
learning organism?
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The relation between a black box and a

learning

organism is the relation that holds between a model
object and its referent: the modeling relation.
Q and A 46:

page 92; line 6; type II, i, D, b.

Of what is the relation between a contour map of a
molecule and the molecule itself an example?
The relation between a contour map of a molecule and
the molecule itself is the relation that holds between a
model object and its referent:
Q and A 47:

the modeling relation.

page 92; line 7; type II, i, D, b.

Of what is the relation between the hamiltonian
operator for a molecule and the molecule itself an example?
The relation between the hamiltonian operator for a
molecule and the molecule itself is an example of the
relation that holds between a model object and its referent:

the modeling relation.

Q and A 48:

page 92; line 10; type II, i, D, b.

Of what is the relation between the random net model
of the brain and the brain itself an example?
The relation between the random net model of the
brain and the brain itself is an example of the relation
that holds between a model object and its referent:
modeling relation.
Q and A 49:

page 92; line 24; type II, i, D, b.

the

1 01

What is the relation between a homogeneous set or
equivalence class of mice and all the individuals of a
given mice strain?
The relation between a homogeneous set or equivalence class of mice and all the individuals of a given
mice strain is the relation that holds between a model
object and its referent:
Q and A 50:

the modeling relation.

page 92; line 26; type II, i, D, b.

What is the relation between the ordered triple (m,
n, Q) and a collision of m cars having as a result n
injured persons with a total damage of Q dollars?
The relation between the ordered triple (m, g, Q)
and a collision of m cars having as a result n injured
persons with a total damage of Q dollars is the relation
that holds between a model object and its referent:

the

modeling relation.
Q

and A 51: page 93; line 23; type II, i, D, b.
What is the relation between a sketch of an animal

population and the animal population itself?
The relation between a sketch of an animal population and the animal population itself is the relation
between a model object and its referent: the modeling
relation.
Q and A 52:

page 96; line 3; type II, i, D, b.

What sorts of elements are related to other elements
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by the modeling relation?
The modeling relation relates constructs to facts.
Q and A 53:

page 96; line 4; type II, i, D, b.

The modeling relates what to what?
The modeling relation relates model objects (and, by
extension, theoretical models) to referents.
Q and A 54:

page 93; line 5; type II, i, D, b.

What is the relation between a sketch of an animal
population and the animal population itself?
The relation between a sketch of an animal population and the animal population itself is the relation
that holds between a model object and its referent:

the

modeling relation.
Q and A 55:

page 100; line 9; type II, i, D, b.

What is the relation between Mand R?
The relation between M and R is the modeling relation.

This relation can be expressed by saying that M is

the model object that models R or that R is a referent
that is represented by model object M.
Q and A 56:

page 92; line 8; type II, i, D-E, b.

Of what is the relation between the Pseudo Areopagite's model of the celestial hierarchy and the celestial hierarchy itself an example?
The relation between the Pseudo Areopagite's model
of the celestial hierarchy and the celestial hierarchy
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itself is an example of the relation that holds between a
model object and its referent:
Q and A 57:

the modeling relation.

page 92; line 10; type II, i, D-E, b.

Of what is the relation between the random net model
of the brain and the brain itself an example?
The relation between the random net model of the
brain and the brain itself is an example of the relation
that holds between a model object and its referent:

the

modeling relation.
Q and A 58:

page 92; line 24; type II, i, D-E, b.

What is the relation between a homogeneous set or
equivalence class of mice and all the individuals of a
given mice strain?
The relation between a homogeneous set or equivalence class of mice and all the individuals of a given
mice strain is the relation that holds between a model
object and its referent:
Q and A 59:

the modeling relation.

page 92; line 26; type II, i, D-E, b

What is the relation between the ordered triple (m,

g, £) and a collision of m cars having as a result n
injured persons with a total damage of £ dollars?
The relation between the ordered triple (m, n, £)
and a collision of m cars having as a result n injured
persons with a total damage of £ dollars is the relation
that holds between a model object and its referent:

the
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modeling relation.
Q and A 60:

page 93; line 10; type II, i, D-E, b.

What is the relation between Ising's model of matter
in condensed states and matter in condensed states itself.
The relation between Ising's model of matter in
condensed states and matter in condensed states itself is
the relation that holds between a model object and its
referent:

the modeling relation.

Q and A 61:

page 96; line 4; type II, i, D-E, b.

What relation is presumed to hold between the set of
all of the first elements of the ordered pair (c,f) and
the set of all of the second elements of the same ordered
pair?
The relation that is presumed to hold between the
set of all of the first elements of the ordered pair
(c,f) and the set of all of the second elements of the
same ordered pair is the relation that is presumed to
hold between a model object and its referent:

the model-

ing relation.
Q and A 62:

page 92; line 6; type II, i, D-K, b.

Of what is the relation between a contour map of a
molecule and the molecule itself an example?
The relation between a contour map of a molecule and
the molecule itself is the relation that holds between a
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model object and its referent:
Q and A 63:

the modeling relation.

page 93; line 23; type II, i, D-K, b.

What is the relation between a sketch of an animal
population and the animal population itself?
The relation between a sketch of an animal population and the animal population itself is the relation
that holds between a model object and its referent:

the

modeling relation.
Q and A 64:

page 92; line 33; type II, i, D-K, b.

What does the sign "§" designate?
The sign

11

§ 11 designates the relation between a model

object and its referent.
Q and A 65:

page 112; line 15; type II, i, E, a.

What is the referent of which the physical interpretation

of

the

symbols;

"s," "F(s)," "G(s,s')" and

"H(s,s')," constitutes a model object?
The referent of which the physical interpretation of
the

symbols;

"s," "F(s)," "G(s,s')," and

"H(s,s')" con-

stitute a model object is an electrical current at a
given point in a circuit.
Q and A 66:

page 112; line 15; type II, i, E, a.

What is the referent of which the sociological interpretation of the symbols; "s," "F(s)," "G(s,s')," and
"H(s,s')" constitutes a model object?
The referent of which the sociological interpreta-
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tion
11

of

the

symbols;

"s,"

"F(s),"

"G(s,s'),"

and

G(s,s 1 ) 11 constitute a model object is the probability of

migration taking place between one given country and
another.
Q and A 67:

page 100; line 21; type II, H, E-G, b.

What do the mass point and the ball do?
The mass point and the ball--as examples of model
objects--constitute alternate hypotheses that

model a

planet.
Q and A 68:

page 103; line 20; type II, i, E-G, b.

What is the water molecule example supposed to show?
The water molecule example is supposed to show how
conjecture and imagination are needed to explain the law
of multiple proportions.

Thus, this example is intended

to exemplify the type of difficulty inherent in the attempt to disclose hidden structure and mechanism.
Q and A 69:

page 109; line 2; type II, i, E-G, b.

What is the purpose of the examples of the mechanisms of electromagnetic propagation, of complex chemical
reactions, and of biological evolution?
The purpose of the examples of the mechanisms of
electromagnetic propagation, of complex chemical reactions,

and of biological evolution is to combat the

identification of the concepts of model and mechanism,
that is, to show that the concept of model is broader
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than this identification would suggest, that there are
models that are not mechanistic.
Q and A 70:

page 109; line 27; type II, i, E-G, b.

What is the purpose of the quantum theory example?
The purpose of the quantum theory example is to show
how a too narrow concept of model object (model objects
are invariably analogues) has precipitated unnecessary
confusion into an area of scientific investigation.
Q and A 71:

page 110; line 8; type II, i, E-G, b.

What is the purpose of the coupled oscillators example?
The purpose of the coupled oscillators example is to
reinforce the point that model objects, and hence theories, are solely sets of statements and never can include pictorial representations as

integral parts.

Q and A 72: page 110; line 8; type II, i, E-G, b.
What is the purpose of the coupled oscillators example?
The purpose of the coupled oscillators example is to
reinforce the point that model objects, and hence theories, are solely sets of statements and never can include pictorial representations as
Q and A 73:

integral parts.

page 100; line 19; type II, i, E-G, c.

What is the point of the example of the mass point
or the ball as model objects for a planet?
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The point of the example of the mass point or the
ball as model objects for a planet is that model objects
by themselves are not sufficient.

Theoretical models

must be constructed from the model objects if they are to
prove useful.
Q and A 74:

page 107; line 14; type II, i, E-G, c.

What is the purpose of the shell oscillation example?
The purpose of the shell oscillation example is the
demonstration of the indispensability of theoretical
models.
Q and A 75:

page 106; line 13; type II, i, E-G, d.

What is the reason for bringing up the example of
the model of a gas as a swarm of point particles connected by van der Waals forces?
The model of a gas as a swarm of point particle
connected by van der Waals forces was brought up for the
purpose of exemplifying the processes whereby the same
model object can be fitted into different general theories thereby producing different theoretical models.
Q and A 76:

page 108; line 10; type II, i, E-G, d.

What is the purpose of the example of the sun, the
rotating ellipsoid or a mass point, and the theories of
gravitation and of light?
The purpose of the example of the sun, the rotating
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ellipsoid or a mass point, and the theories of gravitation and of light is to illustrate what can and should be
done when a

theoretical model embedded in a general

theory fails to conform to the facts.
Q and A 77:

page 108; line 18; type II, i, E-G, d.

What is the purpose of the Dicke and Brans example?
The purpose of the Dicke and Brans example is to
illustrate how the violation of the prescribed methodological rule has, in a real case, led theorists astray.
Dicke and Brans violated this rule by proposing to discard Einstein's highly prestigious gravitation theory.
Q and A 78:

page 109; line 15; type II, i, E-G, d.

What is the purpose of the example of the model of a
machine out of kilter (model object) as a model of an
unreliable fellow (referent) being embedded in the theory
of Markovian machines (general theory)?
The purpose of the example of the model of a machine
out of kilter as a model of an unreliable fellow being
embedded (the model, not the fellow) in the theory of
Markovian machines is to further broaden the concept of
the model object by showing that not all model objects
function as analogues by representing their referents indirectly in terms of another (usually more familiar)
mechanism or process, but rather, that some model objects
represent their referents by ref erring to them directly
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and literally.
Q and A 79:

page 107; line 1; type II, i, E-G-H, d.

What is the purpose of the meteorologist example?
The purpose of the meteorologist example is to show
how,

in an "advanced area," theoretical models are typi-

cally produced by uniting the model objects with preexisting general theories rather than, as in the "backward areas," by building a hypothetico-deductive system
around the model object.
Q and A 80:

page 100; line 13; type II, i, E-J, c.

What is it that constitutes a theoretical model of a
collection R of things?
What constitutes a theoretical model of a collection
R of things is a hypothetico-deductive system with primitive base M.
Q and A 81:

page 98; line 21; type II, i, E-L, c.

What is the central hypothesis of the McCulloch and
Pitts model of the brain?
The central hypothesis of the McCulloch and Pitts
model of the brain is that neurons fire only when the
preceding neurons have fired during the preceding moment.
Q and A 82:

page 93; line 25; type II, i, E-N-Q, b.

What criteria were applied in order to determine the
falsity of Ising's model object?
The criteria that were applied in order to determine
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the falsity of Ising's model object were the relatively
greater prestige of the general theory (statistical mechanics) and the principle that requires a theoretical
model to represent every significant (relevant?) aspect
of its referent if it is not to be considered false.
Q and A 83:

page 107; line 25; type II, i, E-0, d.

What example of a logically strong theory has been
cited?
The example of logically strong theory that has been
cited (by implication, at least) is that of classical
mechanics?
Q and A 84:

page 107; line 14; type II, i, G, c.

What are the three chief functions of theoretical
models?
The three chief functions of theoretical models are
these: (1) the posing of specific theoretical problems,
(2) the solution (explanation) of specific theoretical
problems, and (3)

the testing of proposed solutions

(explanations).
Q and A 85:

page 99; line 18; type II, i, G-H, b.

When a model object has been characterized in exact
terms with the help of mathematical concepts, such as
those of function and series, what has been accomplished?
When a model object has been characterized in exact
terms with the help of mathematical concepts, such as
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those of function and series, a theoretical model has
been constructed.
Q and A 86:

page 105; line 16; type II, i, G-H, b.

What are the two principal goals of model construetion?
The two principal goals of model construction are as
follows:

(1) to acquire theoretical understanding of the

referent,

(2) to make practical use of the referent.

Q and A 87:

page 91; line 10; type II, i, G-H, d.

What can be accomplished with a continuum endowed
with certain properties, such as compressibility and
viscosity?
A continuum endowed with certain properties, such as
compressibility and viscosity can be conjoined with
(grafted onto) classical mechanics,

general relativistic

mechanics or some other general theory to produce a
theoretical model of a fluid.
Q

and A88:

page 106;

line 18;

type II, i, G-H, d.

What is the purpose of assuming different particle
shapes and different force laws while keeping classical
mechanics throughout?
The purpose of assuming different particle shapes
and different force laws while keeping classical mechanics throughout

is to exemplify a

method of applying

different model objects to the same general theory to
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obtain different theoretical models.
Q and A 89:

page 98; line 29; type II, i, G-H-0, b.

What is the purpose of the reference to the success
of McCulloch and Pitts?
The

purpose of

the reference to the success of

McCulloch and Pitts is to justify the method of starting
with models objects that ignore certain significant aspects of their referents and then proceeding to complicate them when necessary.
Q and A 90:

page 99; line 5; type II, i, G-H-0, c.

What is the point of listing some of the aspects of
the referent that stochastic learning models ignore?
Some of the aspects of the referent that stochastic
learning models ignore are listed in order to emphasize
the concept of a model as a simplification or idealization.
Q and A 91:

page 100; line 15;

type II, i, G-H-P, c.

As long as the axiomatizability condition is not
necessary to obtain a theoretical model,

what is the

reason for including it in the description of the process?
Even though the axiomatizability condition is not
necessary to obtain a theoretical model,

it is necessary

in order to give a quick and exact definition of the
concept.
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Q and A 92:

page 98; line 31; type II, i, G-I-0, c.

What does the introduction of Rapoport's stochastic
models of the central nervous system accomplish?
The introduction of Rapoport's stochastic models of
the central nervous system serves to justify the delayed
complication of theoretical model--in this case, with the
addition of the random factor.
Q and A 93:

page 92; line 3; type II, i, G-K, b.

What is the point of saying that the representation
may be pictorial,

conceptual,

figurative,

semisymbolic,

or symbolic?
The point of saying that the representation may be
pictorial, conceptual, figurative,
bolic is that these are

semisymbolic, or sym-

the modes of representation that

model objects may make use of in performing their function of representing their referents.
Q and A 94:

page 92; line 28; type II, i, G-K, c.

What is the importance of the mode of representation
of model objects and theoretical models?

The modes of

representation of model objects and theoretical models
are important only to the extent that they be necessary
to enable the model objects or theoretical models to
accomplish their purpose of representing reality.

All of

which is to say that their importance is not intrinsic at
all;

it is merely instrumental.
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Q and A 95:

page 100; line 26; type II, i, G-K, c.

What does the table do?
The table gives examples of model objects along with
their corresponding referents and theoretical models.

Q and A 96:

page 103; line 29; type II, i, G-M-R, b.

What is the importance of contrasting users with
designers or scientists with engineers?
Users are contrasted with designers and scientists
with engineers to show how the model's application should
determine whether a dark box or a built-up model is
chosen.

Where mere use is contemplated, the dark box

model is adequate,

but where knowledge is desired,

a

built-up model is needed.

Q and A 97:

page 95; line 13; type II, i, G-0, b.

What is the citation of Bush and Mosteller, and of
Sternberg supposed to accomplish
The citing of Bush and Mosteller, and of Sternberg
is supposed justify the procedure whereby crude (simple)
models are utilized in the early stages of an investigation to point the way to the more complicated,

hence

realistic, models that are to be used in the later stages
of the investigation.

Q and A 98:

page 105; line 16; type II, i, G-0, b.

What is the purpose of the Pringle citation?
The purpose of the Pringle citation is to emphasize
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the dependence of the choice of model upon the goal of
the investigator.

If the goal is only to summarize data,

a black box model is sufficient.

But if further know-

ledge is sought, a built-up model is needed.
Q and A 99:

What

page 94; line 30; type II, i, G-0, c.
is

the

introduction of

the papers by Kac,

Uhlenbeck, and Hemmer; Dyson; and Kronig and Penney supposed to accomplish?
The introduction of the papers by Kac, Uhlenbeck,
and Hemmer; Dyson; and Kronig and Penney is supposed to
justify the use of crude theoretical models in the early
stages of an investigation.
Q and A 100:

page 103; line 25; type II, i, G-0-S, b.

What is made of the fact that the water molecule was
rejected by turn of the century energetists?
The rejection of the water molecule model by the
turn of the century energetists is part of a sort of
reductio ad absurdum argument meant to show the foolishness of preferring a grey box model to a built-up one.
The preference for grey or black box models can lead to
the rejection of models that later prove their worth by
gaining general acceptance.
Q and A 101:

page 107; line 35; type II, i, G-Q, c.

What is the object of assessing blame in case a
theory fails?
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The object of assessing blame in case a theory fails
is to know what to modify or discard in order to come up
with a viable theory.
Q and A 102:

page 91; line 11; type II, i, H, c.

In what two ways can theoretical models be obtained?
Theoretical models can be obtained either by grafting model objects onto general theories or by expanding
model objects to hypothetico-deductive systems.
Q and A 103:

page 105; line 37; type II, i, H, c.

In a field of research like contemporary mathematical sociology which has tended to produce isolated bits
of knowledge rather than unifying concepts, how are theoretical models typically constructed?
In a field of research like contemporary mathematical sociology which has tended to produce isolated bi ts
of knowledge rather than unifying concepts,

theoretical

models are typically constructed by by building them
around model objects.

This is usually done by expanding

the model into a mathematically oriented hypotheticodeductive system,
Q and A 104:

page 106; line 3; type II, i, H, c.

In a field of research like atomic and molecular
physics which has tended to produce unifying concepts
rather than mere isolated bits of knowledge,
theoretical models typically constructed?

how are

118

In a field of research like atomic and molecular
physics which has tended to produce unifying concepts
rather than mere isolated bits of knowledge,

theoretical

models are typically produced by fitting model objects to
existing general theories.

That is to say that the model

object is attached to the relevant part of the mathematical hypothetico-deductive apparatus of the general theory.
Q and A 105:

page 106; line 29; type II, i, H, c.

How are theoretical models usually obtained in the
developing areas of science?
In the developing areas of science,

theoretical

models are usually obtained by starting with the model
object and elaborating a set of formulas that define it.
Q and A 106:

page 107; line 8; type II, i, H, c.

What manner of producing theoretical models do psychologists and sociologists have at their disposal?
The manner of producing theoretical models that
psychologists and sociologists have at their disposal
involves building hypothetico-deductive systems around
model objects.
Q and A 107:

page 91; line 11; type II, i, H, d.

What process unites a model object with a general
theory?
The process that unites a model object with a gener-
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al theory is the process of "grafting on."

Q and A 108:

page 97; line 26; type II, i, H, d.

What can be done with a general theory in conjunction with a model object?
A general theory can be applied to a model object to
produce a theoretical model.
Q

and A 109:

page 106;

line 20;

type II, i, H, d.

In what two ways can multiple theoretical models be
generated?
Multiple theoretical models can be generated either
by embedding the same model object into different general
theories or by grafting different model objects onto the
same general theory.

Q and A 110:

page 106; line 25; type II, i, H, d.

How is a model object added to a general theory in
order to produce a theoretical model?
A model object is added to a general theory in order
to produce a theoretical model by adding to the general
theory a set of subsidiary hypotheses that characterize
or define the model object

Q and A 111:

page 107; line 25; type II, i, H, d.

How are general theories tested?
General theories are tested by testing the theoretical models that are produced from them by joining model
objects to them.
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Q and A 112:

page 93; line 33; type II, i, H-I, b.

What procedure do Onsager's good results justify?
The procedure that Onsager's good results justify is
that of making simple model objects to start and complicating them later.
Q and A 113:

page 107; line 19; type II, i, H-I, b.

What is the result of specifying the boundary and
initial conditions, the mass and stress distributions,
and the external forces for the oscillation of a shell?
The result of specifying the boundary and initial
conditions, the mass and stress distributions, and the
external forces for the oscillation of a shell is a model
object.
Q and A 114:

page 97; line 9; type II, i, H-I, c.

What must done with a

model object if it is to

become useful?
If a model object is to become useful, it must be
converted into a theoretical model.
Q and A 115:

page 98; line 8; type II, i, H-I, c.

What can be accomplished by complicating the Bloch
model?
By complicating the Bloch model, more properties of
the crystal can be explained.
Q and A 116:

page 98; line 10; type II, i, H-I, c.

What must be done in order to render the theoretical
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model capable of representing more traits?
To render the theoretical model capable of representing more traits, it must be made more complicated.
Q and A 117:

page 104; line 19; type II, i, H-I, c.

What is the result of adding the constitutive equations of the oscillation of a shell to the model object
of this referent?
The result of adding the constitutive equations of
the oscillation of a shell to the model object of this
referent is a theoretical model of it.
Q and A 118:

page 97; line 25; type II, i, H-I, d.

How was the Bloch model of a crystal obtained?
The Bloch model of a crystal was obtained by applying wave mechanics (a general theory) to a simple
model of a crystal (a model object).
Q and A 119:

page 109; line 19; type II, i, H-I, d.

What would be the expected result of embedding the
model of a machine out of kilter (model object) in the
theory of Markovian machines (general theory)?
The expected result of embedding the model of a
machine out of kilter in the theory of Markovian machines
would be the production of a theoretical model.
Q and A 120:

page 99; line 2; type II, i, H-M, d.

What difference between the advanced and the backward sciences makes it necessary to obtain theoretical
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models differently in each?
The difference between the advanced and the backward
sciences that makes it necessary to obtain theoretical
models differently in each is the relatively plentiful
supply of general theories in the one as opposed to their
relative paucity in the other.
Q and A 121:

page 99; line 22; type II, i, H-M, d.

What is the difference in the way that theoretical
models are typically obtained in the advanced sciences as
opposed to the way that they are obtained in the backward
sciences?
In the advanced sciences, theoretical models are
typically obtained by embedding model objects in one or
another of the relatively plentiful general theories that
are to be found there.
ever,

In the backward sciences, how-

theoretical models are usually obtained by expand-

ing the model objects into mathematically explicit hypothetico-deductive systems;

since there, general theories

are typically scarce.
Q and A 122:

page 100; line 1; type II, i, H-P, c.

What is the prerequisite (if any) for obtaining a
theoretical model?
The prerequisite for obtaining a theoretical model
is a model object.
Q and A 123:

page 107; line 8; type II, i, H-P, d.
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What is the enviable position that the psychologists
and sociologists have not, so far, attained?
The enviable position that the psychologists and
sociologists have not,

so far,

attained is that of being

able to count on general theories to attach their model
objects to in order to produce theoretical models.
Q and A 124:

page 108; line 15; type II, i, H-P, d.

Under what conditions should the model object be
modified or discarded in favor of the general theory?
The model object should be modified or discarded in
favor of the genera 1 theory when the genera 1 theory has
had a long and distinguished career or then the model
object is obviously much too coarse.
Q and A 125:

page 108; line 20; type II, i, H-P, d.

Under what conditions should the general theory be
modified or discarded in favor of the model object?
The general theory should be modified or discarded
in favor of the model object if it has failed in the past
or if it is very young and cannot be assigned a truth
value.
Q and A 126:

page 108; line 23; type II, i, H-Q, c.

What three steps are involved in the verification of
theoretical models?
The three steps involved in the verification of
theoretical models are these:

( 1) the bui !ding of sev-
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eral model objects,(2) the joining of these model objects
to the generic theory to produce theoretical models, a
(3) the testing of these theoretical models to find out
if they agree with the empirical facts.
Q and A 127:

page 108; line 1; type II, i, H-Q-S, d.

If a theoretical model not associated with a general
theory fails to conform to the facts, what can be done?
If a theoretical model not associated with a general
theory fails to conform to the facts,
model must be modified or replaced.

the theoretical

This involves trying

out other theoretical models.
Q and A 128:

page 107; line 35; type II, i, H-Q-T, d.

In case that a theory fails, what options are available with respect to blame assessment?
In case that a theory fails, the options that are
available with respect to blame assessment are either to
blame the theoretical model, and hence the model object,
or to blame the general theory.
Q and A 129:

page 103; line 13; type II, i, H-S, b.

What difficulty is inherent in most attempts to
disclose the inner structure and mechanism of a system?
The difficulty inherent in most attempts to disclose
the inner structure and and mechanism of a system lies in
the fact that such structures and mechanisms are usually
hidden and cannot be seen.

Thus, they must be conjec-
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tured or imagined.

Q and A 130:

page 108; line 5; type II, i, H-S-T, d.

If a theoretical model that is associated with a
general theory fails to conform to the facts, what can be
done?
If a theoretical model that is associated with a
general theory fails to conform to the facts,

either the

theoretical model or the general theory can be rnodif ied
or replaced.

Q and A 131:

page 92; line 2; type II, i, J, b.

What is the object, mechanism, or process that a
model object represents called?
The object, mechanism, or process that a model object represents is called its referent.

Q and A 132:

page 97; line 20; type II, i, J, c.

What is a specific theory?
A specific theory is a theoretical model.

Q and A 133:

page 111; line 33; type II, i, J-L, c.

What is the set of statements,

F1

through F4?

The set of statements, F1 through F4, is the interpreted system that has been obtained by applying the
interpretation; "the capital letters are sets or functions, 'R' is the real line, 'O' is the arithmetic product, etc.;" to the sys tern of s ta tern en t forms A1 through
AS.
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Q and A 134:

page 100; line 9; type II, i, K, a.

What does R represent?
R represents a referent.
Q and A 135:

page 100; line 8; type II, i, K, b.

What does M represent?
M represents a model object.
Q and A 136: page 101; line 37; type II, i, K-R, b.

What can be done to remedy the excessive coarseness
and lack of economy characteristic of the description of
the model

wherein the paired inputs and outputs are

tabulated?
To remedy the excessive coarseness and lack of economy characteristic of the description of the model wherein the paired inputs and outputs are tabulated,

the

ordered pairs can be implied by means of a rule rather
than stated explicitly by means of a table.
Q and A 137:

page 93; line 25; type II, i, N-Q, c.

To arrive at

the diagnostic "false" for

Ising's

model what rule or principle was applied?
To arrive at

the diagnostic "false" for

Ising's

model, the principle that requires a theoretical model to
represent every significant (relevant?) aspect of its
referent if it is not to be considered false was applied.
Q and A 138:

page 93; line 27; type II, i, N-Q, d.

What criterion was applied in order to determine the
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falsity of Ising's model object?
The criterion that was applied in order to determine
the falsity of Ising's model object was the relatively
greater prestige of the general theory (statistical mechanics).
Q and A 139:

page 104; line 7; type II, i, N-S, b.

What is the primary mistake that

the black box

philosopher makes?
The black box philosopher's primary mistake is his
failure to recognize that the acquisition of knowledge as
opposed to mere use requires the construction of built-up
models as opposed to mere dark box models.
Q and A 140:

page 105; line 13; type II, i, N-T, b.

What are the gross criteria that

determine

the

choice from among the variety of models available to
represent any given referent?
The gross criteria that determine the choice from
among the variety of models available to represent any
given referent are the following:

(1)

the nature of

the referent,

(2) the goal of the investigator.

Q and A 141:

page 93; line 27;

type II, i, Q-T, c.

What options are there for placing the blame in case
a theoretical model proves false?.
In case a theoretical model proves false,
usually two options for placing the blame:

there are

(1) It can be
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determined that the model object is at fault. (2) It can
be

determined

Q and A 142:

that

the

general

theory

is at

fault.

page 104; line 14; type II, ii, C-G-I b

Does the black box model have any use in the process
of scientific inquiry?
Yes.

The black box model does have a use in the

process of scientific inquiry.

But this use occurs pri-

marily during the early stages of scientific investigation.
Q and A 143: page 100; line 14; type II, ii, H-I-P, c.

Does the satisfaction of the axiomatizability condition guarantee the production of a theoretical model as
long as the other conditions are as described.
Yes.

The satisfaction of the axiomatizability con-

dition does guarantee the production of a theoretical
model as long as the other conditions are as described.
Q and A 144:

page 100; line 14; type II, ii, H-P, c.

Would it be possible to obtain a theoretical model
of R without satisfying the axiomatizability condition?
Yes.

It would be possible to obtain a theoretical

model of R without satisfying the axiomatizability condition.
Q and A 145:

page 100; line 1; type II, ii, H-P, d.

Is a general theory a prerequisite for obtaining a
theoretical model?
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No.

A general theory is not a prerequisite for

obtaining a theoretical model.

It is quite possible to

obtain a theoretical model even though there is no general theory on the horizon.
Q and A 146:

page 104 line 16 type II, iii,

C-G-I, b.

If one of the aims of research were to be instantaneously and universally realized, what would be the effect on all black boxes?
If one of the aims of research were to be instantaneously and universally realized,

all black boxes would

be converted into built-up models.

Since one of the aims

of research is to throw further light into every box, the
accomplishment of this aim would change all black boxes
into built-up models or, at least, into grey boxes.
Q

and A 147: page 104 line 14 type II, iii, C-I-N, b.
What would be the likely result of the universal

application of the black boxist philosophy?
The likely result of the universal application of
the black boxist philosophy would be the immediate drying
up of the sources of scientific knowledge and, consequently,

an eventual halt to scientific progress.

This concludes the presentation of the questions and
answers that are associated with the task-types I and II.
The questions that have been presented in this chapter
involve the tasks of identification and specification.
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In the next chapter, questions associated with task-types
III, IV, V, and VI will be presented.

Those questions

involve the tasks of description, classification, comparison, and interpretation.
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CHAPTER VII
TASKS III, IV, V, AND VI:
DESCRIBING, CLASSIFYING, COMPARING AND INTERPRETING
The questions and answers associated with task-types
I

and

II

involving the

specif ica ti on
chapter.

have

been

tasks

of

identification and

presented

in

the

preceding

Here the presentation of the questions and

answers continues with the task-types III, IV, V, and VI
involving the tasks of description,
parison, and interpretation.

classification,

com-

These questions and an-

swers, numbered from 148 to 275 follow immediately.
Task III
Q and A 148:

page 95; line 17; type III, i, C, b.

What is a more or less schematic model object?
A more or less schematic model object is a model
object that in some way represents its referent but does
it rather crudely--leaving out many significant aspects
of the referent.
Q and A 149:

page 103; line 6; type III, i,

What kind of a model is a built-up

c,

b.

model of a

system?
A built-up model of a system is a model that shows
the inner structure and the mechanism of the system.
1 31
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Q and A 150:

page 103; line 3; type III, i, C-H, b.

What will a black box model not do?
A black box model will not explain the behavior of a
system, nor will it provide the kind of knowledge that
can be related to scientific knowledge in general.
Q and A 151:

page 96; line 17; type III, i, D-E, c.

What is the logical form of the formula for the
total mass of cell r?
The logical form of the formula for the total mass
of cell r is that of a conditional whose antecedent is a
statement of the modeling relation and whose consequent
is a statement about the total mass of cell r.
Q and A 152:

page 93; line 21; type III, i, H-P, d.

In order to apply the same general theory (classical
statistical mechanics,

for example) to several different

model objects, what must be assumed about those model
objects?
In order to apply the same general theory, such as
classical statistical mechanics, to several different
model objects, it must be assumed that the elements of
each of those model objects are related to each other in
similar ways, in ways described by the general theory.
Q and A 153:

page 104; line 9; type III, i, N-S, b.

What is the black boxist's attitude toward mind and
brain.
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The black boxist would have us consider only the
input and output of the mind and brain without any inquiry into the kinds of structure and mechanism that
convert the one into the other.
Task IV
Q and A 154:

page 91; line 14; type IV, i, A-C, d.

What is a "black box?"
A black box is a kind of a kind of model object in
which no mechanism is displayed;

only an input and

output are provided.
Q

and A 155:

page 100; line 11; type IV, i, A-L, b.

What do any consistent set of conditions (postulates) specifying the structure (mathematical nature) of
then primitive concepts of

Q,

as well as their factual

meaning, constitute?
Any consistent set of conditions specifying the
structure of the n primitive concepts of Q, as well as
their factual meaning, is a theoretical model of R.
Q and A 156:

page 98; line 15; type IV, i, C-E, b.

What kind of model object is the McCulloch and Pitts
brain model?
The McCulloch and Pitts brain model is an example of
a grey box model.
Q and A 157:

page 93; line 10; type IV, i, D, b.

What is the relation between Ising's model of matter
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in condensed states and matter in condensed states itself.
The relation between Ising's model of matter in
condensed states and matter in condensed states itself is
the relation that holds between a model object and its
referent:

the modeling relation.

Q and A 1 58:

page 91 ; line 1 0; type IV, i

I

E, a.

I

E, a.

What is a fluid?
A fluid is an example of a referent.
Q and A 159:

page 91 ; line 1 3; type IV, i

What is a "learning organism?"
A "learning organism" is an example of a referent.

Q and A 160:

page 92; line 9; type IV, i, E, a.

What is the celestial hierarchy?
The celestial hierarchy is an example of a referent.

Q and A 161:

page 92; line 10; type IV, i, E, a.

What is the brain?
The brain is an example of a referent.

Q and A 162:

page 92; line 10; type IV, i, E, a.

What is the random net model of the brain?
The random net model of the brain is an example of a
model object.

Q and A 163:

page 92; line 21; type IV, i, E, a.

What do all the individuals of a given mice strain
constitute?
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All the individuals of a given mice strain constitute an example of a referent.
Q and A 164:

page 92; line 26; type IV, i, E, a.

What is a collision of m cars having as a result n
injured persons with a total damage of £ dollars?
A collision of m cars having as a result n injured
persons with a total damage of£ dollars is an example of
a referent.
Q and A 165:

page 93; line 10; type IV, i, E, a.

What is matter in condensed states?
Matter in condensed states is an example of a referent.
Q and A 166:

page 93; line 23; type IV, i, E, a.

What is an animal population?
An animal population is an example of a referent.
Q and A 167:

page 94; line 23; type IV, i, E, a.

What is a gas?
A gas is an example of a referent.
Q and A 168:

page 94; line 30; type IV, i, E, a.

What is the glass structure?
The glass structure is an example of a referent.
Q and A 169:

page 95; line 22; type IV, i, E, a.

What is R?
R is an example of a referent (the set of individuals to be represented).
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Q and A 170:

page 96; line 4; type IV, i, E, a.

What is the set of all of the second elements of the
ordered pair (c,f )?
The set of all of the second elements of the ordered
pair (c,f) is an example of a referent>

Q and A 171:

page 96; line 9; type IV, i, E, a.

What is a cell?
A cell is an example of a referent.

Q and A 172:

page 97; line 7; type IV, i, E, a.

What is a liquid?
A liquid is an example of a referent.
Q and A 173:

page 97; line 7; type IV, i, E, a.

What is a brain?
A brain is an example of a referent.
Q and A 174:

page 97; line 11; type IV, i, E, a.

What is a gas?
A gas is an example of a referent.

Q and A 175:

page 97; line 26; type IV, i, E, a.

What is a crystal?
A crystal is an example of a referent.
Q and A 176:

page 98; line 15; type IV, i, E, a.

What is the brain?
The brain is an example of a referent.
Q and A 177:

page 99; line 2; type IV, i, E, a.

What is animal behavior?
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Animal behavior is an example of a referent.

Q and A 178:

page 99; line 33; type IV, i, E, a.

What sort of thing does some-of-the-relations-amongthe-individuals-in-a-community constitute?
Some-of-the-relations-among-the-individuals-in-acommunity constitutes an example of a referent.

Q and A 179:

page 100; line 5; type IV, i, E, a.

What is a cell?
A cell is an example of a referent.

Q and A 180:

page 100; line 21; type IV, i, E, a.

What is a planet?
A planet is an example of a referent.

Q and A 181:

page 106; line 7; type IV, i, E, a.

What is a carbon atom?
A carbon atom is an example of a referent.

Q and A 182:

page 106; line 13; type IV, i, E, a.

What is a gas?
A gas is an example of a referent.

Q and A 183:

page 107; line 4; type IV, i, E, a.

What is the real atmosphere?
The real atmosphere is an example of a referent.

Q and A 184:

page 107; line 19; type IV, i, E, a.

What is the oscillation of a shell?
The oscillation of shell is an example of a referent.
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Q and A 185:

page 108; line 10; type IV, i, E, a.

What is the sum (along with its optical and gravitational manifestations)?
The sum (along with its optical and gravitational
manifestations) is an example of a referent.
Q and A 186:

page 109; line 2; type IV, i, E, a.

What are the mechanisms of electromagnetic propagation, of complex chemical reactions, and of biological
evolution?
The mechanisms of electromagnetic propagation, of
complex chemical reactions,

and of biological evolution

are example of referents for which model objects and then
theoretical models can be hypothesized or constructed.
Q and A 187:

page 109; line 16; type IV, i, E, a.

What is an unreliable person?
An unreliable person is an example of a referent.
Q and A 188:

page 110; line 4; type IV, i, E, a.

What is the motion of a set of coupled oscillators?
The motion of a set of coupled oscillators is an
example of a referent.
Q and A 189:

page 91; line 10; type IV, i, E, b.

What is a continuum endowed with certain properties,
such as compressibility and viscosity?
A continuum endowed with certain properties, such as
compressibility and viscosity is an example of a model
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object.
Q and A 190:

page 92; line 6; type IV, i, E, b.

What is a contour map of a molecule?
A contour map of a molecule is an example of a model
object.
Q and A 191:

page 92; line 7; type IV, i, E, b.

What is the hamiltonian operator?
The hamiltonian operator is an example of a model
object.
Q and A 192:

page 92; line 8; type IV, i, E, b.

What is the Pseudo Areopagite's model of the celestial hierarchy?
The Pseudo Areopagite's model of the celestial hierarchy is an example of a model object.
Q and A 193:

page 92; line 24; type IV, i, E, b.

What is a homogeneous set or equivalence class (of
mice)?
A homogeneous set or equivalence class (of mice) is
an example of model object.
Q and A 194:

page 92; line 28; type IV, i, E, b.

What is the ordered triple (rn, n, £)?
The ordered triple (m,

n,

£) is an example of a

model object.
Q and A 195:

page 93; line 10; type IV, i, E, b.

What is Ising's model of matter in condensed states?
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Ising's model of matter in condensed states is an
example of a model object.

Q and A 196:

page 93; line 23; type IV, i, E, b.

What is a sketch of an animal population?
A sketch of an animal population is an example of a
model object.

Q and A 197:

page 95; line 23; type IV, i, E, b.

What do the homogeneous subsets S constitute?
The homogeneous subsets S constitute an example of a
model object.

Q and A 198:

page 95; line 24; type IV, i, E, b.

What is each member s?
Each member s is an element of set S which, in turn,
constitutes an example of a model object.

Q and A 199:

page 96; line 4; type IV, i, E, b.

What is the set of all of the first elements of the
ordered pair (c,f)?
The set of all of the first elements of the ordered
pair (c,f) is an example of a model object.

Q and A 200:

page 96; line 10; type IV, i, E, b.

What is a differentiable manifold?
A differentiable manifold is an example of a model
object.

Q and A 201:

page 97; line 7; type IV, i, E, b.

What is a molecular lattice?
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A molecular lattice is an example of a model object.

Q and A 202:

page 97; line 8; type IV, i, E, b.

What is a neuron net?
A neuron net is an example of a model object.

Q and A 203:

page 97; line 26; type IV, i, E, b.

What is a simple model of the crystal?
A simple model of the crystal is an example of a
model object.

Q and A 204:

page 98; line 15; type IV, i, E, b.

What is the McCulloch and Pitts brain model?
The McCulloch and Pitts brain model is an example of
a model object.

Q and A 205:

page 99; line 32; type IV, i, E, b.

What is a chain of multicolored beads?
A chain of multicolored beads is an example of a
model object.

Q and A 206:

page 99; line 33; type IV, i, E, b.

What is a sociogram?
A sociogram is an example of a model object.

Q and A 207:

page 99; line 35; type IV, i, E, b.

What sort of thing is the Watson-Crick model of DNA?
The Watson-Crick model of DNA is an example of a
model object.

Q and A 208:

page 100; line 5; type IV, i, E, b.

What is a model cell?
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A

model cell is an example of a model object.

Q and A 209:

page 100; line 22; type IV, i, E, b.

What is a mass point?
A mass point is an example of a model object.
Q and A 210:

page 100; line 22; type IV, i, E, b.

What is a ball?
A ball is an example of a model object.
Q and A 211:

page 103; line 22; type IV, i, E, b.

What is a water molecule?
A water molecule is an example of a model object.
Q and A 212:

page 106; line 6; type IV, i, E, b.

What is a hamiltonian operator?
A hamiltonian operator is an example of a model
object.
Q and A 213:

page 106; line 14; type IV, i, E, b.

What is a swarm of point particles connected by van
der Waals forces?
A swarm of point particles connected by van der
Waals forces is an example of a model object.
Q and A 214:

page 108; line 10; type IV, i, E, b.

What is a rotating ellipsoid or a mass point?
A rotating ellipsoid or a mass point is an example
of a model object.
Q and A 215:

page 109; line 16; type IV, i, E, b.

What is a vending machine out of order?
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A vending machine out of order is an example of a

model object.

T~e

unreliable person would, of course, be

the referent of this model object.
Q and A 216:

page 110; line 3; type IV, i, E, b.

What are the alternative representations of the motion of a set of coupled oscillators?
The alternative representations of the motion of a
set of coupled oscillators are examples of model objects.
Q and A 217:

page 110; line 6; type IV, i, E, b.

What are the symbolic diagrams that correspond to
the alternative representations of the motion of the set
of coupled oscillators?
The symbolic diagrams that correspond to the alternative representations of the motion of the set of coupled oscillators are examples of heuristic devices (the
alternative representations) more intelligible while
remaining merely adjuncts to, and not parts of, those
model objects.
Q and A 218:

page 111; line 33; type IV, i, E, b.

What is the series of statements; "the capital letters are sets or functions, 'R' is the real line,

1

0

1

is

the arithmetic product, etc.?"
The series of statements; "the capital letters are
sets or

functions,

'R' is

the

real

line,

1

0

1

is

the

arithmetic product, etc." is an interpretation for the
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system of signs A1 through AS.
Q and A 219:

pag.e 112; line 15; type IV, i, E, b.

What do the physical and sociological interpretations

of

the

symbols;

"s," "F(s)," "G(s,s')," and

"H(s,s')" constitute?
The physical and sociological interpretations of the
symbols; "s," "F(s)," "G(s,s')," and "H(s,s')" constitute
examples of model objects.
Q and A 220:

page 112; line 26; type IV, i, E, b.

What does the set of entities; "the set of bodies,"
"the temperature," "the quantity of heat per unit mass,"
and "the specific heat at constant volume" constitute?
The

set of entities;

"the set of

bodies," "the

temperature," "the quantity of heat per unit mass," and
"the specific heat at constant volume" constitutes an
example of a model object.
Q and A 221:

page 94; line 23; type IV, i, E, c.

What is a linear model of a gas?
A linear model of a gas is an example of a theoretical model.
Q and A 222:

page 94; line 29; type IV, i, E, c.

What is Dyson's random chain?
Dyson's random chain is an example of a theoretical
model.
Q and A 223:

page 95; line 19; type IV, i, E, c.
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What is M?
M is an examf>le of a theoretical model.
Q and A 224:

page 96; line 10; type IV, i, E, c.

What is a differentiable manifold on which certain
real valued functions are given?
A differentiable manifold on which certain real valued functions are given is an example of theoretical
model.
Q and A 225:

page 97; line 10; type IV, i, E, c.

What is the kinetic gas theory?
The kinetic gas theory is an example of a theoretical model.
Q and A 226:

page 98; line 5; type IV, i, E, c.

What is the Bloch model of a crystal?
The Bloch model of a

crystal is an example of a

theoretical model.
Q and A 227:

page 98; line 30; type IV, i, E, c.

What are stochastic models of the central nervous
system?
Stochastic models of the central nervous system are
examples of theoretical models.
Q and A 228:

page 99; line 3; type IV, i, E, c.

What are stochastic learning models?
Stochastic learning models are examples of theoretical models.
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Q and A 229:

page 111; line 17; type IV, i, E, c.

What is the. system of signs: A1 through AS?
The system of signs, A1 through AS, is an example of
a purely formal (and uninterpreted) theory, that is to
say, a related series of statement forms.
Q and A 230:

page 111; line 33; type IV, i, E, c.

Does the interpreted system, F1 through F4,

consti-

tute an example of a theoretical model?
No.

The interpreted system, F1 through F4, does not

constitute an example of a theoretical model because,
although it has now been interpreted,
is mathematical not factual.

Thus,

the interpretation

it still includes no

empirical content.
Q and A 231:

page 91; line 10; type IV, i, E, d.

What is "classical mechanics?"
Classical mechanics is an example of a general theory.
Q and A 232:

page 91; line 13; type IV, i, E, d.

What is "general relativistic mechanics?"
General relativistic mechanics is an example of a
general theory.
Q and A 233:

page 93; line 19; type IV, i, E, d.

What is classical statistical mechanics?
Classical statistical mechanics is an example of a
general theory.
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Q and A 234:

page 97; line 12; type IV, i, E, d.

What is general statistical mechanics?
General statistical mechanics is an example of a
general theory.
Q and A 235:

page 97; line 12; type IV, i, E, d.

What is thermodynamics?
Thermodynamics is an example of a general theory.
Q and A 236:

page 97; line 14; type IV, i, E, d.

What is general graph theory?
General graph theory is an example of a general
theory.
Q and A 237:

page 97; line 24; type IV, i, E, d.

What is the current theory of the solid state?
The current theory of the solid state is an example
of a theoretical model.
Q and A 238:

page 97; line 25; type IV, i, E, d.

What is wave mechanics?
Wave mechanics is an example of a general theory.
Q and A 239:

page 97; line 33; type IV, i, E, d.

What is quantum mechanics?
Quantum mechanics is an example of a general theory.
Q and A 240:

page 106; line 15; type IV, i, E, d.

What is relativistic particle mechanics?
Relativistic particle mechanics is an example of a
general theory.
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Q and A 241:

page 106; line 15; type IV, i, E, d.

What is classical particle mechanics?
Classical particle mechanics is an example of a general theory.
Q and A 242:

page 106; line 37; type IV, i, E, d.

What are hydrodynamics and thermodynamics?
Hydrodynamics and thermodynamics are examples of
general theories.

Q and A 243:

page 108; line 13; type IV, i, E, d.

What are the theories of gravitation and of light?
The theories of gravitation and of light are examples of

general theories.

Q and A 244:

page 109; line 22; type IV, i, E, d.

What is the theory of Markovian machines?
The theory of Markovian machines is an example of a
general theory.
Q and A 245:

page 110; line 37; type IV, ii, A, c.

Can metascientif ic theories ever qualify as semantic
models?
No.

Metascientif ic theories cannot ever qualify as

semantic models.
Q and A 246:

page 111; line 7; type IV, ii, A, c.

Would it be possible for a

semantical model

to

qualify as a model in the metascientif ic sense?
Yes, it would be possible for a semantical model to
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qualify as a model in the metascientif ic sense.

Q and A 247:

pa~e

111; line 7; type IV, ii, A-C, c.

Do all semantical models qualify as metascientif ic
models?
No.

Not all semantical models qualify as metascien-

tif ic models.

Q and A 248:

page 112; line 26; type IV, ii, A-C, c.

Does the set of entities: "the set of bodies," "the
temperature,"

"the quantity of heat per unit mass," and

"the specific heat at constant volume" constitute a semantical model?
No.

The set of entities; "the set of bodies," "the

temperature,"

"the quantity of heat per unit mass," and

"the specific heat at constant volume" does not constitute a semantical model.

Q and A 249:

page 111; line 27; type IV, ii, C, c.

Is the set of statements; "the capital letters are
sets

or

functions,

'R' is

the

real

line,

1

0 1 is

the

arithmetic product, etc;" a semantical model?
No.
sets

or

The set of statements; "the capital letters are
functions,

'R' is

the

real

line,

'O' is

the

arithmetic product, etc;" is not a semantical model.

Q and A 250:

page 94; line 30; type IV, iii, E-N, b.

The concept of one-dimensional models helping the
attainment of understanding of three-dimensional phenome-
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na is an instance of what generalization?
The concept_ of one-dimensional models helping the
attainment of understanding of three-dimensional phenomena is an instance of the concept of crude models helping
the attainment of understanding of complicated phenomena.
Q and A 251:

page 93; line 25; type IV, iii, E-H, b.

What sort of thing was

the solution that Ising

obtained by grafting his model object onto general statistical mechanics?
The solution that Ising obtained by grafting his
model object onto general statistical mechanics was a
theoretical model.
Task V
Q and A 252:

page 100; line 20; type V, i, A, c.

In what way is a theoretical model far richer than
the bare model object?
Q and A 253:

page 110; line 23; type V, i, A, c.

What is the difference between theoretical models
and semantical models?
The difference between theoretical models and semantical models is that while theoretical models are sets of
statements concerning some aspect of reality, semantical
models are interpretations of abstract theories.
Q

and A 254:

page 11 O; line 24; type V, i, C, b •.

In what ways are semantic models and metascientif ic
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models similar?
Semantic models and metascientif ic models are similar to the extent that they both contain designation
rules and semantic assumptions that provide the abstract
statements with factual content that can be assigned
truth values.
Q and A 255:

page 101; line 13; type V, i, C-H, b.

In what way is a grey box an improvement over the
black box?
A grey box is an improvement over the black box in
that the grey box specifies intermediate variables between the input and output rather than merely providing
the latter as does the black box.
Task VI
Q and A 256:

page 96; line 1; type VI, i, B, a.

What does it mean to say that a referent is not
abstract?
To say that a referent is not abstract, is to say
that it is a factual referent.

This means that it (pur-

portedly) represents some concrete (real) thing or event.
It has empirical content.
Q and A 257:

page 107; line 25; type VI, i, B-C, c.

What does it mean for a

theory to be logically

strong?
For a theory to be logically strong means that the

1S2
theory has little empirical content.
falsity of such a

Thus,

the truth or

theory depends primarily upon the

validity of its logical form rather than upon the state
of things in the world.
Q and A 2S8:

page 107; line 2S; type VI, i, B-C, c.

What does it mean for a theory to be logical 1 y weak?
For a theory to be logically weak means that the
theory has considerable empirical content.

Thus, its

truth or falsity depends upon the state of things in the
world rather than upon the validity of its logical form.
Q

and A 2S9:

page 111; line 2S; type VI, i, B-E, c.

What is meant by saying that the system of signs, A1
through AS, is nonsignificant?
By saying that the system of signs, A1 through AS,
is nonsignificant, it is meant that the system is uninterpreted, which is to say that its terms, relations,
operators, etc. have not been assigned meanings.
Q and A 260:

page 92; line 23; type VI, i, B-H, b.

What does it mean to say that the real population,
made up of different individuals, is modeled as a homogeneous (equivalence) class?
To say that the real population, made up of different individuals, is modeled as a homogeneous (equivalence)

class means that all of the properties of the

different individuals making up the set are ignored ex-
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cept for a selected property or properties so that the
the set may be regarded as homogeneous in that the individuals all embody the selected property or properties
without regard for any differences that they may display
with respect to other properties.
Q

and A 261:

page 109; line 32; type VI, i, B-J, b.

What does "The same holds,

a

fortiori,

for

the

diagram" mean?
"The same holds, a fortiori,

for the diagram" means

that the diagram, in some respects, a prototypical case
of metaphor, can be expected to display its properties
~

excellence.

In this case, the property in question

is that of being misleading when used as the

characteri-

zation of a model object.
Q and A 262:

page 95; line 18; type VI, i, B-L, b.

What does it mean to say that a model object constitutes a profile of its referent?
To say that a model object constitutes a profile of
its referent is to say that the model object displays
one, or at most a few, salient aspects of its referent,
but that it ignores many more.
Q

and A 263:

page 112; line 6; type VI, i, B-L, c.

What does it mean to say that the interpreted system, F1 through F4. is "a ready-made dummy?"
To say that the interpreted system, F1 through F4,
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is "a ready-made dummy" is to say that it could be fitted
to any number of factual, that is empirical, interpretations.
Q and A 264:

page 108; line 35; type VI, i, D, b.

How can the relation between hypothetical mechanisms
and model objects be stated in terms of subsets and
supersets?
The relation between hypothetical mechanisms and
model objects can be stated in terms of subsets and
supersets by saying that the set of hypothetical mechanisms forms a subset of the set of model objects, which is
equivalent to saying that the set of model objects forms
a superset of the set of hypothetical mechanisms.
Q and A 265:

page 92; line 26; type VI, i, E, b.

What is the presentation of a collision of m cars
having as a result n injured persons with a total damage
of£

dollars as an example of a referent and the ordered

triple (m, n, £) as an example of a model object meant to
show?
The presentation of a collision of m cars having as
a result n injured persons with a

total damage of £

dollars as an example of a referent and the ordered
triple (m, n, £) as an example of a model object is meant
to show

how model objects miss traits of their refer-

ents, discard details, omit inessentials,

represent only
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certain significant aspects of the referent,
lations as homogeneous sets,

model popu-

and partition them into

equivalence classes.
Q and A 266:

page 98; line 15; type VI, i, E-L, b.

What does it mean to say that the McCulloch and
Pitts model of the brain is a grey box model?
To say that the McCulloch and Pitts model of the
brain is a grey box (semi-phenomenological) model means
that it attempts to provide mechanism enough to account
for only part of the results (input and output) that it
represents.
Q

and A 267:

page 101; line 7; type VI, i, H, b.

What does it mean to say that the natural course is
not necessarily the historical one?
To say that the natural course is not necessarily
the historical one is to imply that one does not always
start with the simplest model object and then proceed to
complicate it bit by bit.

Sometimes one starts with a

complicated model object.
Q

and A 268:

page 101; line 12; type VI, i, H, b.

What does

it mean to say that the hypothesized

mechanisms must be conjectured?
To say that the hypothesized mechanisms must be
conjectured means that must first the end result of the
referent (what it actually accomplishes) must be consid-
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ered, and then a mechanism that could plausibly account
for that end result must be found.
Q and A 269:

page 104; line 34; type VI, i, H-M, b.

What does it mean to say that inferring behavior
from mechanism is a direct problem while conjecturing
mechanism from behavior is an inverse problem?
To say that inferring behavior from mechanism is a
direct problem while conjecturing mechanism from behavior
is an inverse problem means that inferring behavior from
mechanism is a problem in deduction while conjecturing
mechanism from behavior is a problem in induction.
Q and A 270:

page 101; line 15; type VI, i, H-Q-0, b.

What does it mean to say that the game is not just
to account for appearance at any price?
To say that the game is not just to account for
appearance at any price means that the attempt should be
made not only to produce a mechanism that will adequately
explain the end results of the referent, but come up with
the actual mechanism that produces those results.

This

can be accomplished by showing some intermediate results
that can be checked against those derived from the hypothetical mechanism.
Q and A 271:

page 107; line 14; type VI, i, H-S, c.

What does it mean to pose a theoretical problem?
To pose a particular theoretical problem is to re-

157
quire an explanation for a set of observed facts about
specific phenomena.

More specifically, it is to repre-

sent those facts in a relatively succinct form.
Q and A 272:

page 107; line 14; type VI, i, H-S, c.

What does it mean to solve a particular theoretical
problem?
To solve a

particular theoretical problem is to

provide an explanation for a set of observed facts about
specific phenomena.

More specifically, it is to repre-

sent the explanation in a relatively succinct form, to
wit:

first, a model object; ultimately, a theoretical

model.
Q and A 273:

page 93; line 1; type VI, i, J, b.

What is meant by "idealizing reality?"
By "idealizing reality" is meant simplifying it,
leaving out certain aspects of it.
Q and A 274:

page 113; line 14; type VI, i, J, c.

What two meanings of "model" show up most prominently in theoretical science?
The two meanings of "model" that show up most prominently in theoretical science are those of "model object" and "theoretical model" (also called "specific
Q and A 275:

page 93; line 3;

type VI, ii, H-0, b.

Is the Rashevsky citation meant to inform the reader
about how to go about performing a scientific investiga-
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tion, or what?
The Rashevsky citation is not meant to inform the
reader about how to go about the performance of a scientific investigation, but to describe some of the essentials of scientific investigation as necessarily performed by practicing scientists.
At this point, the presentation of the questions and
answers associated with task-types III, IV, V, and VI
which involve the tasks of description,

classification,

comparison, and interpretation has been made.
next chapter,

In the

the presentation of the complete question

and answer set will be concluded with the questions and
answers associated with task-types VII and VIII involving
the tasks of explanation and evaluation.

CHAPTER VIII
TASKS VII, VIII:
EXPLAINING, EVALUATING
In the previous chapters, the questions and answers
numbered

1

through

275

have been presented.

These

questions and answers are associated with task-types I
through VI.

They involve the tasks of identification,

specification, description, classification, comparison,
and interpretation.

In this chapter, the presentation of

the complete question and answer set will be concluded.
The questions and answers to be shown in this chapter,
numbered from 276 through 345, are associated with tasktypes VII and VIII.
tion and

evaluation

They involve the tasks of explana(judging).

These questions

and

answers follow immediately.
Task VII
Q and A 276:

page 91; line 21; type VII, i, B, b.

In what way are model objects of themselves "barren?"
Model objects of themselves are barren in that they
are untestable and, therefore, of no use to science.
Q and A 277:

page 98; line 19; type VII, i, B-E, b.

Why did the McCulloch and Pitts model of the brain
159
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ignore the time of conduction along the axon and the
variance of the synaptic delay?
The McCulloch and Pitts model of the brain ignores
the time of conduction along the axon and the variance of
the synaptic delay in order to avoid complicating the
calculations with matters that were not central to what
was being investigated.
Q and A 278:

page 92; line 14; type VII, i, B-G, b.

Why do model objects capture only approximately the
relations among the aspects they incorporate?
Model objects capture only approximately the relations among the aspects that they incorporate because
referents worth modeling are too complicated to represent
completely.

The possession of sufficient knowledge of

the referent to enable the construction of a model object
capable of capturing the exact and complete relations
among the elements that it incorporated would render the
construction of such a model object unnecessary.
Q and A 279:

page 104; line 16; type VII, i, B-H, b.

Why is the task of throwing light into boxes, for the
theoretician, a task of invention rather than discovery?
The task of throwing light into boxes, is for the
theoretician, a task of invention rather than discovery
because the internal structures and mechanisms that are
looked for are not visible for the most part.

This means
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that they must be conjectured.

Q and A 280:

page 107; line 25; type VII, i, B-H-N, c.

Why might the logical strength of a theory be expected to turn out to be inversely related to its ability
to solve particular theoretical problems and to empirical
testability of that theory.
The logical strength of a theory might be expected
to turn out to be inversely related to its ability to
solve particular theoretical problems and to the empirical testability of that theory because logical strength
is gained only at the

expense of empirical content,

whereas particular theoretical problems are essentially
about empirical content.

Q and A 281:

page 98; line 12; type VII, i, B-L, c.

What is the reason for saying that simplicity is the
privilege of either total ignorance or extreme generality
(no deta i 1)?
The reason for saying that simplicity is the privilege of either tot a 1 ignorance or extreme generality is
to justify the complication of theoretical models.

Q and A 282:

page 92; line 13; type VII, i, C, b.

Why are model objects apt to include imaginary elements?
Model objects are apt to include imaginary elements
as stand-ins for real elements whose nature is unknown
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but whose functions are known
Q and A 283:

pa9e 104; line 18; type VII, i, C-H, b.

Given that the functioning of a black box may explained by infinitely many hypotheses concerning the
underlying mechanisms, what is to prevent the task of
conversion from black box to built-up model from degenerating into a process of merely making an arbitrary
choice from among them?
Although

the functioning of a

black box may be

explained by infinitely many hypotheses concerning the
underlying mechanisms, it is the requirement that the
explanation fit into patterns of pre-existing knowledge
that prevents the task of conversion from black box to
built-up model from degenerating into a process of merely
making an arbitrary choice from among them.
Q and A 284:

page 100; line 25; type VII, i, C-H, c.

Why is it possible for the testing of theoretical
models to "become as involved as one wishes?"
It is possible for the testing of theoretical models
to "become as involved as one wishes" because, while a
finite number of tests (even one, sometimes) can refute a
theoretical model, only an infinity of tests could verify
it completely.

This means that theoretical models are

verified only partially, to the point at which confidence
is felt that the model is "True."

And whether or not
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this point has been reached is a matter of judgement, so
the testing "can become as involved as one wishes."
Q and A 285:

page 102; line 19; type VII, i, C-H, c.

If a referent displays modes of behavior not in
conformity with a definite law, how does this affect the
construction of the theoretical model?
If a referent displays modes of behavior not in
conformity with a definite law, the theoretical model
must represent these different modes of behavior by means
of appropriate laws, however definite or indefinite they
may turn out to be.
Q and A 286:

page 93; line 11; type VII, i, C-P, b.

Why is it necessary for Ising's model of matter in
condensed states to assume that the units are ordered
linearly?
It

is

necessary

for

Ising's model of matter in

condensed states to assume that the units are ordered
linearly because Ising's model is a one-dimensional model, therefore, the elements can be arranged only along a
linear dimension.
Q and A 287:

page 105; line 30; type VII, i, C-P, b.

Why must the referents of models be assumed to be
real if the results are to have scientific value?
The referents of models must be assumed to be real
if the results are to have scientific value because one
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of the basic premises of

science holds

that

science

proposes to deal_ with real things.
Q and A 288:

page 101; line 30; type VII, i, C-Q, b.

In what way are grey boxes deficient?
Grey boxes are deficient in that their intermediate
variables do not explain or account for the mechanisms of
the referent;

Q and A 289:

they only supplement them computationally.
page 103; line 5; type VII, i, C-Q, b.

Why should the fact that black and grey boxes merely
permit the attainment of computational results rather
than also providing explanations of these results be
considered a defect of these models?
The fact that black and grey boxes merely permit the
attainment of computational results rather than also
providing explanations of these results is considered a
defect of these models because computational results
generally remain isolated bits of knowledge rather than
fitting with and adding to the great mosaic of human
knowledge in general.
Q and A 290:

page 108; line 12; type VII, i, D-E, d.

How are a rotating ellipsoid or a mass point related
to the theories of gravitation and of light?
A rotating ellipsoid or a mass point are related to
the theories of gravitation and of light in the following
way.

A rotating ellipsoid or a mass point are examples
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of model objects that can be associated with the general
theories of gravitation and of light in order to produce
theoretical models of the sun with its optical and gravitational manifestations.
Q and A 291:

page 108; line 12; type VII, i, D-E, b.

How are the sun (along with its optical and gravi tational manifestations) and a rotating ellipsoid or a mass
point related to each other?
The sun (along with its optical and gravitational
manifestations) and a rotating ellipsoid or a mass point
are related to each other in the following way.

The sun

(along with its optical and gravitational manifestations)
is an example of a referent for which a rotating ellipsoid or a mass point is an example of a model object.
And, conversely, a rotating ellipsoid or a mass point is
an example of a model for which the sun (along with its
optical and gravitational manifestations)

is an example

of a referent.
Q and A 292:

page 96; line 6; type VII, i, D-H-S, b.

Why should the modeling relation occur explicitly in
any formulation of a scientific theory that takes care of
the factual meaning of its symbols?
The reason that the modeling relation should occur
explicitly in any formulation of a scientific theory that
takes care of the factual meaning of its symbols is to
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avoid any possible confusion between the model (theoretical) and the modeled (referent).
Q and A 293:

page 96; line 13; type VII, i, D-L, c.

Why is every formula containing the symbol of the
modeling relation either an interpretative axiom or a
semantic assumption?
Every formula containing the symbol of the modeling
relation is either an interpretative axiom or a semantic
assumption because such a formula relates the theoretical
model s of a cell to the referent, or real cell r.
Q and A 294:

page 95; line 29; type VII, i, E-F, c.

How is it possible to tell that S is the model
object and M is the theoretical model,

and not vice-

versa?
It is possible to tell that S is the model object
and that Mis the theoretical model and not vice-versa by
noting that S merely represents the referents themselves,
while L, in addition to including R, also includes the
mathematical representation of the properties of the
referents as well as the relations between them.
Q and A 295:

page 98; line 31; type VII, i, E-F, c.

How is it possible to know that stochastic models of
the central nervous system constitute examples of theoretical models?
It is possible to know that stochastic models of the
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central nervous system constitute theoretical models
because the mathematical apparatus that they must possess
in order to be stochastic models provides assurance that
they will also turn out to be theoretical models.
Q and A 296:

page 106; line 6; type VII, i, E-G-H-0, b.

Why were the carbon atom and the hamiltonian operators mentioned?
The carbon atom and the hamiltonian operators were
mentioned in order to exemplify the process of model
construction in fields of research which have tended to
produce unifying concepts rather than merely isolated
bits of knowledge.
Q and A 297:

page 106; line 5; type VII, i, E-H-0, d.

Why is quantum mechanics mentioned?
Quantum mechanics is mentioned in order to exemplify
the process of constructing theoretical models in a field
of research which has tended to produce unifying concepts
rather than merely isolated bits of knowledge.
Q and A 298:

page 111; line 1; type VII, i, F, c.

Why is it impossible for metascientific theories
ever to qualify as semantic models?
It is impossible for metascientif ic theories
strictly speaking,
tion,

i.e.,

(or,

their systems of factual interpreta-

their model objects)

ever to qualify as

semantic models because those interpretations would have
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to make the theories come out true under all logically
possible circumstances.

This would, of course, be impos-

sible since an infinite number of tests would be necessary to establish this.

And this would, obviously, be

impossible in the empirical world.
Q and A 299:

page 111; line 7; type VII, i, F, c.

Why is it that some semantical models fail to qualify as metascientific models?
Some semantical models fail to qualify as metascientif ic models because, as purely formal systems, they lack
empirical content.
Q and A 300:

page 111; line 17; type VII, i, F, c.

Why does the system of signs, A1

through A5, not

qualify as a semantical model?
The system of signs, A1 through A5, does not qualify
as a semantical model because it is not an interpretation
of a theory that makes the theory true in all cases, or
even an interpreted theory whose interpretation makes it
come out true in all cases (in the latter instance, it
might loosely be termed a model by extension.)
Q and A 301:

page 112; line 26; type VII, i, F, c.

Why does the set of entities; "the set of bodies,"
"the temperature," "the quantity of heat per unit mass,"
and "the specific heat at constant volume;" not constitute a semantical model?
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The set of entities; "the set of bodies," "the temperature," "the quantity of heat per unit mass," and "the
specific heat at constant volume;" does not constitute a
semantical model because;

while it does constitute a

factual interpretation of the mathematical system, F1
through F4, and, hence, of the purely formal system, A1
through AS; precisely because it is a factual interpretation, it does not make these systems come out true in
every case.
Q and A 302:

page 111; line 27; type VII, i, F-L, c.

Why does the set of statements; "the capital letters
are sets or functions,

'R' is the real line, 'O' is the

arithmetic product, etc.;" fail to qualify as a semantical model?
The set of statements; "the capital letters are sets
or functions,

'R' is the real line,

'O' is the arithmetic

product, etc.;" fails to qualify as a semantical model
because, while it is an interpretation of the system of
signs , A1 through AS, it does not make the system true
in all cases.
Q and A 303:

page 9S; line 21; type VII, i, G-H, b.

What good does it do to pretend that the domain of
individuals to be represented can be partitioned into
homogeneous subsets if they really cannot?
While the domain of individuals to be represented
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cannot be partitioned into subsets that are homogeneous
in every respect,

it really can be partitioned into

subsets that are homogenous in one respect.

But this is

enough--if only one property is being controlled for.
Q and A 304:

page 104; line 14; type VII, i, G-H, b.

Does the black box model have any use in the process
of scientific inquiry?
Yes.

The black box model does have a use in the

process of scientific inquiry.

But this use occurs pri-

marily during the early stages of scientific investigation.
Q and A 305;:

page 103; line 9; type VII, i, G-N, b.

Why might it be expected that the assumption that
every system has an inner structure and mechanism will
encourage research?
It might be expected that the assumption that every
system has an inner structure and mechanism will encourage research because the assumption that a thing of value
and interest exists can be expected to lead to attempts
to discover what that thing is.
Q and A 306:

page 92; line 15; type VII, i, H, b.

Why will most individual variations in a class be
deliberately ignored and most of the details of the
events involving those individuals be discarded?
Most individual variations in a a class will be
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deliberately ignored and most of the details of the
events involving those individuals will be discarded
because the function of a model object is usually the
isolation and investigation of certain relevant properties of the referent classes.

In general, science con-

cerns itself with individuals only to the extent that
knowledge of them leads to knowledge of classes.
Q and A 307:

page 92; line 20; type VII, i, H, b.

Why may all the individuals of a given mice strain
be taken to be indiscernible?
All the individuals of a given mice strain may be
taken to be indiscernible because the model object is
being constructed only to model the behavior of the mice
with respect to their propensity to push bars for food
pellets.
Q and A 308:

page 92; line 21; type VII, i, H, b.

Why may all ways of pressing a bar for food pellets
be assumed to be equivalent?
All ways of pressing a bar for food pellets may be
assumed to be equivalent because only the propensity to
push a bar for food pellets is being investigated by
means of the model object, not the manner of pressing it.
Any unnecessary complications introduced into the structure of the model object would be gratuitous.

They

would augment the amount of difficulty and work involved
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in the construction and use of the model object without
any compensatory increase in the value of the results.
Q and A 309:

page 93; line 29; type VII, i, H, b.

If complicating the model brings it closer to reality,

why not make it more complicated right from the

beginning as a way of saving time and effort?
Models are not always made as complicated as they
eventually become right from the beginning because the
knowledge gained from the construction of the early simpler models

is often needed for the construction of

later, more complicated, models.
Q and A 310:

page 96; line 22; type VII, i, H, b.

Why is an explicit statement of the semantic assumptions mandatory in the axiomatic reconstruction of a
scientific theory?
An explicit statement of the semantic assumption is
mandatory in the axiomatic reconstruction of a scientific
theory because the same mathematical formulas will sometimes fit more than one referent.

For example,

the flow

of water in a pipe can be represented by the same (or
analogous) formulas as the flow of electricity in a wire.
Thus, an explicit statement of the semantic assumption is
needed to make sure that there is no confusion regarding
which formula is being linked to which referent.
Q and A 311:

page 101; line 7; type VII, i, H, b.
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Why is the method of starting with the simplest
model object and then gradually proceeding to complicate
it described as the natural course?
The method of starting with the simlplest model
object and then gradually proceeding to complicate it is
described as the natural course because the assumption is
made that it is natural to proceed from the simple to the
complicated.

The assumption that this procedure is natu-

ral is probably derived from the observation that it
frequently turns out to be convenient.
Q and A 312:

page 104; line 16; type VII, i, H, b.

Why is the task of throwing light into boxes, for
the theoretician, a task of invention rather than discovery?
The task of throwing light into boxes, is for the
theoretician, a task of invention rather than discovery
because the internal structures and mechanisms that are
looked for are not visible for the most part.

This means

that they must be conjectured.
Q and A 313:

page 106; line 29; type VII, i, H, c.

Why is it that theoretical models are obtained in
the developing sciences by constructing a hypothetico-deducti ve system around the model object instead of attaching the model object to a general theory as is frequently done in the

more advanced sciences?
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Theoretical models are obtained in the developing
sciences by constructing a hypothetico-deductive system
around the model object instead of attaching the model
object to a general theory as is frequently done in the
more advanced sciences because, in the developing sciences, general theories are not as likely to be available as
they are in the more advanced sciences.
Q and A 314:

page 107; line 14; type VII, i, H, c.

What does it mean to pose a particular theoretical
problem?
To pose a particular theoretical problem is to require an explanation for a set of observed facts about
specific phenomena.

More specifically, it is to repre-

sent those facts in a relatively succinct form.
Q and A 315:

page 107; line 14; type VII, i, H, c.

What does it mean to solve a particular theoretical
problem?
To solve a particular theoretical problem is to
provide an explanation for a set of observed facts about
specific phenomena.

More specifically, it is to repre-

sent the explanation in a relatively succinct form, to
wit:

first, a model object; ultimately, a theoretical

model.
Q and A 316:

page 106; line 29; type VII, i, H-M, c.

Why is it that theoretical models are obtained in
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the developing sciences by constructing a hypotheticodeductive system around the model object instead of attaching the model object to a general theory as is frequently done in the

more advanced sciences?

Theoretical models are obtained in the developing
sciences by constructing a hypothetico-deductive system
around the model object instead of attaching the model
object to a general theory as is frequently done in the
more advanced sciences because, in the developing sciences, general theories are not as likely to be available as
they are in the more advanced sciences.
Q and A 317:

page 96; line 18; type VII, i, H-M-S, c.

What error does the "semantical freak" involve?
The "semantical freak" involves a confusion between
theoretical model and referent.

The theoretical model is

discussed as though it were the referent.
Q and A 318:

page 95; line 10; type VII, i, H-Q, b.

How might the failure of the precise solutions obtained through the use of a simple model prove more
instructive than the success of the vague solutions obtained by means of more complicated, hence realistic,
models?
The failure of the precise solutions obtained
through the use of a simple model might prove more instructive than the success of the vague solutions ob-
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tained by means of more complicated, hence realistic,
models by indicating the kinds of modifications to the
model that will produce more realistic models.
Q and A 319:

page 95; line 21; type VII, i, H-Q, b.

What good does it do to pretend that the domain of
individuals to be represented can be partitioned into
homogeneous subsets if they really cannot?
While the domain of individuals to be represented
cannot be partitioned into subsets that are homogeneous
in every respect,

it really can be partitioned into

subsets that are homogenous in one respect.

But this is

enough--if only one property is being controlled for at a
time.
Q and A 320:

page 101; line 7; type VII, i, H-Q, b.

Why is the method of starting with the simplest
model object and then gradually proceeding to complicate
it described as the natural course?
The method of starting with the simlplest model
object and then gradually proceeding to complicate it is
described as the natural course because the assumption is
made that it is natural to proceed from the simple to the
complicated.

The assumption that this procedure is natu-

ral is probably derived from the observation that it
frequently turns out to be convenient.
Q and A 321:

page 96; line 22; type VII, i, H-R, c.
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Why is an explicit statement of the semantic assumptions mandatory in the axiomatic reconstruction of a
scientific theory?
An explicit statement of the semantic assumption is
mandatory in the axiomatic reconstruction of a scientific
theory because the same mathematical formulas will sometimes fit more than one referent.

For example, the flow

of water in a pipe can be represented by the same (or
analogous) formulas as the flow of electricity in a wire.
Thus, an explicit statement of the semantic assumption is
needed to make sure that there is no confusion regarding
which formula is being linked to which referent.

Q and A 322:

page 91; line 19; type VII, i, H-T, b.

Why would it not be preferable to construct a model
object that could represent its referent in every aspect
instead of in merely certain significant aspects?
It would not be preferable to construct a

model

object that could represent its referent in every aspect
instead of in merely certain significant aspects because
the possession of sufficient knowledge to construct such
a model object would render its construction redundant.

Q and A 323:

page 108; line 1; type VII, i, J, c.

What are "theoretical ideas?"
Theoretical ideas are, in effect, theoretical models
or general theories.
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Q and A 324:

page 101; line 37; type VII, i, K-Q, b.

Why is the description of the model as a set of
ordered pairs too coarse and uneconomical?
The description of the model as a set of ordered
pairs is too coarse and uneconomical because every single
input along with its corresponding output must be displayed.

Thus,

the description will tend to turn out

lengthy and cumbersome.
Q and A 325:

page 96; line 26; type VII, i, M-S, b.

Why is it important not to confuse the model object
with its referent?
It is important not to confuse the model object with
its referent because the same referent may be modeled by
different model objects in different ways.

Confusing the

model object with its referent would, by obliterating or
at least minimizing these differences, defeat the purpose
of model objects--to discover ever "truer" ways of representing reality.
Q and A 326:

page 95; line 29; type VII, i, N, c.

How is it possible to tell that S is the model
object and M is the theoretical model,

and not vice-

versa?
It is possible to tell that S is the model object
and that .M is the theoretical model and not vice-versa by
noting that S merely represents the referents themselves,
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while L, in addition to including R, also includes the
mathematical representation of the properties of the
referents as well as the relations between them.
Q and A 327:

page 91; line 19; type VII, i, Q, d.

Why are general theories not sufficient for science?
General theories are not sufficient for science
because they cannot be tested.

Testing is, of course,

necessary to science.
Q and A 328:

page 104; line 14; type VII, ii, C-G-H, b.

Does the black box model have any use in the process
of scientific inquiry?
Yes.

The black box model does have a use in the

process of scientific inquiry.

But this use occurs prim-

arily during the early stages of scientific investigation.
Q and A 329:

page 92; line 12; type VII, iii, B-G-H, b.

Why do model objects always miss certain traits of
their referents?
Model objects always miss certain traits of their
referents because any referent worth modeling would be
too complicated to represent completely.

The possession

of knowledge of the nature of the referent sufficiently
ample to enable the construction of a model object that
included every trait of its referent would render the
construction of such a model object superfluous.
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Q and A 330:

page 108; line 25; type VII, iii, B-H, c.

Why is it possible for the testing of theoretical
models to "become as involved as one wishes?"
It is possible for the testing of theoretical models
to "become as involved as one wishes" because, while a
finite number of tests (even one, sometimes) can refute a
theoretical model, only an infinity of tests could verify
it completely.

This means that theoretical models are

verified only partially, to the point at which confidence
is felt that the model is "True."

And whether or not

this point has been reached is a matter of judgement, so
the testing "can become as involved as one wishes."
Q and A 331:
Why

page 107; line 25; type VII, iii, B-H-N, c.

should the logical

strength of a

theory be

expected to turn out to be inversely related to its
ability to solve particular theoretical problems and to
empirical testability of that theory.
The logical strength of a theory might be expected
to turn out to be inversely related to its ability to
solve particular theoretical problems and to the empirical testability of that theory because logical strength
is gained only at the expense of empirical content,
whereas particular theoretical problems are essentially
about empirical content.
Q and A 332:

page 98; line 12; type VII, iii, B-L-R, c.

1 81
What is the reason for saying that simplicity is the
privilege of either total ignorance or extreme generality
(no detail)?
The reason for saying that simplicity is the privilege of either total ignorance or extreme generality is
to justify the complication of theoretical models.
Q and A 333:

page 101; line 3; type VII, iii, C-D, b.

Why does the fact that there are many kinds of model
objects imply that there are many kinds of theoretical
models?
The fact that there are many kinds of model objects
implies that there are many kinds of theoretical models
because theoretical models inherit the characteristics of
the model objects that they are based upon.
Q and A 334:

page 104; line 18; type VII, iii, C-H, b.

If the functioning of a black box may be explained
by infinitely many hypotheses concerning the underlying
mechanisms, what is to prevent the task of conversion
from black box to built-up model from degenerating into a
process of merely making an arbitrary choice from among
them?
Although

the functioning of a

black box may be

explained by infinitely many hypotheses concerning the
underlying mechanisms, it is the requirement that the
explanation fit into patterns of pre-existing knowledge
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that prevents the task of conversion from black box to
built-up model from degenerating into a process of merely
making an arbitrary choice from among them.
Q and A 335:

page 103; line 11; type VII, iii, C-N, b.

Why might the black box paradigm be expected to
encourage superficiality?
The black box paradigm might be expected to encourage superficiality because the fact that this paradigm,
by implication,

ignores the possibility of the existence

of an internal structure and mechanism of its referent.
Thus, the paradigm discourages the attempt to discover
the internal structure and mechanism whose existence it
ignores.
Q and A 336:

page 93; line 8; type VII, iii, C-Q, b.

Why should the one-dimensional representation of a
tridimensional system be considered the most audacious of
all model objects?
The one-dimensional representation of a tridimensional system should be considered the most audacious of
all model objects because, although model objects inherently fall short of fully representing their referents,
the one-dimensional model object's attempt to represent
tridimensional referents can be considered particularly
daring by virtue of the double handicap that it imposes
upon itself by dispensing with two of the three dimen-
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sions that would ordinarily seem indispensable to the
adequate representation of tridimensional referents.
Q and A 337:

page 94; line 23; type VII, iii, E-F, c.

How can it be known that a 1 inear model of a gas is
a theoretical model?
It can be known that a linear model of a gas is a
theoretical model because it has been stated that a
linear model of a gas can mimic the condensation process.
In order to mimic the condensation process, the model
must specify the mathematical dimensions of the changes
or movement that takes place.

And if a model can specify

the mathematical dimensions of the changes or movement
that takes place, it must be a theoretical model.
Q and A 338:

page 106; line 6; type VII, iii, E-G-H, b.

Why were the carbon atom and the hamiltonian operators mentioned?
The carbon atom and the hamiltonian operators were
mentioned in order to exemplify the process of model
construction in fields of research which have tended to
produce unifying concepts rather than merely isolated
bits of knowledge.
Q and A 339:

page 91; line 18; type VII, iii, G, c.

Why are theoretical models necessary to science?
Theoretical models are necessary to science because
they alone are testable.

The unstated premise of this
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argument is that testing is necessary to science.
Q and A 340:

page 92; line 11; type VII, iii, G-K, b.

Why is the represent a ti on of a concrete object always partial and more or less conventional?
The representation of a concrete object is always
partial and more or less conventional because concrete
objects are, as far as is known, inherently too complicated to fully represent.

Also, the possession of know-

ledge of the referent of a model object as faithfully
complicated as its referent would obviate the reason for
constructing any model object of that referent.
Q and A 341:

page 103; line 9; type VII, iii, G-N, b.

Why might it be expected that the assumption that
every system has an inner structure and mechanism will
encourage research?
It might be expected that the assumption that every
system has an inner structure and mechanism will encourage research because the assumption that a thing of value
and interest exists can be expected to lead to attempts
to discover what that thing is.
Task VIII
Q and A 342:

page 110; line 24; type VIII, i, S, b.

In section 1 O,

it is stated that

(1)

semantical

models are interpretations of formal systems that make
all statements of the system true, (2) theoretical models
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(since their content is empirical)

are never more than

partially true so they cannot be semantical models, (3)
the three empirical model objects described on page 112
are not always true, nonetheless (4) they constitute (or
produce) semantical models.
This is not possible,
contradiction.

How is this possible?
it constitutes an unexplained

If semantical models are interpretations

of formal systems that make all statements of the system
true (1), and theoretical, hence empirical, models are
never more than partially true (2), then it is manifestly
impossible for them to constitute semantical models.
Q and A 343:

page 100; line 17; type VIII, ii, A, c.

Are theoretical models necessarily true?
No.

Theoretical models are not necessarily true;

they may be either true or false.
Q and A 344:

page 100; line 19; type VIII, ii, A-G, c.

Do some theoretical models manage to represent the
full complexity of their referents completely and accurately?
No.

No theoretical model ever manages to represent

the full complexity of its referent completely and accurately.

Any theoretical model of a concrete object is

bound to fall short of representing the complexity of its
referent.
Q and A 345:

page 104; line 14; type VIII, ii, C-E-H, b.
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Does the black box model have any use in the process
of scientific inquiry?
Yes.

The black box model does have a use in the

process of scientific inquiry.

But this use occurs pri-

marily during the early stages of scientific investigation.
This concludes the presentation of the question and
answers,

numbered from 276 through 345, associated with

task-types VII and VIII in this chapter and those of the
complete question and answer set, numbered from 1 through
345, associated with task-types I through VIII in this
this chapter together with the two previous chapters.
The questions and answers

displayed in this chapter

involve the tasks of explanation and evaluation, while
those presented in the three chapters terminating in this
chapter involve the tasks of identification,
tion, description,

classification, comparison,

tation, explanation, and evaluation.

specificainterpre-

All that remains to

be done now is to of fer a brief summary of what has been
accomplished or at least attempted in the present work.
The conclusion, doing just that, will follow in the next
and last chapter.

CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION

In the preceding chapters, the problem of constructing an autodidactic tool for the study of a document in
the philosophy of science has been formulated.

The meth-

odology involved in this undertaking has been discussed,
and the results shown.

It has been seen that this prob-

lem is translatable into the problem of using the document as a starting point for the generation of a set of
questions and suggested answers that would in some way
reflect the document's logical structure.

Moreover, it

has become apparent that this translation of the original
problem can itself be resolved into a set of subordinate
problems:

(1) an analysis of the text to determine its

conceptual elements, (2) an analysis of the methods of
setting forth those conceptual elements within the text,
(3) the formulation of a set of tasks that,

when expres-

sed as questions and answers, will promote, exercise, and
test

the student's conceptual grasp of the text, (4) the

conversion of these tasks into such a question and answer
set and (5) the categorization of the resultant questions
and answers in a way that reflect the logical structures
of the various conceptual elements, tasks, etc. that went
187
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into their formulation.

Then a more or less detailed

description of these analyses, determinations and formulations followed.

The nucleus of the present work is the

exhibition of the results of these procedures:

the ques-

tions and answers themselves.
It is this nucleus then that, through its capacity
both to mirror the conceptual content and to elucidate
the concept structure of the objectdocument, can hopefully serve both as the basis of an auto-didactic approach
to the understanding of this document and as a point of
departure for the future application of this approach to
study of other professional documents.
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APPENDIX

APPENDIX
The appendix consists of the document referred to
throughout the present work as "the object-document" or
"the object-text."

The page numbers

found

in the

identity-lines of the questions and answers refer to the
page numbers of the original document.

Thus,

these page

numbers have been retained along with the pagination of
this work.

These page numbers can be found on odd num-

bered pages of the object-document a little below and
slightly to the right of the page numbers on the upper
right corners of the pages of this work.

And they will

be found on the upper left hand side of the even numbered
pages.

However, the un-numbered title pages ( 8 9-91 ) of

the object-document are located on pages 191-193 of this
work.
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CHAPTER

5

CONCEPTS OF MODEL*

The purpose of this chapter is to elucidate the two notions of model that
occur in factual (natural or social) science. These concepts are those of

model obj"lct, or schema, and theoretical model, or specific theory. A
clarification of these notions is needed in view of the ambiguity of the
term 'model' and of the merry confusion, prevailing in the current
scientific and philosophic literature, among various senses of this
word.
We shall be concerned with model objects and theoretical models as
hypothetical sketches of supposedly real, though possibly fictitious, things
or facts. Thus a fluid may be modeled as a continuum endowed with certain properties, such as compressibility and viscosity. Such a model ohjcct
may be giafted onto any of a number of general theories, say classical
mechanics, or general relativistic mechanics. Likewise, a learning organism may be modeled as a black box equipped with certain input and
output terminals, and this model object may then be expanded into a
hypothetico-deductive system. In either case a specific theory, or theoretical model, of a concrete (or supposedly concrete) object, results. What
can be subjected to empirical tests are such theoretical models: on the
other hand general theories, being unconcerned with particulars, remain
empirically untestable unless enriched with models of their referents.
And model objects remain barren unless introduced in, or expanded
into, some theory.
Besides offering elucidations of the concepts of model object and theoretical model, we shall examine their relations to several other concepts
with which they are often mixed up. These are, in particular, the aesthetic
sense (pictorial representation), the heuristic sense (analog of a familiar
object), and the model-theoretic sense (realization or true interpretation
of a formal system). It will be shown that any relation to these other
characters is accidental and that model objects and theoretical models
are not important by what they may suggest but by what they perform,
to wit, a partial representation of a chunk of reality.
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I.

CONCRETE OBJECT AND MODEL OBJECT

A schem:llic representation of an object may be called a model objecr.
lf the represented object (or referent) is concrete or physical, then its
model is an idealization of it. The represent•1lio11 may be pictorial, as in
the case of a drawing, or conceptual, as in lhe case of a mathematical
formula. It may be figuratiw, like lhc ball-and-spoke model of a molecule,
of scmisymbolic, us in the case of the contour map of the same mole·
culc; or finally symbolic like the hamiltonian operator for that same ob·
ject. The model object may be extratheoretical like the Pseudo
ArCllpagitc's model of the cdestial hierarchy; or intrathcoretical as in
the case of the random net model of the brain.
Thi: representation of a concrete object is always partial and more or
kss conventional. The model object will miss certain traits of its referent,
it is apt to include imaginary elem<;nts, and will recapture only approximately the relations among the aspects it does incorporate. In particular,
most individual variations in a clas~ Wall be deliberately ignored and most
of the details of the events involving those individuals will likewise be
discarded. As an eminent economist says, "Typically they [models] are
representations in which details, that appear inessential for intended uses,
are omitted. A model is intended to represent the real thing in certain
significant aspects" (Orcutt, 1967, p. 69). For example, all the individuals
of a given mice strain may be taken to be indiscernible and all ways of
pressing a bar for food pellets may be assumed to be equivalent as well.
In other words, the real population, made up of different individuals, is
modeled as a homogeneous set (an equivalence class), and likewise the
set of all possible events is partitioned into homogeneous (equivalence)
classes. For example, a collision of m cars having as a result 11 injured
persons with a total damage of p dollars can be represented by the ordered
triple (111, 11, p ). From the point of view of the traffic engineer all the car
collisions characterized by the same triple of numbers m, n, and p are
equivalent, even though the particular circumstances of interest to the vie·
tims, the doctors, or the police, may be quite different. The engineer may
then assume that every fact/ of this nature is represented by such a triple
or, as we shall put it, that (m, n, p) a/, where' a• designates the relation
of model object to its referent. More on
in Sec. 3 and Ch. 6. Let us now
examine a striking kind of model, rather unrealistic and yet quite fertile.

=
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EXAMPLE: LINEAR MODELS OF TRlDlMENSlONAL THINGS

The conceptual conquest of reality starts, paradoxically enough, by idealizing it. Whether in astronomy or in biology, in chemistry or in history,
if we want to build conceptual models "we must begin with a study of
non-realistic abstract situations. We cannot attempt lo grasp any situation
in its entire complexity. We must first study the partial, simpler aspccti. of
a complex situation and then, as the next step, investigate the various
possible combinations of those partial aspects" (Rashcvsky, 1968, p. 16).
Consider the most audacious of all model objects, namely, the one dimensional representation of a tridimcnsional system. The bci.t known
model of this kind is lsing's model of matter in condensed stales. One
assumes that tbe units (m.:>lecuks or ions) are ordered linearly and cnch .
of them interacts but with it$ nearest neighbor. This oversimplified moJcl
of liquids and solids was proposed in 1920 by W. Lenz, who gave his
student E. Ising the task of building the corresponding theoretical model.
In other words, the problem was to construct the (or rather a) theory
describing that model object of matter in a condensed state. (For the
fascinating story of this theoretical model see Brush, 1967.) Ising did not
have to start from scratch but was able to use an existing general framework, namely classical statistical mechanics. This is an extremely general
theory that does not commit itself as to the nature of the individuals
constituting a statistical ensemble and may therefore be "applied to" (conjoined with) a number of model objects. One such model object could be
Ising's, another could be a sketch of an animal population. Ising grafted
the model object onto statistical mechanics and worked out the exact
solution (1925). But this solution failed to represent the typical qualitative
transitions such as the jump to the ferromagnetic state. Diagnostic: The
theoretical modd is false. Since the generic framework (statistical mechanics) was judged to be basically correct, clearly the model object was
responsible for the shortcomings of the theoretical model. Prognostic:
If we complicate the model we may bring it closer to reality. But the task
of solving the two dimensional Ising problem was too formidable: Ising
got discouraged and gave up physics. The job was taken up two decades
later by L. Onsager. His results were so good that we are justified in expecting even better results from the attempts to solve the tridimensional
Ising problem, which is still open at the time of writing.
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Surely this model, which among other things neglects the long-range
interactions among molecules, is a simplified representation of matter.
Still, it poses formidable mathematical problems - essentially the exact
computation of the partition function, which yields all the rnacroproperties of the material system. Why invest so much ingenuity and labor in a
model that is known to be physic:.illy too simple and mathematically too
complicated? For no better reason than we would not know how to proceed otherwise than by successive refinements or complications of an
initial coarse model. Whether the number of dimensions of a space is
increased or decreased, whether the given is simplified or is assumed to be
made up of suprasensible components, conceptual models are built and
these are the only reasonable symbolic pictures of reality. Only models
built with the help of intuition and mathematics, and susceptible to empirical tests, have succeeded in representing reality and can be corrected
as need be. Moreover even a coarse model, like Ising's one-dimensional
representation, is capable of explaining complex facts of interest to biology, such as the elasticity of macromolecules and the uncoiling of proteins
(sec Vol'kenshtcin, 1970). A crude mathematical model is worth a thousand jeremiads on the defeating complexity of life.
Take a look at a recent volume devoted to some oversimplified models
of physical systems: Mathematica/ Physics in One Dimension, by Lieb and
Mattis (1966). One finds here classics such as the papers by Kac,
Uhlenbeek, and Hemmer on a linear model of a gas capable of mimicking
the condensation process; Dyson's article on the dynamics of a chaotic
chain; the memoirs of Kronig and Penney on the movement of electrons
in linear lattices, and many other imaginative contributions. They are not
just exercises in applied mathematics but (crude) theoretical models of
real objects: they propose full-fledged (but specific) theories specifying
schematic representations of physical systems. Thus Dyson's random
chain is a coarse model of the glass structure. AH these fantasies intend
to grasp reality. How? Listen to the editor-authors of this singular volume:
The solution to one dimensional problems "make a contribution to the
three-dimensional [account of] reality as well: by educating us to the need
for rigorous and exact analysis, they lead us away from the easy and simplistic first theories toward a more critical and mathematical approach,
and finally to a better definition [representation] of rea \ity" (Lieb and
Mattis, 1966, p. vi).

198

CONCEPTS OF MODEL.

95

Surely a number of real complexities are discarded when working on
model objects, whether one-dimensional, three-dimensional or pluric.limensional. For example, a one-dimensional model of matter in a condensed state fails to represent condensation, freezing, and magnetization.
But as a compensation one may obtain exact solutions, which arc easier
to interpret than the approximate solutions to more complex problems
(in particular the numerical solutions obtained with the help of computers). What better preparation for facing more realistic, i.e., more complex,
problems? Certainly one must expect that any such oversimplified model
will fail. But the failure of a precise idea is more instructive than the
success of a muddled idea, for it may suggest the precise modifications
producing more realistic (truer) models. (For lucid discussions concerning
the adjustment of theoretical models in contemporary psychology see Bush
and Mosteller, 1955; and Sternberg, 1963.) Briefly, to grasp reality one
starts by sifting the available information and discarding most of it. Then
one adds imaginary (or rather hypothetical) components - though with
a realistic intention. One thus constitutes a more or less schematic model
object. This model object is hoped to constitute a profile of its referent.
3. THE MODELING RELATION

As we recalled in Section 1, one starts modeling by pretending that the domain(s) R of individuals to be represented can be partitioned into homogeneous subsets S, i.e., into subsets all of whose elements are identical in a
given respect. We then attribute each members of every such equivalence
class S certain key predicates P 1 , P 2 , ••• , Pn-i· These predicates stand for
properties and relations (in particular functions) that are for the most
part unobservable. {Although these predicates are defined on S, they will
be satisfied only approximately, if at all, by the ultimate referents, i.e. the
members of R.) We thus form a relational system M = (S, P1 ,P2 , •• • , Pn_ 1)
intended as a conceptual model of the concrete referents R. In short, M
models R or, briefly, M :R.
The model object, if theoretical, is a more or less elaborate construct:
a set together with a few functions, a ring of operators in a Hilbert space,
or what have you. It need not and in general it is not intuitable: but it
always has a factual referent, even if hypothetical. For example, social
mobility in a community can be represented by a certain transition probability matrix. Such a matrix is not a picturable model object but it is not
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al1ogc1her abstract either, for it represents jumps of real people from one
social rung to another: it is a factual construct or, better, a construct with
a factual referent. Tn other words, the relation
of modeling is included
(in extension) in the set of all ordered pairs (c,f), where c is a construct
and/a fact.
The modeling relation ~ should occur explicitly in any formulation of
a scientific theory that takes care of the factual (physical, psychological,
historical, etc.) meaning of its symbols (Bunge, l 967b}. Thus in theor~
tical biophysics one may assume that a eel! r is rcprescntl!d by, or modeled
as, a subset s of a differentiable manifold on which certain real value\!
functions arc given, that represent so many properties of the cell (temperature, density, etc.). We may then write 's= r' and similarly for the
predicates. Every formula containing the symbol '=' of the modeling
relation may be called an interpretative axiom or a semantic assumption.
If written out in extenso, any theoretical statement in factual science
will contain the modeling relation ..' Thus the formula for the total mass
of a cell r will be: .. If s == r, then M ~r) =111 the Lebesgue integral of the
mass density over the sets". If no such precaution is taken, a semantical
freak such as 'the total mass of the set s' is apt to be engendered.
In informal scientific discourse one rarely takes pains to state explicitly
any such semantic assumptions: they are usually hinted at in what undergraduates call "the conceptual part of the stuff." But an explicit statement
of the semantic assumptions is mandatory in the foundations of the science
and in particular in the axiomatic reconstruction of a scientific theory, if
only because any given mathematical formalism fits a number of kinds of
concrete object: it is noncommittal and thus ambiguous. An explicit exhibition of the modeling relation will not only indicate what one is talking
about but may also constitute a reminder that the object model, though
hoped to represent a certain thing, is not the same as it. It is never useless
to insist that every model object is an idealization of a system or a fact
taken to be real or realizable. There are as many idealizations as idealizers,
data, and goals. Even if two model builders have access to the same empirical information, they may construct different models, for model building is a creative activity engaging the background, abilities, and taste of
the builder. Hence the worries of administrators and politicians, about
the "unnecessary duplication" of theoretical work, are unfounded. Instead, the absence of communication among the model builders faced

=
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with the same problem (but likely to come up with different results) does
justify an ulcer or two. So does the playing around with model objects
without ever expanding them into full-fledged theoretical models.
4. FROM MODEL OBJECT TO THEORETICAL MODEL
It is not enough to conceive of a liquid as a molecular lattice or of a brain

as a neuron net: all this has to be described in detail and, if possible, in
agreement with the known general laws. In other words, one must build
a theory of the modei object, i.e., a theoretical model. The kinetic gas
theory is such a theoretical model, whereas neither general statistical
mechanics nor thermodynamics are theoretical models of a gas, since
they do not specify the peculiarities of a gas vis-a-vis other kinds of system.
Nor is geHeral graph theory a theoretical model: on the other hand some
of its applications, e.g., to human organizations such as enterprises, are
theoretical models. From these examples we infer a first characterization
of the notion of a theoretical model, namely this. A theoretical model is
a bypothetico-deductive system concerning a model object, which is in
turn a schematic conceptual representation of a thing or of a situation
assumed to be actual ~r possible. If such a specific theory is couched in
exact (mathematical) terms, it is often called a mathematical model of a
certain domain of facts (see, e.g., Neyman et al., 1959). Let us review a
distinguished specimen of this kind of animal.
The current theory of the solid state was founded by Bloch four decades
ago. Bloch's master idea was to apply wave mechanics (a generic theory) to
a simple model of the crystal. The constituents of this model object are
a set of fixed points representing an atom each, and a bunch of electrons
(or rather model electrons) wandering among the fixed centers. The lattice
of fixed centers (fiction) is assumed to be rigid (fiction), the interaction
among the electrons is set equal to zero (fiction), and the electron-lattice
interaction is represented by a potential that is periodic in space but constant in time (approximation). This model object is next conjoined with
the vast framework of quantum mechanics. In the course of the computations some additional mathematical simplifications may have to be introduced. However, the results are frequently in agreement with the experimental data, which suggest that a nearly true image of a real crystal
(a nonpictorial image·to be sure) has been built. Thus, although initially
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one does not postulate any difference among conductors, semiconductors,
and insulators, this partition is obtained upon analyzing the distribution
of energy levels (or rather bands). These bands are separated by "forbidden" regions (no states). If every band is occupied by the electrons, then
there will be no electric current, i.e. the system will be an insulator. This
theoretical model explains numerous macroproperties of most pure crystals: their thermal and electric conductivities, magnetic susceptibility,

optical properties, etc. Some other properties, such as luminisccnce, arc
explained upon complicating the Bloch model by adding impurities, assuming disorder in the lattice, and so on. The more traits a theo::-etic::i.l
model is to take in and the more accurately it is to represent them, the
more complex it will have to be. Simplicity is the privilege of either total
ignorance or extreme generality (no specific detail at all).
The procedure is the same in the nonphysical sciences. Consider the
brain model proposed by McCulloch and Pitts three decades ago. This
model covers only the nerve fibres and it does not account for the mechanism of the nerve pulse: it is a semiphcnomenological model (or grey box
theory) that will have to be supplemented with models accounting for the
physical and chemical process of nerve conduction. Also the time of conduction along the axon is ignored, and the synaptic delay is assumed to
be constant and the same for all neurons. Next one formulates the central
hypothesis of the theoretical model: that a neuron does not fire unless the
preceding neurons have fired during the preceding moment (i.e., no spontaneous firings and no effect before the cause). This statement is translated
into mathematical formulas, one for each type of connection. Once in the
possession of these formulas one attempts to embed them in an existing
mathematical calculus: otherwise one will have to invent a new mathematical theory. In the present case, the ready-made mathematical foil was
Boolean algebra. In this way McCulloch and Pitts succeeded in constructing a theory that explains some neurophysiological processes. If one
wishes to go beyond he will have to complicate this model. For example,
if synaptic contacts are assumed to be formed randomly, then one can
pose and solve the question of the chance formation of certain nervous
loops - which should in turn explain the appearance of ideas that seem
to come out of the blue (i.e., without external stimulation). Which is
precisely what Rapoport and his coworkers have done, namely to develop
stochastic models of the central nervous system.
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Stochastic models became fashionable in mathematical psychology
when it was realized that animal behavior is far from consistent and
systematic. There are thus numerous stochastic models of the process
of learning simple tasks such as running a maze under reward or punishment. All these models share the following traits. Firstly, they ignore
dilTcrences among animal species as well as the dilTcrcnccs in the tasks
to be learned. Secondly, they discard all the biological variables: they

focus on stimuli, responses, and the effects of the latter (in particular
reward and punishment), thus bypassing the central nervous system.
Thirdly, in each model the central hypothesis is a formula for the probability of respor.se of a subject as c. function of the number of trials. This
function varies from one model to the other. In any case, what is usually
called a 'stochastic learning model' is actually the central hypothesis of a
specific theory (=theoretical model) in consonance with the general frame·
work of learning theory. (The hypothesis in question is central by virtue
of being accompanied by subsidiary hypothesis concerning either the
mathematical structure of the constructs involved or their factual content.)
In sum, once a model of the thing has been conceived, the model has
got to be characterized in exact terms with the help of mathematical concepts, such as those of function and series. If possible, the resulting
specific theory should be inserted into a comprehensive theoretical schema.
This, a common practice in the physical sciences, is hardly possible in the
new sciences, rich though they are in grandiose but woolly conceptions.
Backward disciplines include at most such conceptions, developing areas
have only theoretical models, and advanced fields include both theoretical
models and vast theories that make room for theoretical models. (Recall
Chapter 2.)

5.

THEORETICAL MODELS

Not all model objects are conceptual and those which are may not be
theoretical models although they can constitute bases for such specific
theories. A necklace of multicolored beads can represent a chain polymer,
and a sociogram may represent some of the relations among the individuals in a community, but the former is a physical model or analogue while
the latter is just a data display. Even the Watson-Crick model of DNA is
a model object which, at the time of writing, is still in search of a full
theoretical description, or expansion into a theoretical model. In order
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to obtain a theoretical model, the model object must be either blown up
or embedded into a theoretical framework. Upon being absorbed by a
theory, whether existing or created ad hoc, the model object inherits the
peculiarities of the theory and, in particular, whatever law statements the
theory may contain. Thus a model cell, if adjoined to the general theory
of di!Tusion, will satisfy the latter's diffusion equation: otherwise it will
not be able to mirror an intracellular diffusion process.
Let M=(S, P1 , /' 2 , ••• , P"_ 1 ) be a model of a concrete object of the
kind R, i.e. let M R. Further, assume that the various coordinates of
M are logically independent from one another, i.e., not interdefir.able.
Then any consistent set of conditions (postulates) specifying the structure
(mathematical nature) of then primitive concepts, as well as their factua!
meaning, will be a theoretical model of R. In other words, a theoretical
model of a collection R of things is a hypothetico-deductive system with
primitive base M. (The axiomatizability condition is sufficient but not
necessary for getting a theoretical mo~el, but it is necessary in order to
give a quick and exact definition Qf the concept.) Wheth(!r any given
theoretical model is true to some extent is another matter.
Any theoretical model of a concrete object is bound to fall short of
the complexity of its referent, but in any case it is far richer than the bare
model object, which is just a list of traits of the concrete object. Thus if
a planet is modeled as a mass point, or even as a ball, not much is said.
It is only by further assuming that such a model satisfies certain law
statements, in particular laws of motion, that we get a piece of scientific
knowledge. Look at a few more examples:

=

Thing or fact
(referent)

Model object
(conceptual schema)

Theoretical model
(specific theory)

Deuteron
Solute in dilute solution
Traffic at rush hour

Proton-neutron potential
well
Perfect gas
Continuous flow

Learning organism

Markovian black box

Bunch of singing cicadas

Collection of coupled
oscillators

Enterprise

Flowchart

Quantum mechanics of the
p-n potential well
Kinetic theory of gases
Mathematical theory of
traffic flow
Bush and Mostellcr's
linear operator model
Statistical mechanics of an
ensemble of coupled
oscillators
Inventory theory
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6. FROM THE BLACK BOX TO THE MECHANISM
There are many kinds of model object and, consequently, of theoretical
model. At one end of the spectrum we find the black box equipped only
with input and output terminals. At the other end we find the box filled
up with mechanisms, more or less bidden, serving to explain the external
behavior of the box. The natural course (but not necessarily the historical one) is to start with the simplest model object, one without a structure. One then proceeds to assign a simple structure, e.g., by dividing the
o:iginal box into two, and he may continue this process of successive
complications till whatever was to be explained gets ir. fact explained.
Since the hypothesized mechanisms are not usually on display, they must
be conjectured. This conjecturing may or may not be based on existing
knowledge: for example, the mechanism may be assumed to consist in
a known field or in a newly invented one. In either case the game is not
just to account for appearance (observable behavior) at any price, but to
try to guess the actual mechanism. In other words, it is not a question of
imitating Ptolemy's epicycles or even the "virtual" particles and processes
of contemporary physics, which discharge only computation duties but
have no real referents (Bunge, 197ld). Hypothetical mechanisms should
be taken seriously, as representing the innards of the thing. To take such
conjectures seriously is to demand that they be empirically testable: an
occult mechanism that fails to show up in any distinctive way, that stays
aloof from the known portion of the net of laws, and that is contrived
only to comply with the data, is no more than a makeshift.
Consider any system whatever, machine or animal, molecule or institution, and assume we wish to describe and predict its behavior without for
the moment being com:erned with either the composition of the processes
that may occur inside the system. In this case one will build a black box
model that will constitute a representation of the global functioning of
the system - just like the idea a young child has of a TV set. Assume
further that all environmental factors but one are disregarded, and call
I the strength of that factor, or input. Assume also that the system has a
single property that is influenced by the input: call 0 the intensity of the
output, or response of the system to the environmental stimuli /. The
simplest representation of the events involving the box will be a table
displaying the various couples (/, 0) of the values of the input and the

205

102

METHOD, MODEL AND MATTER

corresponding output. Each evenl will then be represented by one such
ordered couple, which will be a model event. But this description of the
model is too coarse and uneconomical. We shall gain by replacing the
table of observed values by a hypothesized general formula relating the
set of input v.ilucs to the set of output values (or some function of it).
Such a formula will represent, in a concise and general fashion, the behavior of the model system without saying a word about the events going
on inside the system. If the formula is related to other formulas, and
particularly if one succeeds in inserting it into a general theory, one will
get a black box model of the system. Such a simplistic representation may
temporarily assuage our cognitive thirst, particularly ii our ultimate go::.!
is to use the system rather than to know all about it or to improve on it.
The next stage in the theoretical investigation of the system will consist
in introducing further variables of the same types (inputs and outputs). A
time may come when one or more variables of a third type will have to be
introduced, namely variables S specifying the internal state of the system.
The law of the system, or rather a scliematic representation of one of its
Jaws, will then be a formula tying up the three sets of variables,/, 0, and
S, or rather a whole bunch of formulas involving these variables. If the
system cannot only react in a certain manner, i.e., in conformity with a
definite Jaw, but can also jump into some other form of behavior, be it
spontaneously or under the influence of an external stimulus, then the
theoretical model will have to be enriched with the laws of such a behavior
change. (Think of a watch used as a projectile or of an individual taking an
LSD dose.) In any case a theoretical model of the behavior of a system is a
set of statements, preferably mathematical formulas, relating the exogenous
variables I and 0 and the endogenous variables S of the system. Since no
mechanism has been conjectured, the box is still dark; but since it has
been assigned internal states, it is grey rather than black. In other words,
the theoretical model includes endogenous variables but the latter do not
represent any detail of the inner structure of the system: they are just
intervening variables with a computational rather than representational
value. (For a rich set of black and grey boxes, see Zadeh and Desoer,
1963. For a general black box framework, see Bunge, 1963b, and for a
philosophical analysis see Bunge, 1964.)
A beharior model of a system will satisfy the requirements of empiricist
philosophies (positivism, pragmatism, operationism, phenomenalism) as
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well as of conventionalism since, without going much beyond the data, it
enables one to condense the latter and even to predict the evolution of the
system. But no model of this kind, be it a black box or a grey one, will
explain the behavior both external and internal of the system. Moreover
it will remain isolated from the rest of our knowledge of things or at least
it will make no use of it. To obtain such an explanation and Lo establish
contacts with other theories and, a fortiori, with other disciplines, we shall
have to try a build-up model of the same system, i.e. we must disclose the
inner structure and the mechanism of it. (That every system has an inner
structure and mechanism, is a rather bold metaphysical assumption that
has always er.couraged research, whereas the black box paradigm encourages superficiality.) Such a disclosure is not difficult to perform in the
case of a clock, at least if we remain content with a rnacrodescription. But
in general, whether we have to do with light or with chemical bonds, with
thought or with institutions, the task is hard and probably open ended.
The reason for this is that most of the structures and mechanisms responsible for appearance are hidden to the senses. Hence, instead of attempting
to see them we must try to imagine them. Even if we finally succeed in observing a part of the inner structure and mechanism, we shall have made
hypotheses and shall have checked them. For example, to explain the
semiphenomenological law of multiple proportions we must posit molecules made up of atoms. Thus, by assuming that the water molecule is
composed of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom, we account for
the macrofact that two volumes of hydrogen combine with exactly one
volume of oxygen. (Incidentally, this hypothesis was rejected by the energetists of the turn of the century, who argued along positivist lines against
the positing of any hidden structure and mechanism: thermodynamics, a
grey box theory, was enough for them.)
To most drivers a car is a black box: they operate the leversand
switches knowing what behavior they will induce thereby but they know
little if anything about the engine and the transmission mechanism.
Likewise most computer users know how to operate computers but have
only faint ideas about their build-up. To a machine designer, on the
other hand, a car and a computer are transparent or at least translucid
boxes rather than black ones. (However, every single component of a
machine may be handled, for practical purposes, as a black box. It behoves the physicist or the chemist, rather than the engineer, to find out

207

104

METHOD, MODEL AND MATTER

what is inside the box.) It would be absurd to laugh at drivers and computer
programmers for taking a phenomenological approach with respect to the
machines they operate since, unlike the engineer, the user of a machine is
is supposed to treat it as a means not as an end. But it would be equally
absurd to criticize research engineers for not remaining satisfied with the
external approach and for wishing to know whal mechanism each switch
controls. Yet that is precisely what the behaviorist (phenomenalist, positivist, black boxist) philosophy does: it derides all those who inquire into
the modus op<'ra11di of tl1ings. In particular, black boxism discourages the
attempt to unveil the neurophysiological mechanisms of the mind: it asserts not only that psychology can bypass the brain in a first stage of research, but that it must do so as a matter of principle. Enforcing black
boxism in science would be like banning car designers and mechanics:
after a while there would be no more cars to be driven. In sum, while the
black box is a useful model, it should be only a preliminary one.
An aim of research is to throw further light into every box. As far as the
theoretician is concerned this task is one of invention rather than discovery. There is considerable leeway in the transition from a black box to a
translucid box. Indeed the functioning of a black box may be explained
by infinitely many hypotheses concerning the underlying mechanisms.
For every function/ relating the inputs I to the outputs 0 there are infinitely many pairs of functions g and h such that g maps the set I of inputs
into a set S of intermediaries (e.g., internal states) and h maps S into the
set 0 of outputs, subject to the condition that the composition of g and h
equals the given function/ If the intervening variables are interpreted in
factual (e.g. biological) terms, then one gets infinitely many possible mechanisms for every black box - provided the various hypotheses are not
required to be in tune with any known laws of nature.
Empiricists hold this ambiguity to be a shortcoming of any model that
covers more than the observable external behavior. On the other hand
realists regard that as a virtue of the translucid box approach for, if one
is lucky enough to find (or rather invent) the real mechanism, then the
apparent behavior remains uniquely determined by that mechanism,
whereas the converse is false. In other words, if a mechanism is posited
then one derives its behavior, whereas if the latter is given the former can
only be guessed. (Inferring behavior from mechanism is a direct problem;
conjecturing mechanism from behavior is an inverse problem, hence a
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much harder one.) Any such guess must of course be checked. The outcome of such a control may be regarded as successful, i.e. the mechanism
hypothesis may be taken to be confirmed pro tempore if it satisfies the
following conditions: (a) it accounts for the observed behavior; (h) it
predicts new facts, not covered by the black box model, and some such
predictions are borne out by new observations or experiments; and (c) it
is consistent with the bulk of the known Jaw statements. (For a list of criteria for the evaluation of scientific theories sec Bunge, I 967a, Chapter 15.)
One may then propose a variety of models of any given system: the
black box, the grey box with internal states, or the translucid box equipped
with a mechanism. One may try causal boxes or stochastic boxes, i.e. boxes
with random features built into them. One may build single level boxes
(e.g., physica! models) or multilevel boxes (e.g., psychosocial models). The
choice among these various model objects and the corresponding theoretical models depends not only upon the nature of the system itself but also
upon the goal of the investigator. If the aim is just to handle a system,
then a black box may suffice. But if one wishes to understand how the
system works, be it out of intellectual curiosity or with a view to improving
on it, then he must imagine more complex models enjoying the support of
general theories as well as of new experiments. As an eminent biologist
wrote a propos of muscle models (Pringle, 1960), the postulation of a
conceptual model is unnecessary if the goal is the synthesis of data: in this
case the goodness of fit is the only requirement. But if the objective is
further data analysis, or the construction of a compass for a deeper experimental exploration, then it will be necessary to imagine theoretical models,
which alone will justify adopting a given "empirical curve" rather than any
other curve fitting thP. same empirical data. In sum, it is up to us to decide
which road to take: superficial knowledge (description and prediction of
behavior) or deep knowledge (explanation and ability to explain unheardof effects). But in either case we have to do with the construction of model
objects and theoretical models of supposedly real things.

7.

GENERATING THEORETICAL MODELS

In some fields of research the theoretical model is built around the
model object. Jn others the model object can often be attached to an
existing general theory. Thus in contemporary mathematical sociology
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there is hardly a generic theory: here every theory proper (as distinct from
a vague view) is specific and the various specific theories do not seem to
assemble into a single comprehensive theory. On the other hand in atomic
and molecular physics the construction of theoretical models usually consists in applying a generic theory (frequently quantum mechanics) to
models of the thing concerned. Thus, if we wish to generate theoretical
models of the carbon atom, we try symbolic models of it (namely, hamil·
tonian operators that gather basic properties such as the number of electrons and their interactions) and plug such model object:> into the general
theory.
Any given model object can, within bounds, be conjoined with a number
of gi!neral theories to yield as many different theoretic~l models (specific
theories) of the real object concerned. Example: the model of a gas r.s a
swarm of point particles connected by van der Waals forces may be
inserted either in classical or in rel;itivistic partiele mechanics, to yieid two
different theoretical models of the gas. Conversely, a number of model
objects can be associated to any £i~cn general theory provided they are
couched in the language of the latter. Example: assume different particle
shapes and different force laws but keep classical mechanics throughout:
you will obtain different theoretical models of the gas. Whenever general
theories are available, theoretical models can then be generated in either
of two ways: either by embedding a given model object into different
general theories, or by grafting different model objects onto a given generic
framework. In either case a theoretical model is a generic theory together
with a model object. More precisely, when a generic theory Tg is available,
a theoretical model or specific theory T. can be built by adjoining to T,
a set S of subsidiary hypotheses, i.e. T.= Tu u S. These subsidiary hypotheses characterize ("define") a given model object.
This does not hold for the developing areas of science, where most of
the time model construction proceeds centrifugally, out of model objects.
Here one starts out from some M and tries to weave a net of formulas
characterizing Min as precise a manner as possible. Consequently problem solving is hardest in the underdeveloped fields of research: here one
must make a fresh start almost every time, relying only on data on the one
hand and on pure mathematics on the other, without the guide of a comprehensive framework. Such a guide can often be taken for granted in the
more advanced areas. For instance, nowadays the theoretical meteorologist
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starts from the general equations of hydrodynamics and thermodynamics,
which are assumed to hold regardless of the atmospheric composition. I lis
job is often to contrive a set of subsidiary assumptions representing the
composition of the real atmosphere - i.e., to devise a model atmosphere.
Atmosphere pollution by industry, as well as atmospheric clean-up, will
force him to change the model object, hence the theoretical model of the
atmosphere - not however the general equations. This enviable position
is certainly not the one attained so far by psychologists and sociologists,
who are still waiting for their second conceptual revolution - the first one
having been the introduction of mathematical models.
8. MODELS AND TESTABILITY
Particular theoretical problems, that is, problems concerning the representation of specific situations, can be posed and solved only within
specific theories of some scope or other. By the same token, only specific
theories (theoretical models) are empirically testable: the general theories
yield no particular conclusion, hence no precisely testable one. Thus, in
the case of mechanics, if we wish to find, say, the modes of oscillation of
a particular structure, such as a shell, we have to specify the external forces,
the mass and stress distributions, the constitutive equations of the material, and the boundary and initial conditions - in short. we have to enrich
the general theory with a definite model shell. In sum, model-free theories
are not empirically testable.
A first conclusion: both the ability to solve particular theoretical problems and the empirical testability of a theory are inversely related to the
logical strength of the theory. Second: the testing of general theories calls
for the production of specific ones: by themselves, the extremely general
theories, such as information theory, and even theories of intermediate
breadth, such as quantum mechanics, are untestable, as was argued in
Chapter 2. What can be tested is only a specific theory, i.e., a theoretical
model, whether or not it is the outcome of attaching a model object to a
generic theory. Third, in testing a theoretical model in an advanced field,
where comprehensive theories are available, it is not always clear which is
to be blamed in case of failure: whether the general theory, or the model
object, or both - even assuming the data themselves to be blameless. Let
us take a closer look at this situation.
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If the theoretical model T. disagrees with the facts and if one can be
reasonably certain that this dissonance is not the fault of the empirical
dala, then the theoretical ideas will have to be revised. If T. is not embedded
in a comprehensive framework, then one has to try different central
hypotheses, leading to as many alternative theoretical models. But if '1~
is embedded in a generic theory, then we have a double infinity of possible
alternatives. In fact, in this case one may either change the model object
M characterized by T. without touching the generic framework T~, or
one may keep M and adopt or construct a different general theory Ts.
Thus, if certain calculations on the propagation of light in the vicinity of
the sun do not agree with the data, then one may try either complicating
the model of the sun (e.g., rotating ellipsoid instead of mass point), or
changing the general theory of gravitation or that of light. The type of
change one may find advisable will depend critically on the services rendered in the past by both the general theory and the model object. If the
comprehensive framework has had a distinguished career or if the model
object is obviously much too coarse, then it will be wise to keep the former
and try an alternative model object. (If Dicke and Brans had taken this
methodological rule into account they might not have proposed an alternative to Einstein's gravitation theory.) But if the general theory has failed
in the past, or else if it is very young and cannot be assigned a truth value,
then it will be advisable to try alternative theoretical systems with a wide
scope. In any case, the verification procedure of such a generic theory
cannot dispense with the construction of a number of model objects, and
the test of any theoretical model can become as involved as one wishes
(see Bunge, 1970). So complex indeed that no clear cut decision is attainable in some cases. For example, to date one does not know which of the
various stochastic models of learning is the truest, even though they are
quite different from one another (see Sternberg, 1963; Ritchie, 1965). All
of which casts doubts on the simplistic methodologies of science advising
us to adopt a theory if, and only if, it agrees with the evidence.

9.

MODELS, MECHANISMS, ANALOGS, PICTURES

Every hypothetical mechanism of a process is a model object but the
converse is not true: not every conceptual model sketches a mechanism.
Thus a black box is a model that ignores inner mechanisms. Moreover
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mechanism models need not be mechanical or mechanistic. Thus the
mechanisms of electromagnetic propagation, of complex chemical reactions, and of biological evolution, are nonmechanical, i.e., they arc modeled in ways that are foreign to mechanics. At any rate the frequent identification of model object with mechanism - an identification inherited from
the mechanistic period of physics - is mistaken.
Nor need model objects be deterministic: they may be probabilistic.
In other words, some or even all of the predicates occurring in a model
object may be random variables. Thus every specific stochastic learning
model is cer.tered on some formula expressing the response probability at
the nth trial as a function of the event(s) preceding that trial. Any such
formula may be taken either at its face value or as representing a definite
random process. In the latter case it will be said to embody a stochastic
model, or a chance mechanism, of the process.
Also, while some models are literal and unfamiliar, others are analogical, i.e., conceived in imitation of familiar situations. Thus an unrcliahlc
person may be regarded as simiJar to a vending machine out of order, that
delivers the goods only a fraction of the times it swallows a dime. This is
an example of an analog or simulate: the real thing (the unreliable fellow)
is modeled on a model of a known kind (a machine out of kilter), and the
resulting model object can be embedded in a generic theory, namely the
theory of Markovian machines. Conceptual analogs can of course be as
respectable as material analogs or simulates, but the point is that they
constitute a proper subset of the set of model objects. Many, perhaps most,
model objects are literal and more or less uncanny (to the layman) rather
than analogical and familiar. Thus there are no adequate analogical models of electrons, ecosystems, and markets. Furthermore, the insistence on
analogical models, such as the particle and the wave analogies, is responsible for a great deal of confusion in the quantum theory (Bunge, J967e).
At any rate, the characterization of the model object as a metaphor, which
has recently been revived (Black, 1962; Hesse, 1966), is misleading.
The same holds, a fortiori, for the diagram, which - except in pure
mathematics - may be regarded as a kind of analog. In factual science a
diagram is a visual and sketchy representation of a model object: it
pictures the latter without replacing it. Being more or less conventional,
a diagram is not a unique representation ofits referent and is consequently
unintelligible unless accompanied by some interpretation code. The vari-
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lHIS piclures ,1f a model object need not be isomorphic tu one another and
consequently they cannot replace the object they picture even though lhey
can help to understand it. For example, the allernative representations of
the motion of a set of coupled oscillators, in usual coordinates and in
"normal" (interaction-free) coordinates, are theoretically equivalent,
whereas the corresponding symbolic diagrams are not: while in the former
case the various dots ••re linked with springs, in the latter case they arc
unauad1cd. At any rate, pictorial diagrams arc not part and parcel of
factual thel>rctical science although they may illuslrale some parts of a
theory in equivocal ways. They are not for the simple reason that a theory
is, by definition, a set of statements not a mixture of statements and
pictures. Pictures and, in general, metaphors, may occur in the process of
building, learning, teaching or applying a theory but they are not part of
the theory.
In summary, there are many kinds of model object: mechanical and
nonmechanical, deterministic and stochastic, literal and analogical, figurative and symbolic - and so on. None of these properties is desirable in
itself, for what makes a model ooject work is something else, namely its
being an idea concerning some aspects of a thing or of a fact, and as such
something that can be expanded into a hypothetico-deductive system.

10. THEORETICAL MODELS AND SEMANTICAL MODELS
In semantics, and particularly in model theory (the semantics of pure
mathematics), the term 'model' signifies an interpretation of an abstract
theory, under which (interpretation) all the statements of the theory are
satisfied (or true). For example, since the integers (Z) satisfy ring theory,
the structure ;t'=(Z, +, ·, 0, 1) is a model of ring theory, itself an abstract theory admitting alternative models. What is the relation between
this semantic concept of model and the metascientific concepts of model
object and theoretical model? Clearly every scientific theory, whether
generic or specific, is an interpreted theory in the sense that, if properly
formulated, it contains both designation rules and semantic assumptions
endowing the formalism with a factual content. (Recall Chapter 4.) Moreover, if such an interpreted theory did turn out to be wholly true it would
qualify as a model, in the semantic sense, of the underlying abstract formalism. But things arc not quite so simple.
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Firstly, not all theoretical models have been subjected to tests for truth:
consequently they cannot all be assigned a truth value. Secondly, every
tested theoretical model proves to be at best partially true in the sense that,
with toil and luck, some of its testable statements turn out to be approximately true. Therefore no theoretical model is, strictly speaking, a model
in the model-theoretic sense, for this requires the exact satisfaction of
every formula in the theory. Nor is it true that all semantical models are
models in the metascientific sense. Thus ad hoc models and mathematical
model;; (interpretations within mathematics) mirror no real systems. Since
the arrow points in neither direction, the semantic and the metascientific
concepts of model do not coincide - pace Suppes (196 l ). What might be
said is that a theoretical model that has been given a pass mark constitutes
a quasimodel of its underlying formalism. But this semantic concept .of
quasimodel has yet to be ehlcidated. In any even!, the model-theoretic or
semantic concept of a model fails to capture the metascientific concepts of
model. A simple example will bear out this conclusion.
Consider the following system of signs

Al
A2
A3
A4
AS

S ::P 0.
(a) F: S-+ R. (b) G: S x S-+ R. (c) H: S x S-+ R.
s, s' e S => H (s, s') = h e R.
(a)O:RxR-+R. (b)O:RxR-+R.
s, s' e S => G(s, s') = hO [F(s') OF(s)]

This system of signs is nonsignificant. We may assign it as many meanings as interpretation codes we care to adjoin it. Let us do it in two stages.
In a first stage Jet us interpret the capital letters either as sets or as functions, according to the context. Moreover, we shall stipulate that 'R'
stands for the real line, 'O' for the arithmetic product, and 'D' for subtraction; the remaining symbols shall be assigned the standard interpretation. In this way we obtain the following interpreted system
Fl
F2
F3
F4

S is a non-empty set.
(a) F is a real valued function on S.

(b) G and H are real
valued functions on the set of pairs of members of S.
His the constant function with value /z.
For every sands' in S, G(s, s')=lz[F(s')-F(s)].
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This is a form:llism interpreted within pure mathematics. It makes no
sense outside mathematics. In particular, it is not a theoretical model in
any metascientific sense of the term, for it does not concern anything
extramathematical: the basic set Sis an arbitrary (abstract) set and therefore the functions F, G, and H cannot represent any concrete properties.
Precisely this renders the formalism valuable from a scientific point of
view, for it is a ready-made dummy that can be clothed in a number of
ways.
To transform the preceding formalism into a theoretical model of a
concrete thing it is necessary and sufficie.it that the primitive concepts
S, F, G, and H be interpreted in such a way that the resulting theory will
in fact concern real (or supposedly real) objects. See here two, among
many other, possible factual interpretations of the preceding formalism:
Symbol

Physical interpretation

Sociological interpretation

s

Point on a d.c. electric circuit
Electrical potential at s

Country
Enticement offered bys
(e.g.• standard of living)
Migratory pressure from s to s'

F(s)

G(s, s')
H(s,s')

Intensity of current between
sands'
Conductivity betweens ands'

Permeability of the border between
.sands'.

The very same formalism is of course susceptible to further alternative
interpretations in factual terms. For example, if Sis interpreted as the set
of bodies, Fas the temperature, Gas the quantity of heat per unit mass,
and H as the specific heat at constant volume, we get the nucleus of
elementary thermology. If we interpret Sas the academic body, Fas the
number of publications, G as professional jealousy, and H as natural
hatred, we obtain a theoretical model of an important aspect of Academe.
In sum, we have alternative semantical models of an abstract structure and
each of them seems to be a theoretical model of some real system.
But this is just a first approximation. We know, in fact, that the first
model is inadequate (false) at low temperatures. The second model does
not seem to have been subjected to an empirical test, so that we can assign
it no truth value. This situation is not exceptional but common. Indeed,
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all the theoretical models that have been checked prove to be more or less
distant from full truth: they are not and they could not possibly be completely true, since they all involve simplifications. Consequently every
theoretical model is, in the best of cases, a quasimode1 in the sense that
its formulas are (at best) satisfied only approximately by reality. Therefore
the model-theoretic concept of a model does not coincide with either of
the two metascientific notions of model. Which shows that model theory
is not enough to constitute the semantics of science, and suggcl>ls that the
very term 'theoretical model' (and also 'mathematical model') would be
advantageously replaced by 'specific theory'.
11. CONCLUSION
To surr. up, the terrr. 'model' designates a whole set of concepts that should
be distinguished. 1n theoretical science, whether natural or social, the
term seems to have been assigned two main significations: (a) that of
schematic representation of a concrete object (i.e., model object), and (b)
that of theory characterizing a model object. A theoretical model lives as
long as experience tolerates it. On the other hand a general theory Jives
as Jong as it can generate reasonably true theoretical models. Being special
purpose devices, theoretical models are transient and disposable as compared to general theories. The latter, being more adaptable, last longer.
While the young sciences can boast, if at all, of their theoretical models,
a mature and healthy science evolves theories of both kinds.
NOTE
• Based on Bunge (1968c, 1969c).
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